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Abstract
In recent decades, observers of American politics noticed a growing divide in the voting
behavior of individuals with and without a college education. Today, Americans with a college
degree are much more likely to support the Democratic Party and those without a college degree
are much more likely to support the Republican Party. This trend, concentrated among whites, is
a reversal of voting behavior in the past. I call this reversal the education realignment: the
movement of college educated whites from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party; and of
non-college educated whites from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party. While there has
been much work conducted on the causes of this realignment, there is less work on its effects. This
dissertation attempts to fill that gap in our understanding of this phenomenon by examining the
effects of the education realignment on party position taking.
Because public opinion research finds a consistent effect of educational attainment on a
wide variety of political attitudes, this dissertation hypothesizes the removal of less educated voters
and addition of highly educated voters in the Democratic Party and the opposite in the Republican
Party are likely to affect the kinds of positions both parties take. Specifically, I expect the parties
to become more internally united yet further apart from one another on social issues; and to become
more internally divided yet closer together on economic issues. This is based on research which
finds greater education is associated with more liberal positions on social issues and more
conservative positions on economic issues. The theory presented here builds on prior work on
party position taking which argued changes in a party’s coalition can have significant effects on
the kinds of positions that party takes.
I test this theory using three different issue areas: (1) LGBTQ+ rights; (2) environmental
protection; and (3) economic regulation. Party position taking is measured as the positions taken

by both parties’ members in the U.S. Congress; and I use data from congressional scorecards
produced by interest groups who lobby on these three issue areas. I track outliers in both parties
on these issues over time and examine whether these outliers were affected by the education
realignment. On the two social issue cases, LGBTQ+ rights and environmental protection, I find
strong support for my theory: the education realignment contributed to the removal of socially
liberal Republicans and socially conservative Democrats in Congress; and they were replaced by
socially liberal Democrats and socially conservative Republicans respectively. This resulted in
more polarized parties on social issues, but also parties which were in greater agreement on these
issues than in years past.
Less support is found for the education realignment affecting party position taking on
economic regulation, especially for the Republican Party. Despite increasingly drawing their
support from more economically populist, less educated voters, Republicans in Congress maintain
very conservative positions on economic policy. There are more robust findings among
Democrats: The chief effect of the education realignment was the transformation of who economic
conservatives in the Democratic Party are and what kinds of constituents they represent. Whereas
in years past, conservative Democrats hailed from less educated constituencies and were outliers
on both economic and social issues, today’s typical conservative Democrat represents highly
educated voters and are only outliers on economic policy.
This dissertation finds support for the education realignment affecting party position
taking, with the greatest effects on social issues rather than economic issues. As the realignment
progresses, these effects should only become more prominent.
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Chapter 1. Introduction

“This district is pro-life, pro-gun, and pro-working families.”
- David Haynes, Northern Michigan University (Gilgoff 2010)
The congressional district referred to here is Michigan’s First Congressional District,
which was long occupied by Democrat Bart Stupak. First elected in 1992, Stupak established
himself as a relatively liberal Democrat on economic issues: he routinely voted against free trade
agreements and supported withdrawing the United States from the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) throughout his time in Congress (Barber 2010). He also supported a more
progressive tax policy and voted against the “Bush tax cuts” to the wealthy in 2001.1 At the same
time, Stupak took much more conservative stances on social issues, especially on abortion rights:
Stupak was staunchly pro-life, which put him at odds with most of his Democratic colleagues.
This tension between Stupak and the Democratic Party over abortion rights exploded
during the effort to pass the eventual Affordable Health Care Act in 2009. With Barack Obama
newly inaugurated as president and Democrats holding large majorities in both chambers of
Congress, the party wanted to use its political capital to pass a major health care reform bill that
would expand health care access for millions of Americans. This effort hit a major roadblock when
Stupak, along with Republican Joe Pitts of Pennsylvania, introduced a controversial amendment
to the health care bill. The amendment would prevent any individuals who purchased health care
plans which covered abortion procedures from receiving subsidies from the federal government

1

Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, H.R. 1836, 107th Congress (2001).
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towards their insurance premiums. Stupak and Pitts argued this amendment was necessary to
maintain the Hyde amendment, the federal policy which for decades outlawed any federal funds
for abortions (MacGillis 2009).
Stupak and other pro-life Democrats informed Democratic leaders that they would not
support the broader bill unless the amendment was included. This eventually forced Democratic
Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to allow a vote on the amendment on the House floor. 64
Democrats and every Republican voted for the amendment, and it would be included in the
language of the bill the House of Representatives passed in the fall of 2009 (Thrush 2009). This
was a victory for pro-life advocates and a defeat for supporters of abortion rights;2 and this made
Stupak somewhat of a pariah in the Democratic Party. He subsequently decided to not run for
reelection the following year; and his district was won by Republican Dan Benishek and no
Democrat has won it since.
As the above quote describes, this was a district whose constituents may support economic
policies from the left to help working families like restricting free trade or requiring the wealthy
to pay more taxes, but they also support conservative social policies like restricting abortion access
and easing gun control laws. Those were the politics of a Democrat like Bart Stupak, but
increasingly, Democrats like Stupak and the constituents he represented are an endangered species.
The near extinction of economically liberal and socially conservative Democrats is a byproduct of
the education realignment: the realignment of non-college educated whites from the Democratic
Party to the Republican Party and of college educated whites from the Republican Party to the
Democratic Party.

2

The Stupak-Pitts amendment was not included in the final bill passed in 2010. It was stripped out in the Senate
version of the bill, but Stupak and his allies agreed to support the bill after they were assured by President Obama that
he would sign an executive order barring any funds from the Affordable Care Act being used to pay for abortions
(Montgomery and Murray 2010).
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Stupak’s district was one populated with many non-college educated whites. At the time
Stupak left office, his district was over 92% white and the percent of constituents who received a
college education was 10% below the national average. It was also a district which narrowly voted
for Barack Obama for president in 2008, but also which Joe Biden lost by twenty points in 2020.
As the education realignment progresses, Democrats have come to lose many such districts and
states around the country; and these electoral losses come with the loss of a certain kind of
economically populist and socially conservative Democrat in Congress. Such losses transform the
composition of the Democratic Party and importantly, the kinds of positions the party is likely to
take. These transformations, along with those produced by the education realignment in the
Republican Party are the focus of this dissertation.

1.1. The Education Realignment and Party Position Taking
American party politics is increasingly divided by education: today, college educated
voters are much more likely to support the Democratic Party; and non-college educated voters are
much more likely to support the Republican Party. This is a reversal of past voting behavior, in
which the relationship between educational attainment and partisanship was in the other direction.
This is also a pattern primarily observed among white Americans; and is well documented by
recent scholarship (Miller and Schofield 2008; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018; Kitschelt and
Rehm 2019; Zingher 2022). Many argue this education realignment is the result of a greater focus
on social issues over economic issues in American politics in recent decades. College educated
whites typically hold more conservative views on economic issues and more liberal views on social
issues; and the opposite is true for non-college educated whites (Phelan et al. 1995; Campbell and
Horowitz 2016; Broćić and Miles 2021; Bullock 2021). In periods when economic policy is very
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salient, college educated whites are drawn to the Republican Party and non-college educated
whites are drawn to the Democratic Party; but the opposite can be expected when social policy is
salient.
In recent decades, social issues garnered more attention and the expected shifts among
voters based on their educational attainment occurred. This results in a Democratic Party with a
greater concentration of college educated, affluent voters and a Republican Party with a greater
concentration of non-college educated, working class voters. Both groups of voters have a distinct
set of issue positions – so what is the effect of introducing these new groups of voters into each
party? Relatedly, what is the effect of the Democratic Party losing non-college educated whites
and the Republican Party losing college educated whites? These questions about the effect of the
education realignment on both parties are the primary research questions of this dissertation.
Specifically, this dissertation is interested in the effects of the education realignment on party
position taking.
Prior theories on party position taking highlight the power changes in a political party’s
coalition have in determining the kinds of positions a party will take (Wolbrecht 2000; Karol 2009;
Baylor 2017). I utilize those theories to argue that the education realignment, which is transforming
both the Democratic and Republican coalitions, will change the positions both parties adopt. As
Democrats lose less educated voters and gain highly educated voters, I argue they will adopt more
liberal positions on social issues and more conservative positions on economic issues. This is in
line with the transformation of preferences among their coalition. The opposite should occur
among Republicans as they lose highly educated voters and gain less educated voters. Because the
Democratic Party is predisposed to taking liberal positions on both social and economic issues and
the Republican Party is predisposed to taking conservative positions, this will create greater

4

intraparty agreement on social issues and greater intraparty conflict on economic issues in both
parties.
Such changes in party position taking will be engineered through the removal of existing
party elites and addition of new party elites as part of the education realignment. The education
realignment is leading Democrats to lose congressional districts and states with low levels of
educational attainment and win districts and states with high levels of educational attainment.
Democrats who represented the former kind of constituency were often socially conservative and
economically liberal or progressive, like Stupak. Those types of Democrats are leaving and newly
elected Democrats who represent highly educated constituencies are more socially liberal, but also
may be more economically conservative. An opposite pattern is likely for Republicans. The
number of socially liberal and economically conservative Republicans from highly educated
districts and states is dwindling, while the number of socially conservative and economically
populist Republicans from less educated constituencies should increase.
The education realignment can help explain several key developments in American
national party politics in recent years. Beyond explaining what happened to members of Congress
like Bart Stupak, it can explain why the parties continue to polarize on social issues in recent years.
On issues like abortion, LGBTQ+ rights,3 racial equality, and climate change, there were often
politicians who took both sides of the issue in both parties, but now socially conservative
Democrats and socially liberal Republicans are rare in the halls of Congress. This then filters up
to the kinds of policies both parties promote: Why did Democrats begin to support the legalization
of same-sex marriage? Why do Republicans seem so opposed to addressing or even believing in
climate change? I argue the education realignment is key to answering such questions.

3

The term LGBTQ+ refers to the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer community.
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At the same time, it may also explain developments on economic policy in both parties:
Why was a candidate like Donald Trump who espoused populist positions like raising tariffs so
successful in the Republican Party? Why have Democrats, whose activists push for economic
populism too, been unable to enact many of these populist policies while in power? The education
realignment creates a Republican Party which is more predisposed to supporting economically
populist positions by introducing more non-college educated voters into the coalition. It also
creates a Democratic Party with more college educated voters who are less receptive to economic
populism and an increased role of the government in the economy; and these voters will oftentimes
elect representatives who share those views. On economic policy and social policy, the education
realignment is likely to have profound effects through its effects on party position taking.

1.2. Plan of the Dissertation
To examine these effects, this dissertation will look at the effect of the education
realignment on party position taking in the United States Congress on three different issues: (1)
LGBTQ+ rights; (2) environmental protection; and (3) economic regulation. To measure party
position taking, I rely on legislative scorecards produced by relevant interest groups who lobby
Congress on these issue areas: the Human Rights Campaign, the League of Conservation Voters,
and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce respectively. I test whether the education realignment affected
party position taking on these three issues by identifying congressional outliers in both parties; and
tracking whether the education realignment contributed to the removal and/or addition of outliers
in each issue area over the course of the recent decades.4 I argue changes in the numbers of outliers
on each issue is evidence of the effect of the education realignment on party position taking.
4

More information about the selection of cases, sources of data, and choice of methods can be found in subsequent
chapters.
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The dissertation proceeds as follows: In Chapter 2, I discuss in greater detail the nature of
the education realignment and its causes. I also review prior theories of party position taking,
particularly focusing on theories concerning the effect of changes in a party’s coalition on position
taking. Using those theories and public opinion research on the relationship between educational
attainment and an individual’s political attitudes, I outline a theory of how the education
realignment will affect position taking in both the Democratic and Republican parties. This theory
predicts the realignment of both non-college educated whites from the Democratic to Republican
Party and college educated whites from the Republican to Democratic Party will increase
intraparty agreement on social issues but create more intraparty conflict on economic issues.
Furthermore, it will create more polarization on social issues, but could also lead to more crossparty alliances on economic issues.
This theory is tested in three subsequent chapters. Chapter 3 examines the effect of the
education realignment on party position taking on LGBTQ+ rights. This is a social issue on which
the parties have increasingly polarized in recent years, with Democrats supporting a wide array of
pro-LGBTQ+ policies and Republicans lining up against such policies. It is also an issue on which
greater educational attainment is associated with more liberal positions. Using data on
congressional behavior from the Human Rights Campaign, I find that the number of pro-LGBTQ+
Republicans and anti-LGBTQ+ Republicans in Congress decreased in recent decades; and that
such members represented highly educated and lowly educated constituencies respectively. Such
constituencies switched parties and pro-LGBTQ+ Republicans were replaced by pro-LGBTQ+
Democrats and anti-LGBTQ+ Democrats were replaced by anti-LGBTQ+ Republicans.
A similar patten is observed on party position taking on the environment in Chapter 4.
Environmental protection has a similar history to that of LGBTQ+ rights as an issue which once

7

engendered more bipartisan support but now is highly polarized. Highly educated individuals tend
to be more concerned for the environment and more supportive of policies designed to protect it.
As such individuals gravitate towards the Democratic Party in recent years, and less educated
individuals with more anti-environment positions gravitate towards the Republican Party, this
produces an effect on position taking on the environment in Congress. I use data from the League
of Conservation Voters’ congressional scorecard to show that many pro-environment Republicans
and anti-environment Democrats were replaced in Congress as a byproduct of the education
realignment; and they were replaced by pro-environment Democrats and anti-environment
Republicans respectively.
While Chapters 3 and 4 examine party position taking on social issues, Chapter 5 examines
position taking on economic regulation. Using data from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s
congressional scorecard, I examine outliers in both parties on this issue area. Despite public
opinion research which finds greater educational attainment is associated with more conservative
economic positions, I find a weaker relationship between member of Congress’ economic positions
and how educated their constituents are. I find outliers in both parties can come from districts and
states with low and high levels of educational attainment. But I do find effects of the education
realignment on who the current congressional outliers are on economic regulation, especially in
the Democratic Party. Whereas Democratic outliers in earlier periods often came from less
educated constituencies and were conservative on both social and economic issues, outliers in
recent years come from highly educated areas and are more conservative on economic issues but
often quite liberal on social issues. In the Republican Party, the effects are less clear.
Chapter 6 offers a brief conclusion that summarizes the theoretical expectations and
subsequent findings detailed in this dissertation. I discuss whether the findings in the empirical

8

chapters support the broader theory expressed in Chapter 2; and what the findings tell us about
both party position taking and the education realignment. I end the chapter by discussing future
avenues for research.

9

Chapter 2. Explaining the Education Realignment and Its Consequences on
Party Position-Taking

“Significant numbers of Republicans we turned out, look to have voted Democrat.”
- Fred Whitaker, Republican Party Chair of Orange County, California (Graham 2018)
Orange County in California was long considered a Republican stronghold. The southern
California county which was the birthplace of Richard Nixon and which Ronald Reagan once
described as the place “where all good Republicans go to die” voted for a Republican for president
in every election since 1940. That trend changed in 2016 when Democrat Hillary Clinton won the
county by nearly five points. That victory was attributed to the county’s growing racial and ethnic
diversity, but also the large number of college-educated voters who resided there (Mehta, Goffard
and Do 2016). Two years later, in the 2018 midterm elections, Democratic congressional
candidates won all seven of the county’s congressional districts, flipping four districts from red to
blue. This marked the first time since the 1930s that Orange County residents would not send a
Republican to represent them in Congress (Barabak, Mozingo and Finnegan 2018).
Beyond the fact that these four districts shifted parties, they also shared a common attribute:
their constituents had high educational attainments. Each district’s percentage of constituents who
held a bachelor’s degree or higher was at least ten points higher than the national average. The
four newly elected Democrats, Gil Cisneros, Mike Levin, Katie Porter, and Harley Rouda joined
a large freshmen class of House Democrats in the Capitol. Like these four, many Democrats had
flipped highly educated Republican-held districts which allowed the party to take control of the
House of Representatives for the first time in almost a decade.
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And despite Cisneros and Rouda losing reelection in 2020, Orange County still leaned
Democratic and supported Joe Biden over Donald Trump in the presidential election, albeit more
narrowly than it had supported Clinton over Trump four years earlier (Lai 2020). A year later,
Orange County continued to support Democratic candidates and voted against recalling the
incumbent Democratic governor of California, Gavin Newsom (Mouchard 2021). While
Republicans may win back some support in Orange County in the years to come, it appears that it
will remain a competitive area which is a reversal of trends in prior decades.
What happened in Orange County in the last several years is the culmination of a broader
shift in American party politics in recent years in which college-educated white voters are
becoming more likely to vote for Democrats and non-college educated whites are becoming more
likely to vote for Republicans. This is a reversal of prior voting behavior that existed throughout
much of the late twentieth century. This education realignment was in the works for many decades
but has been more pronounced and more discussed in recent years as it reshapes both the
Democratic and Republican parties’ electoral coalitions. In this chapter, I provide evidence for the
education realignment’s effects on patterns of American partisanship and discuss some of the
explanations for why this realignment began in the first place. Many of these explanations center
around the argument that the education realignment is a byproduct of greater saliency of social and
cultural issues in American politics compared to economic issues, an argument I endorse.
Next, I develop a theory of how the education realignment affected and continues to affect
the kinds of issue positions Democratic and Republican elites take. I argue the education
realignment contributes to a feedback loop between party elites and party supporters. This
feedback loop was initiated by party activist pressure beginning in the 1960s and 1970s that pulled
the parties further apart on social issues. Party supporters responded to those shifts and switched
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parties on the basis of educational attainment. These shifts in mass partisanship contributed to
further shifts among party elites, which in turn contributed to more shifts in mass partisanship.
This theory is based on prior work on party position-taking that emphasizes the influence changes
in a party’s coalition have on the kinds of positions a party takes.
This theory is also grounded in public opinion literature which finds greater educational
attainment is associated with more liberal positions on social issues and more conservative
positions on economic issues. Thus, the education realignment created an influx of socially liberal
and economically conservative voters into the Democratic coalition and socially conservative and
economically liberal voters into the Republican coalition. Consequently, we can expect differential
effects on party position-taking on social and economic issues. The chapter concludes with a
discussion of the different social and economic issues used to test this theory in this dissertation:
(1) LGBTQ+ rights; (2) environmental protection; and (3) economic regulation; and discusses the
choice to focus on congressional behavior as evidence of party position-taking.

2.1. The Education Realignment
Educational attainment has long been a demographic category important to the study of
electoral politics in the United States. It is important to political behavior as research has found
that the more educated an individual is, the more likely there are to vote (Wolfinger and
Rosenstone 1980); and participate in other ways politically (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995).
Additionally, as a college education becomes more and more common among Americans, studying
the differences between individuals who receive a college education and those who do not becomes
more salient.
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Educational attainment is also salient because it is a factor in shaping an individuals’
political preferences from policy to partisan preferences. For much of the mid- to late-twentieth
century, higher levels of educational attainment were associated with a greater likelihood to
identify as a Republican and support Republican candidates. Conversely, individuals with less
education were more likely to identify as Democrats and support Democratic candidates. This
dynamic was the legacy of the class dynamics associated with both parties’ coalitions: especially
after the 1930s and the creation of the New Deal Democratic coalition, working class Americans,
who seldom had a college education, overwhelmingly supported the Democratic Party; and
wealthy Americans, who were much more likely to possess a college degree, supported the
Republican Party. In this period when economic issues were very salient, this pattern of the
working class supporting a party which advocated for greater income redistribution and regulation
of the economy and the wealthy supporting a party which advocated for laissez-faire economics
made sense.
But as Figure 2.1 demonstrates, this pattern did not endure. Towards the latter decades of
the twentieth century, the advantage Democrats had with Americans without a college degree and
the advantage Republicans had with Americans with a college degree dwindled. In the 2000s and
2010s, the relationship between educational attainment and partisan affiliation flipped and in
recent electoral cycles, college educated Americans support the Democratic Party over the
Republican Party and the opposite is true for non-college educated Americans. These shifts also
are intertwined with race: Republicans perform better with whites at all levels of educational
attainment; and most of the shifts occurred among white Americans with non-white Americans
not shifting their partisan loyalties in the same manner as whites.
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Figure 2.1. Republican Advantage in Party Identification by Education and Race, 1952-2020
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This realignment is also impacted by gender. Figure 2.2 shows the advantage Republicans
have in electoral support by educational attainment and gender. Like race, gender mediates the
relationship between educational attainment and partisan identification. Generally, women at all
levels of educational attainment are more supportive of the Democratic Party than their male
counterparts. But I observe a difference between college educated and non-college educated
Americans regarding gender. Whereas in recent years, men and women without a college degree
have shifted towards the Republican Party at similar rates, college educated women moved

5

Exact sources of data and variables used to produce public opinion figures can be found in Appendix I.
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Figure 2.2. Republican Advantage in White Party Identification by Education and Gender, 19522020 (ANES)
40

30

Republican - Democratic Party ID

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30

-40
1952

1956

1960

1964

1968

1972

1976

1980

1984

1988

1992

1996

2000

2004

2008

2012

2016

2020

Year
High School or less (Male)

High School or less (Female)

Bachelor's degree or higher (Male)

Bachelor's degree or higher (Female)

towards the Democratic Party much more starkly than college educated men. This suggests the
shift of college educated Americans towards the Democratic Party was led by women.
So why did this shift occur? Why have we observed the relationship between educational
attainment and partisan affiliation reverse? Prior scholarship on this question pointed to the rise in
prominence of social and cultural issues in relation to economic issues (Hunter 1991; Brewer and
Stonecash 2007; Sides, Tesler and Vavreck 2018; Highton 2020). Social issues like abortion, the
environment, and LGBTQ+ rights took up a larger portion of the national political agenda
beginning in the 1970s. This followed the dominance of another social issue, race, throughout
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much of the 1960s. Race upset the existing party coalitions by pushing white Southerners out of
the Democratic Party (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Schickler 2016). I see the education
realignment as emerging out of this earlier realignment.
Some argue the rise in saliency of these cultural issues is the natural byproduct of a shift to
a post-industrial society (Manza and Brooks 1999; Norris and Inglehart 2011; Dalton 2018;
Kitschelt and Rehm 2019). The argument is that as America shifts to a post-industrial society, the
greater economic security which comes with such a shift decreases the salience of class divisions
and increases the salience of cultural divisions. Others argue the rise in prominence of cultural
issues is the result of deliberate actions by elites (Hillygus and Shields 2008; Mellow 2008; Reiter
and Stonecash 2011). Hillygus and Shields argued elites realized they could use social issues as
wedges to attract disaffected voters in the opposing party. Why social issues became more
prominent is less consequential for this project as I am primarily concerned with the effects of this
shift from economic to social issues. What is consequential is that social issues take up a larger
portion of our current political agenda, which destabilizes partisan alignments.
Hunter (1991) described the two sides of these newly salient cultural conflicts well: on one
side are “progressives” and on the other sides are the “orthodox.” Progressives are typically highly
educated professionals from the upper middle class who take more liberal stances on issues of
race, gender, and sexuality; whereas the orthodox are less educated lower-class workers who take
more conservative cultural stances. The problem was that there were many progressives in the
Republican Party and many orthodox in the Democratic Party. This was not a significant issue
when the parties were competing on economic issues, but partisan conflict turned to cultural issues
in the late twentieth century, it became a problem. Affluent, highly educated Republicans agreed
with their party’s conservative economic stances but disagreed with the party’s sharp turn towards
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extreme conservative social issue positions. Likewise, less educated, working-class Democrats
supported the party’s progressive economic policies but balked at their progressive social policies.
These two groups of voters were alienated by their party’s social issue positions and over
time, they began to gradually leave their party’s coalition. This formed what Key referred to as a
secular realignment, or a gradual “movement of members of a population category from party to
party that extends over several [election cycles]” (Key 1959, 199). Looking at the data from
Figures 2.1 and 2.2, this description appears to fit the realignment on the basis of educational
attainment observed among whites in recent decades. This education realignment resulted in
college-educated Americans leaving the Republican Party and joining the Democratic Party and
Americans without a college degree leaving the Democratic Party and joining the Republican
Party. The pace of the realignment accelerated in recent electoral cycles (Schaffner, MacWilliams
and Nteta 2018; Sides, Tesler and Vavreck 2018; Zingher 2022).
But it is important to note that while this shift garnered greater attention in recent years,
the education realignment is not a new phenomenon (Carnes and Lupu 2016) and other scholars
have discussed this realignment for many years (Bartels 2006; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2006;
Miller and Schofield 2008; Camobreco and Barnello 2015; Geismer 2015). It is also important to
consider that this is not a uniquely American phenomenon; and similar cultural conflicts and
electoral trends are observed in other advanced industrialized nations (Van de Werfhorst and de
Graaf 2004; Gethin, Martinez-Toledano and Piketty 2021; Simon 2021). Much of this comparative
work also found a shift towards leftist parties among educated, cosmopolitan voters and towards
conservative parties among less educated, parochial voters.
These shifts occurred in the American party system to create the current state of the parties
as described by Alan Abramowitz:
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“The Democratic Party now draws its strongest support from the groups with the most
positive views of recent social and cultural changes…The Republican Party draws its
strongest support from the groups with the most negative views of the same social and
cultural changes” (Abramowitz 2018, 13).
The education realignment produced significant changes in both the Democratic and Republican
coalitions: it made the former much more educated and the latter less so. But what do these changes
mean for the parties in a broader sense? How are the parties affected by these changes? I argue
one of the primary effects of the education realignment will be a change in both parties’ position
taking. This argument relies on the literature on party position taking which finds a connection
between changes in a party’s coalition and the positions that party takes; as well public opinion
literature which finds a relationship between an individual’s educational attainment and the policy
positions the individual holds. Both literatures are reviewed below and are followed by an
explanation of my own theory regarding the education realignment and party position taking.

2.2. Theories of Party Position Taking and Change
What causes a party to take a new position or change an old position on an issue? Prior
answers to this question can largely be grouped into two categories: (1) parties are responding to
changes in voters’ attitudes; and (2) parties are responding to pressures from activists within their
coalition. Both explanations assume parties are institutions which respond to demands from their
supporters, but vary on which kind of supporter, voters or activists, is most influential.
The voter-centered explanation of party position taking is based on a conception of political
parties as institutions controlled by ambitious office-seekers whose primary goal is to win elections
(Downs 1957; Aldrich 1995). To do this, Downs argued parties will adopt positions to maximize
their electoral support with the public. Monroe (1983) found that American party platforms tend
to adopt positions that are supported by the majority of the population and Adams et al. (2004)
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found support for parties responding to public opinion in West European countries. Specifically,
they find that political parties shift their positions when public opinion is clearly moving away
from the parties’ position on a given issue.
In a two-party system, Downs predicted parties will attempt to converge in the middle of
the ideological spectrum to maximize votes. In American politics today, we often do not observe
the convergence Downs predicted as parties became increasingly polarized over time (Poole and
Rosenthal 1997; Theriault 2008) as has the electorate (Abramowitz 2010). Nevertheless, this does
not mean that parties are totally unresponsive to public opinion. It could just be that parties care
about the opinion of some groups but not the opinion of the general public. This latter point is
important for this project as I will argue the Democratic and Republican parties have come to adopt
positions favored by college-educated voters and non-college-educated voters, respectively.
But it could also be that parties have constraints that prevent them from converging at the
center, namely partisan activists (Aldrich 1983). Bawn et al. (2012) argued activists hold
considerable power in political parties as they are major contributors of resources politicians need
to get reelected. Activists typically have more stable policy preferences compared to politicians
and thus, they attempt to pressure politicians to campaign on and implement those policies. Victor
and Reinhardt (2018) found that activists can shape their party’s platform: activist groups who are
loyal to their party are rewarded with the inclusion of their desired policy positions in both the
Democratic and Republican party platforms. Over time, this means that activists can help change
a party’s entire platform and brand (Miller and Schofield 2003).
These platform effects may also explain why activists are found to be a source of the
growing polarization between the Democratic and Republican parties. Layman et al. (2010) argued
activists lead to conflict extension within parties. By conflict extension, Layman et al. meant the

19

process by which Republicans have become consistently more conservative and Democrats have
become consistently more liberal on several policy dimensions. They argued activists drive
conflict extension through the nomination process. During primaries for elected offices, ambitious
office-seekers attempt to garner the support of the party’s activists who often sway primary results.
Activists are more ideologically extreme than average voters and office-seekers must adopt more
extreme positions to win activists’ support. This leads to more extreme candidates and contributes
to polarization.
I agree that activists are an important factor to understanding the machinations of political
parties – they exert great influence through activities like donating to campaigns or mobilizing
voters. But for the context of this project which is concerned with the effects of a political
realignment on party position taking, I expect parties are responding more to pressures from voters
than activists. As the coalitions of both parties change as the education realignment transpires, I
expect parties to respond to the new groups of voters who constitute their new base of electoral
support. This is not to say that activists have no role in this process – I will discuss below how I
believe pressures from activists were key to jumpstarting the education realignment in the first
place.
Regardless of whether party position change is driven by voters or activists, prior
scholarship often finds a connection between changes in a party’s coalition and changes in a party’s
position taking. Whenever a group enters or leaves a party’s coalition, this has the potential to
affect the kinds of positions that party takes. Wolbrecht (2000) argued this is because these changes
can affect the decision calculus for the party – new groups entering or old groups leaving can make
issues that were previously electorally costly to endorse electorally advantageous. This explains
both parties’ position changes on the issue of women’s rights in the 1970s according to Wolbrecht.
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This argument is also echoed by Karol (2009). He looked at several pathways for party position
change but the one I focus on here is coalition group incorporation. This process is gradual and
involves party elites shifting positions to attract a new constituency. Often this process is triggered
by an issue that was once cross-cutting (dividing both parties internally) becoming polarized along
party lines. As this occurs, the party is incentivized to shift its position to draw in new voters and
keep them in the party’s coalition. As time goes on, this new group of voters will become more
prominent and more well represented in the party’s coalition and the party’s platform. This further
attracts more members of this group to shift allegiances to the party. Examples of party position
change which occurred through group incorporation according to Karol include the Republicans’
shifts on race in response to the influx of white southerners and on abortion in response to the
influx of evangelical Christians.
The finding regarding the latter instance of party position change was one also discussed
by Baylor (2017). In the 1970s, evangelical Christians were politicized due to the politics of social
issues like abortion and gay rights. As evangelicals became a more significant part of the
Republican coalition, the Republican Party shifted to the right on many social issues. This shift to
the right among Republicans in the 1970s is key to the subsequent education realignment as I will
discuss below. In addition to his findings regarding evangelical Christians and the Republican
Party, Baylor, along with Schickler (2016), find group incorporation as an explanation for why the
Democratic Party became more supportive of racial equality in the mid-twentieth century. They
both argued the incorporation of African Americans and northern white liberals into the
Democratic coalition in the 1930s and 1940s propelled the party to shift its position on civil rights
in subsequent years. The incorporation of these two groups who supported civil rights changed the
decision calculus of Democratic politicians who could now support civil rights legislation that
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would upset white Southerners in the party’s coalition, because these new groups could replace
the group that was pushed out.
In many ways, this process of group incorporation is like the process of issue evolution
described by Carmines and Stimson (1989) in their study of the parties’ shift on race. They also
credited the influx of blacks and white liberals into the Democratic Party as the engine of change,
but they ascribed more autonomy to party activists and elites as drivers of mass opinion change.
Instead, I emphasize the power both ordinary voters and elites can have in the process of party
position change in this project. While I agree that voters respond to shifts among elites, I will
emphasize the influence voters can have in leading to subsequent instances of party position
change as they respond to elite shifts.
Party position change implies a shift among those elites, but there is a question of whether
those shifts will involve issue conversion among existing elites or replacement of existing elites
with new elites who hold different issue positions. Any party position change is likely to involve
both processes, though one is typically more common. Karol argued that in instances of group
incorporation, elite replacement is common. This is intuitive as a new group entering the party’s
coalition at the level of the electorate is likely to also enter the party’s coalition at the elite level,
whether that be in elected or unelected positions. More broadly, this is what should be expected in
a partisan realignment – if a group of voters is shifting allegiances from one party to the other, it
is likely they will bring down elites in their old party and raise up elites in their party as they
realign. This is what I expect to occur in the education realignment: replacement will be more
important than conversion; and the new party elites brought up through this realignment will hold
different issue positions in contrast to their predecessors.
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2.3. The Relationship between Educational Attainment and Issue Attitudes
In the 1970s, sociologists Herbert Hyman and Charles Wright performed a wide-reaching
study of the effect of education on knowledge and values and concluded the following:
“The large, lasting, and diverse good effects on values…coupled with the very large,
pervasive, and enduring effects in heightening knowledge, receptivity to knowledge, and
information-seeking…establish that formal education has long been an important force
throughout America in molding character as well as intellect” (Hyman and Wright 1979,
61).
While education unsurprisingly had a positive effect on the acquisition of knowledge, Hyman and
Wright also found it had a significant effect on the kinds of values an individual held, such as
equality, freedom, and humanitarianism. These values were most prevalent among individuals
with a college education.
Establishing this effect educational attainment had on the kinds of values an individual held
was important at a time when more and more Americans were attending college. From 1940 to
2020, the percent of Americans who attended college for four years or more increased from 4.6
percent to 37.5 percent according to the U.S. Census Bureau. This means that the effects of a
college education on a person’s predispositions are significant for a much larger portion of the
population. Unsurprisingly then, more research was conducted about the effects of education on
an individual’s positions (Jackman and Muha 1984; Bobo and Licari 1989; Phelan et al. 1995;
Campbell and Horowitz 2016; Broćić and Miles 2021; Bullock 2021). These studies tended to
confirm that education is a significant factor on an individual’s beliefs, though they differed on
how this effect was produced and which values or issues it influenced.
Three predominant causal pathways emerged as explanations for how education affected
individual attitudes on a wide variety of issues ranging from support for civil rights to attitudes
towards redistribution. One argument is that education affects attitudes through the development
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of students’ cognitive abilities (Hyman and Wright 1979). Students’ increasing cognitive abilities
allow them to process complex concepts like equality and tolerance. Essentially, education
transforms how students think – they become much more rational in how they process information
and ideas.
A second explanation puts more emphasis on the content students are introduced to inside
and outside of the classroom. This explanation argues education influences attitudes through
socialization (Phelan et al. 1995). Through education, students are introduced to new concepts
and ideas in classes and are taught to value some concepts over others – they are taught to value
equality and tolerance, rather than just receiving the training to process these concepts as the
developmental model argues. Additionally, in the context of higher education, the kinds of people
and ideas students are familiar with change as they reside on college campuses, which may
influence students’ views on outgroups.
A final argument rejects the idea that education changes the attitudes students hold and
instead argues education just cements attitudes students already hold. Jackman and Muha (1984)
termed this “ideological refinement.” They argued the kinds of students who attend college have
a specific ideology which places emphases on values like individual rights and that what higher
education does is to help students better articulate their existing ideologies, which tends to harden
those ideologies. Furthermore, Jackman and Muha argued the typical ideology of college students
is one that justifies the status quo, as these students often hail from privileged backgrounds. This
argument may be less applicable as increasingly students from less privileged backgrounds attend
college as well.
I do not argue any of these three arguments are the only answer to the question of how
education affects individual attitudes. Instead, I argue that the explanatory power of each argument
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may vary depending on the kind of attitude in question. In other words, it may be that the
socialization argument best explains the effect of education on tolerance towards marginalized
groups; and the ideological refinement argument best explains the effect of education on
opposition to economic redistribution. Each issue which greater education is found to affect
individuals’ attitudes on may require its own unique explanation or causal mechanism.6
Whatever the causal pathway education takes to affect attitudes, research on its effects
generally finds that there is an asymmetry in its effects on social and economic issues. Whereas
greater educational attainment tends to produce more liberal views on social issues, it results in
more conservative views on economic issues (Phelan et al. 1995; Campbell and Horowitz 2016;
Broćić and Miles 2021; Bullock 2021). Phelan et al. (1995) argued this reflects higher education
socializing students to the “official culture” of America. This official culture is characterized by
equal respect and opportunity, which lends itself to more liberal social issue positions on issues
like race and LGBTQ+ rights; but the official culture does not include equal outcomes, which
pushes college graduates to oppose policies to decrease economic inequality and regulate the free
market. This is just one explanation, but regardless of why there is this asymmetry, the fact that it
exists has important consequences for the education realignment.

2.4. A Theory of the Education Realignment’s Effect on Party Position Taking
The previous sections of this chapter established three findings: (1) there is a growing
education realignment in American party politics that is resulting in the Democratic Party
absorbing more educated voters and the Republican Party absorbing less educated voters; (2) party

6

In subsequent chapters, I review literature on the effect of education for the issues I focus on: LGBTQ+ rights,
environmental protection, and economic policy; and develop individualized arguments for how education affects
attitudes on each issue area.
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position taking is often a function of the demands of a party’s coalition; and (3) educational
attainment affects the kinds of attitudes an individual holds, with preferences often differing
between individuals with and without a college education. I combine these three findings together
to develop a theory for how the education realignment is likely to affect party position taking in
the American party system.
The literature on party position taking argues that whenever there is a change in a party’s
coalition, this creates the opportunity for party position change (Wolbrecht 2000; Karol 2009;
Baylor 2017). If a political party is seen both as an organization chiefly concerned with winning
elections (Downs 1957) and as a coalition of disparate groups competing for influence (Bawn et
al. 2012), then as Wolbrecht (2000) and Karol (2009) argued, as a new group enters or an old
group leaves a party’s coalition, this would change which groups have influence in the party and
elected elites should respond to whichever group or groups now have the most influence to
maximize electoral support. This will in many cases involve adopting positions favorable with
these newly influential groups of voters and activists.
The education realignment presents ample opportunity for party position change according
to these theoretical expectations. This realignment involves non-college educated whites leaving
the Democratic coalition and entering the Republican coalition; and the opposite occurring among
college educated whites. This is changing both parties’ coalitions dramatically, both in terms of
who each party’s reliable voters are and where their electoral bases of support are, as educational
attainment is not evenly distributed geographically in the United States. This transformation of
both parties’ coalitions can be observed in Figure 2.3. This figure shows the changes in the kinds
of congressional districts and states Democrats and Republicans draw their support from by level

26

Figure 2.3. Constituent Educational Attainment Distribution of Congressional Democrats and
Republicans, 1983-2021
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of educational attainment.7 Over time, Democrats have come to represent fewer districts and states
with low levels of educational attainment and more districts and states with higher levels of
educational attainment. The opposite is true for Republicans. This figure is evidence for the
education realignment trickling its way up to the halls of Congress, which is where I will look for
party position change.
This figure also suggests that Democratic position taking should become more reflective
of the preferences of college educated voters and Republican position taking should become more
reflective of the preferences of non-college educated voters over time. Based on the public opinion
findings about the relationship between educational attainment and policy preferences, this should
mean the Democratic Party should take more liberal positions on social issues and more
conservative positions on economic issues; and the Republican Party should do the opposite. I
argue this will occur through the addition of newly elected officials and removal of existing elected
officials in both parties which will be engineered by the education realignment. But how exactly
will the education realignment produce this party position change? I sketch out a theory for how
this process will unfold below.
The prior literature on the education realignment attributes the realignment to the rise of
social issues in the 1960s and 1970s. The emergence of issues like affirmative action, abortion,
climate change, and LGBTQ+ rights led the parties to take opposing stances on issues which had
not been particularly salient before; and generally, the Democratic Party took the more liberal
stance, and the Republican Party took the more conservative stance. These stances on social issues
are combined with the parties’ established stances on economic issues, with Democrats taking
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The levels of educational attainment (low, medium, high) are in comparison to all congressional districts and states
for each year include here. Educational attainment is measured by the percent of constituents in a district or state who
have a Bachelor’s degree or higher.
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liberal or progressive positions and Republicans taking conservative positions. But unlike
economic issues which there was significant agreement on within both parties in the mid-twentieth
century, these emergent social issues created more disagreement. While there were many liberal
Democrats, there were also many who were pro-life or skeptical of climate change; and there were
similar outliers on social issues in the Republican coalition in Congress. But generally, the parties’
brands became that where social issues were concerned, Democrats were the liberal party and
Republicans were the conservative party.
As these brands become more established in the 1980s and 1990s, this begins to alienate
college educated whites in the Republican coalition and non-college educated whites in the
Democratic coalition. Whereas previously in periods when economic issues were more salient,
economically conservative college educated whites were comfortable identifying as and voting for
Republicans and economically liberal non-college educated whites were comfortable identifying
as and voting for Democrats, the rise of social issues changed that. Highton and Kam (2011) found
that in the 1980s and 1990s, social issue positions became more influential on an individual’s
partisanship. College educated and non-college educated whites were not immune to these trends.
As the Democratic Party became increasingly known as a liberal party on social issues, this
alienated non-college educated whites who found themselves at odds with their party on these
social issues; and the same occurred for college educated whites in the Republican Party.
The increasing alienation both college educated and non-college educated whites felt in the
Republican and Democratic parties respectively would eventually lead them to drift away from
their existing partisan identities; and begin to identify as independents or cross over to the opposing
party. This is the beginning of the education realignment. Eventually, these shifts among individual
voters are numerous enough to begin to affect electoral outcomes: Democrats begin to lose districts
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and states with lower levels of educational attainment and win districts and states with higher
levels; and the opposite occurs for Republicans.
If we assume Democrats who represent less educated constituencies will be more likely to
take liberal economic positions and conservative social positions and Republicans who represent
highly educated constituencies should do the opposite; then the education realignment would have
the effect of removing Democrats who are socially conservative and economically liberal and
Republicans who are socially liberal and economically conservative. It would also have the effect
of increasing the number of socially liberal and economically conservative Democrats and socially
conservative and economically liberal Republicans. This assumes that Democrats who represent
highly educated constituencies and Republicans who represent less educated constituencies will
take positions reflective of those voters’ preferences.
This would have the eventual effect of creating a more socially liberal and economically
conservative Democratic Party and a more socially conservative and economically liberal
Republican Party. This argument follows Miller and Schofield’s (2008) earlier argument that the
ongoing transformations of both parties’ coalitions will shift the parties’ stances on social and
economic issues in these directions, though they focused more on class divides rather than
education divides between the parties. Furthermore, we would expect more intraparty agreement
on social issues, as social issue outliers in both parties are removed; and more intraparty conflict
on economic issues, as economic issue outliers in both parties are created. This leads to the
following hypotheses:
H1a: The education realignment will remove socially conservative and economically
liberal Democrats and socially liberal and economically conservative Republicans from
both parties’ coalitions in Congress.
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H1b: The education realignment will add socially liberal and economically conservative
Democrats and socially conservative and economically liberal Republicans to both
parties’ coalitions in Congress.
H2: The education realignment will create more intraparty agreement on social issues and
more intraparty conflict on economic issues in both parties.
As reviewed previously, party position change can occur through elite conversion or replacement.
I argue the latter is more likely considering that educational attainment is not evenly
geographically distributed: some congressional districts and states have much higher levels of
educational attainment than others; and that the education realignment involves active party
switching among college-educated Republicans and non-college educated Democrats. Thus,
Republicans are likely to lose control of highly educated districts and states in Congress and the
opposite should occur among Democrats. It is less likely that there are massive changes in
constituent educational attainment within districts and states over time, except perhaps due to
redistricting in the context of House districts. Consequently, while we may observe conversion
among existing Republicans and Democrats on social and economic issues, it will likely be
unrelated to the education realignment. This leads to a third hypothesis:
H3: The party position change created by the education realignment will occur more
through elite replacement than elite conversion.
This process of party position change engineered by the education realignment, I argue, is likely
to be an iterative one driven largely by social issues: (1) the parties take initial polarizing stances
on social issues, (2) which alienates college educated Republican voters and non-college educated
Democratic voters who begin to switch to the opposite party. This results in (3) both parties taking
more extreme stances on social issues and nominating and electing fewer elites who take positions
on social issues out of step with their party’s position. This then (4) further alienates non-college
and college educated voters which accelerates their realignment and polarization on multiple social
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issues but should have a more muted effect when it comes to economic issues. This process is
illustrated in Figure 2.4.
Characterizing this process as continual and involving more than one issue is a contribution
to the literature on party position change. Whereas much prior work on party position change looks
at one issue at a time (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Wolbrecht 2000; Karol 2009), I argue it is
important to consider how changes in one issue area can affect changes in another. In the case of
the education realignment, earlier changes on one social issue like racial equality can be seen as
driving changes on other social issues like LGBTQ+ rights and the environment. Additionally,
while the education realignment is primarily driven by social issues, I argue it will have important
consequences for economic issues as well because of the effect of educational attainment on
economic attitudes. Individuals possess attitudes on countless issues, so just because one issue may
drive them to change their partisan affiliation, does not mean that their preferences on other issues
will not be consequential after that change in partisanship occurs.
Also, given the gradual nature of secular realignments, which I argue the education
realignment is an example of, I argue it is important to consider how any party position change
that results from this realignment should be gradual and can occur in waves as more and more
groups of voters shift their allegiances from one party to the other. We should look for multiple
cycles of voters realigning and affecting party positions. This resembles a feedback loop, as
illustrated in Figure 2.4. This also suggests that the effects the education realignment may have on
party position taking are far from over as the realignment is only increasing in recent electoral
cycles.
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Figure 2.4. A Theory of the Education Realignment's Effect on Party Position Taking
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2.5. Case Selection
While I argue there are many issues in which the education realignment may affect party
position taking, I focus on three in subsequent chapters: (1) LGBTQ+ rights, (2) environmental
protection; and (3) economic regulation. The choice of these three cases is justified first by a desire
to look at both social (LGBTQ+ rights; environmental protection) and economic (regulation)
issues. This is necessary because of the hypotheses I aim to test: that there will be a contrasting
effect of the education realignment on party position taking when it comes to social vs. economic
issues. The choice of the two social issues is deliberate to allow for different kinds of social issues.
On the one hand, the case of LGBTQ+ rights concerns the politics of a marginalized group akin to
racial and ethnic minorities and women. Much of the initial polarization on social issues in
American party politics is the result of these marginalized groups becoming more prominent both
in number and in influence in America, so in a sense the choice of LGBTQ+ rights is an easier test
of my theory of the education realignment – if the education realignment is going to affect party
position taking, we may expect it to be most likely to affect position taking on the politics of a
marginalized group.
Environmental protection is an issue area that some may argue straddles the line between
a social issue and an economic issue. The policies used to protect the environment often involve
regulating businesses to limit the amount of pollution they release into the environment, but the
argument that the environment needs to be protected in the first place requires a belief in the
science surrounding the environment. This is especially true surrounding belief in climate change
that is the result of human activity. I argue this makes the environment a social issue, albeit one
that is a different kind of social issue to something like LGBTQ+ rights. This difference is the
rationale for choosing it as a case to broaden the diversity of social issues studied in this project.
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Economic regulation is the only economic issue included here, and one that is admittedly
much broader than the two social issues included in this study. But it is an issue which divided
college educated and non-college educated voters; and one that is less tied to social policy in
contrast to health care or welfare policy. That makes it distinct from the social issues it will be
compared to. Moreover, all three of these cases also have mobilized activists and interest groups
which pressure the parties. This allows me to control for a competing explanation that any party
position change on these issues is a result of activist or interest group pressure. These interest
groups also provide me with the primary data source I used to measure party position change:
interest group scorecards of congressional behavior.8
I chose to study party position taking among both parties’ coalitions in Congress because
of the variation it allows for on both my primary dependent and independent variables. In contrast
to look at party platforms as measures of position taking where the number of observations is much
smaller, looking at members of Congress allows for hundreds of observations for each
congressional session for both parties. Also, because educational attainment is not distributed
evenly across the country, looking at members of Congress allows for significant variation here as
well: I am able to look at members of Congress from both parties who represent districts and states
with high and low levels of educational attainment. I examine congressional behavior primarily in
the 2000s and 2010s, due partially to data availability, but also because this is the period when the
education realignment became more prominent both in voting behavior and in public discourse.

8

The choice of specific interest group scorecards and the merits of using these scorecards as a data source will be
discussed in subsequent chapters.
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2.6. Conclusion
This chapter presented a theory of how the education realignment is likely to affect party
position taking in the United States. This theory is based on prior work on how party position
change occurs, which is often a function of changes in a party’s coalition that affects the decision
calculus among party elites as to which issues will be most popular with their electoral coalition.
It is also based on prior work on both the education realignment, which argued it is the result of
the rise in prominence of social issues in American politics; and public opinion research which
found a consistent effect of educational attainment on individuals’ attitudes.
Combining these three strands of literature together led to a theory that the education
realignment will create more internal agreement on social issues and more internal conflict on
economic issues in both the Democratic and Republican parties. I argued this will be the case
because public opinion research generally finds that greater educational attainment leads to more
liberal positions on social issues and more conservative positions on economic issues. The
education realignment removes non-college educated whites, who are socially conservative and
economically liberal, from the Democratic Party; and college educated whites, who are socially
liberal and economically conservative, from the Republican Party. These two groups then are
added to the opposing party’s coalition. This should result in the Democratic coalition becoming
more uniformly socially liberal but may also introduce more economic conservatism into the
coalition; and the Republican coalition will become more uniformly socially conservative but may
be more diverse on economic policy.
These changes will be engineered through elite replacement in both parties. As Democrats
lose constituencies with low levels of educational attainment and win constituencies with high
levels of educational attainment, the Democratic coalition at the elite level will lose socially
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conservative and economically liberal members and gain socially liberal and economically
conservative members. The opposite will occur among Republicans as they lose highly educated
constituencies and win less educated constituencies. This will be an iterative process of party
position change as changes among voters lead to changes among elites, which in turn will lead to
further changes among voters. This theory will be tested in the following three chapters which will
look at the education realignment’s effect on party position taking on LGBTQ+ rights,
environmental protection, and economic regulation.
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Chapter 3. A Schooling in Sexual Politics: The Effect of the Education
Realignment on LGBTQ+ Rights

“If you get rid of all the homosexuals in Congress and on the staff, you’d still have Republicans
like Chris Shays and Susan Collins pushing the gay agenda.”
- Mike Mears, Concerned Women for America (Neuman 2006)
This 2006 quote from an evangelical conservative activist highlights the awkward position
the Republican Party found itself in on the issue of LGBTQ+ rights during the 2000s. Despite most
of the party positioned staunchly against the advancement of LGBTQ+ rights, there were still many
Republican voters and members of Congress who were more supportive of the LGBTQ+
community. Two such members are mentioned in the above quote: Representative Chris Shays of
Connecticut and Senator Susan Collins of Maine. Both had voting records in Congress that were
much more pro-LGBTQ+ than many of their Republican colleagues. While Collins remains in the
Senate as one of the few moderate Republicans, Mears would soon see his wish to oust Shays
come true: in 2008, Shays lost reelection to Democrat Jim Himes after serving more than twenty
years in the House.
The loss of Shays was significant for the representation of the LGBTQ+ community in the
Republican Party. In addition to his pro-LGBTQ+ voting record, Shays sponsored and led the fight
to pass the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) throughout the 1990s and 2000s. This
bill would have banned job discrimination of gays and lesbians. Such a bill has yet to become
federal law. Its modern iteration, the Equality Act, passed the House of Representatives in 2021
with only three Republicans voting for the bill.9 Susan Collins had been the lone Republican

9

Equality Act, H.R. 5, 117th Congress (2021).
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senator to support the Equality Act in recent years, but she dropped her support in early 2021
(Johnson 2021). This came after Collins was not endorsed for reelection by the Human Rights
Campaign for the first time in 2020. While Collins is not the only pro-LGBTQ+ Republican to
walk back some of their support for the LGBTQ+ community, as this chapter will show, Chris
Shays’ fate is more common than that of Collins.
Many pro-LGBTQ+ Republicans retired or lost reelection in recent years and their seat is
now held by the Democratic Party. A similar trend is found among anti-LGBTQ+ Democrats who
were replaced by Republicans. This chapter will demonstrate that these developments in both
parties throughout the last two decades is connected to the education realignment. Shays
represented an affluent district in Connecticut with one of the highest rates of college education in
the country. Voters in such districts are becoming increasingly Democratic, while voters in less
educated districts are becoming increasingly Republican. As discussed in an earlier chapter, part
of what is motivating this realignment are social issues like LGBTQ+ rights. This chapter will
show education has long been associated with greater support for LGBTQ+ rights. So, it is not
surprising that pro-LGBTQ+ Republican members of Congress like Shays comes from a highly
educated district. This is a trend that continues in the present day: the average percent of
constituents with a college education in the three districts whose Republican members voted for
the Equality Act in 2021 is more than five points higher than the overall House Republican
average.
But such pro-LGBTQ+ Republicans from highly educated districts are rare in Congress
today, as are anti-LGBTQ+ Democrats from less educated districts. This chapter explores how the
education realignment made such members of Congress few and far between. I find that the
education realignment led to the replacement of many pro-LGBTQ+ Republicans with pro-
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LGBTQ+ Democrats; and anti-LGBTQ+ Democrats with anti-LGBTQ+ Republicans. While there
was elite conversion of some pro-LGBTQ+ Republicans and anti-LGBTQ+ Democrats to be more
in step with their respective parties, this is less a product of the education realignment. The result
of this elite replacement and conversion though is the creation of two parties that are do not include
much variation of opinion on the issue of LGBTQ+ rights: the Democratic Party has very few antiLGBTQ+ members and the Republican Party has very few pro-LGBTQ+ members. But the
consequence of these shifts is that the parties are more polarized on LGBTQ+ rights than they
were in the 1990s and 2000s.
This chapter proceeds as follows: I first discuss prior party position taking on LGBTQ+
rights. I then present prior research and public opinion data that demonstrates support for LGBTQ+
rights is affected by educational attainment. Subsequently, data on congressional behavior on
LGBTQ+ rights and recent electoral trends are used to show how the education realignment
affected party position taking on LGBTQ+ rights through replacement and conversion. I conclude
by contemplating what these findings suggest for the future of the advancement of LGBTQ+ rights
in American politics.
3.1. LGBTQ+ Rights in American Party Politics
In the fifty years since the Stonewall riots launched the modern queer rights movement,
the LGBTQ+ community has gone from a state of near total exclusion from American politics to
a position in which one of the major American political parties regularly advocates on their behalf.
While the LGBTQ+ community traditionally aligned itself with the Democratic Party more than
the Republican Party, its issues were often sidelined by Democrats and there were several
occasions when Democrats outright acted against the advancement of LGBTQ+ rights (Frymer
1999; Smith 2007). Such occasions were more common in the 1970s and 1980s, when the
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LGBTQ+ rights movement was less professionalized and had less political power. But in the
1990s, the LGBTQ+ community was beginning to come out of the AIDS crisis of the 1980s, during
which it increased its organizational and lobbying power; and there was Democratic control of
Congress and the presidency for the first time in over a decade. This gave cause for hope among
the LGBTQ+ community.
Unfortunately, the LGBTQ+ community continued to be sidelined by Democrats in the
1990s over the issues of gays and lesbians serving in the military and same-sex marriage. The
former issue came to a head early in the Clinton administration. Newly elected President Bill
Clinton had pledged to repeal the ban on gays and lesbians serving in the military during the 1992
campaign. In 1993, his administration sought to fulfill this campaign promise and change military
policy on this issue. Clinton quickly ran into resistance from conservative members of his own
party who did not want to see the policy changed. This resistance was led by Senator Sam Nunn
of Georgia, who was then the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Nunn and his
allies wanted the absolute ban to remain military policy. After pushback from both Congress and
the public, the Clinton administration settled on a compromise: gays and lesbians would be allowed
to serve in the military if they kept their sexuality hidden. This policy came to be known as “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell” and remained military policy until Democrats successfully pushed for its repeal
in 2010.
Three years after “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Democrats again acted against the interests of
the LGBTQ+ community on the issue of same-sex marriage. After the Hawaii Supreme Court
issued a ruling that the state of Hawaii must demonstrate compelling interest to prohibit same-sex
marriages in 1993, a panic arose among anti-gay activists and politicians that same-sex marriage
would soon become legal in the United States. These anti-gay forces eventually set their sights on
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passing the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in Congress that defined marriage as between a
man and a woman in federal law. In 1996, this bill easily passed both houses of Congress with the
support of nearly all Republicans and a majority of Democrats.10 Though President Clinton had
opposed the bill during its consideration by Congress, he signed the bill into law as the bill had
enough congressional support to overcome a veto anyways. The next Democratic president,
Barack Obama, as well as most of the Democratic Party would come out in support of same-sex
marriage by the early 2010s.11
At the same time as portions of the Democratic Party acted against the interests of the
LGBTQ+ community, there were significant factions within the Republican Party that supported
some key LGBTQ+ policies. Despite the history of Republican hostility to the advancement of
LGBTQ+ rights and the Reagan administration’s paltry response to the AIDS crisis during the
1980s, there were always significant numbers of Republicans in Congress that supported some
modest pro-LGBTQ+ policies. Ten years after DOMA became law, both houses of Congress voted
on another same-sex marriage bill: the Federal Marriage Amendment, a constitutional amendment
prohibiting same-sex marriage. The amendment failed to attract the required two-thirds support in
either the House or Senate, but importantly, twenty-seven Republicans in the House and seven
Republicans in the Senate voted against the amendment.12 Similarly, floor votes on the previously
described Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) attracted significant Republican support.
A 2007 vote in the House garnered thirty-five Republican votes and a 2013 vote in the Senate
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Defense of Marriage Act, H.R. 3396, 104th Congress (1996).
For more in-depth analyses of the politics surrounding “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and DOMA, see: Vaid; Urvashi.
1995. Virtual Equality: The Mainstreaming of Gay and Lesbian Liberation. New York: Anchor Books; Rayside,
David. 1998. On the Fringe: Gays & Lesbians in Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; Rimmerman, Craig
A. 2002. From Identity to Politics: The Lesbian and Gay Movements in the United States. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press.
12
Marriage Protection Amendment, H.J.Res. 88, 109th Congress (2006); Marriage Protection Amendment, S.J.Res. 1,
109th Congress (2006).
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garnered ten Republican votes.13 Most of the Republican support on this measure has evaporated
in recent years, especially as protections for the transgender community were added into the
modern Equality Act.
The decrease in Republican support and increase in Democratic support for LGBTQ+
rights can be seen in Figure 3.1 that shows the average legislative scorecard rating on LGBTQ+
rights from the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) by party and chamber since 1989. The Democratic
Party became more pro-LGBTQ+ and the opposite occurred in the Republican Party. Explanations
for why these shifts occurred are myriad, but largely break down into two broad categories: the
efforts of pro- and anti-LGBTQ+ activists and public attitude shifts on LGBTQ+ rights.
The activist explanation focuses on the increased prominence of the LGBTQ+ community
in the Democratic coalition and the religious right in the Republican coalition. The logic behind
the activist explanation stems from Layman and Carsey’s (2002) theory of conflict extension. This
theory posits that as activists increase their influence in party politics through nomination
processes, activists push party elites and subsequently, rank-and-file partisans to become more
polarized on a wide swath of issues (Layman and Carsey 2002; Layman et al. 2010). Following
this theory, LGBTQ+ activists would have pressured Democratic politicians and voters to become
more liberal on LGBTQ+ issues and the religious right would have pressured Republicans to
become more conservative on LGBTQ+ issues.
Previous studies of both the LGBTQ+ community and the religious right found evidence
for these groups affecting party position taking on LGBTQ+ rights. Fetner (2008) argued the two
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Employment Non-Discrimination Act, H.R. 3685, 110th Congress (2007); Employment Non-Discrimination Act, S.
815, 113th Congress (2013).
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Figure 3.1. Average HRC Scorecard Rating by Party and Chamber, 1989-2020
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competing sides both affected politicians’ behavior and affected the other group’s behavior and
strategies. In particular, the religious right has been a strong force within the Republican coalition
since the 1970s (Baylor 2018). In addition to influencing other social issues like abortion, the
religious right pressured Republicans to take conservative stances on issues like same-sex marriage
and employment discrimination. In fact, one of the reasons given by Republican members of
Congress who recently dropped their support for the Equality Act described earlier is that the bill
does not provide enough protections for religious freedom. Oldmixon and Calfano (2007) found
broader support for the religious right affecting congressional behavior on LGBTQ+ issues: they
found the presence of significant numbers of conservative Protestants and Roman Catholics in a
member’s constituency was associated with a decrease in support for LGBTQ+ rights. It should
be noted that their study did not look at activist pressure overtly though. A study that did was
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Haider-Markel (1999b) who found campaign donations from anti-LGBTQ+ groups to be a
significant determinant of member behavior on LGBTQ+ rights.
In the same study, Haider-Markel also found donations from pro-LGBTQ+ groups to be
significant as well. In a different study, Haider-Markel (1999a) found that LGBTQ+ activist
pressure had more of an effect on conservative lawmakers than on liberal ones – the logic being
that it is more effective to lobby conservatives who are more up in the air on LGBTQ+ issues than
liberals who are already committed to supporting those issues. Thus, we would expect donations
from LGBTQ+ groups to conservative Republican candidates to be the most influential. The issue
is that increasingly LGBTQ+ groups are not lobbying or donating money to Republicans. In the
2018 midterm election cycle, the Human Rights Campaign, one of the largest LGBTQ+ interest
groups, gave no campaign donations to Republican congressional candidates (Center for
Responsive Politics 2019). This reflects the dearth of national Republican politicians who are
supportive of LGBTQ+ rights. This chapter will show that many of the Republicans in Congress
who were supportive of LGBTQ+ rights have either retired or been voted out of office.
Karol (2012) argued LGBTQ+ activists have become more influential in the Democratic
Party. He argued the shift in the Democratic Party on LGBTQ+ rights can be explained by the
increased prominence of LGBTQ+ activists in the party’s coalition. Karol specifically looked at
position changes on LGBTQ+ issues among Democratic members of Congress and finds that both
conversion and replacement explain the changes we have observed in the Democratic Party on this
set of issues. He argued conversion played a more significant role than replacement. This fits in
with Layman and Carsey’s theory of conflict extension and is supported by other more historical
accounts of the LGBTQ+ rights movement (Baylor 2018; Garretson 2018).
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Bishin, Freebourn and Teten (2020) also looked at party position change on LGBTQ+
rights in Congress. In contrast to Karol, they found replacement to be the chief means of position
change among Democrats. They also looked at Republican position change as well and found both
replacement and conversion to be significant in pushing the party to be more uniformly against
LGBTQ+ rights. But like Karol, they argued that this position change stems from a shift in power
in both parties’ coalitions: LGBTQ+ activists in the Democratic Party and evangelical Christians
in the Republican Party.
I endorse the argument that the work of both pro- and anti-LGBTQ+ activists affected
Democratic and Republican position taking on LGBTQ+ rights, but I also argue that except for the
ways that the work of activists may have affected public attitudes on this issue area, activist
pressure is a separate explanation from the one I advance in this chapter concerning the effect of
the education realignment on party position taking on LGBTQ+ rights. This effect cannot be
explained by Layman and Carsey’s (2002) conflict extension theory, as they find conflict extension
only affects committed partisans, which realigning voters could not be considered during this party
position change. Instead, I argue the effect that the education realignment had is much more closely
related to the public opinion explanation.

3.2. Public Opinion on LGBTQ+ Rights
Public attitudes on LGBTQ+ rights have warmed among most Americans in recent
decades. Hart-Brinson (2018) argued this change was largely driven by generational turnover.
Older Americans rooted their attitudes on LGBTQ+ issues in understandings of queer behavior,
which was viewed by many as immoral and led to low support for LGBTQ+ rights. Younger
Americans understand LGBTQ+ issues as an identity issue and an identity that should be protected.
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As older Americans died and younger Americans came of age, public attitudes shifted favorably
towards the LGBTQ+ community.
Brewer (2008) argued elite opinion cues drove some of this shift in understanding about
LGBTQ+ issues. The increase in LGBTQ+ representation in the media alongside politicians and
celebrities favorably framing LGBTQ+ issues explain the increase in favorable attitudes towards
these issues. On the issue of partisan elite cues, Lindaman and Haider-Markel (2002) did not find
Democratic and Republican elite cues on LGBTQ+ issues to be significant in shaping opinions
among their supporters. This echoes findings from Bishin et al. (2020), who found anti-LGBTQ+
backlash often remains at the elite level and does not filter down significantly into mass opinion.
I argue these findings may be the result of the parties not being well sorted on LGBTQ+ issues at
the time, which resulted in elite cues being rebuffed by significant portions of both parties’
coalitions. Garretson (2018) argues the increased visibility of the LGBTQ+ community was in part
caused by the push by LGBTQ+ activists to have queer Americans come out to their friends and
families. As many queer individuals came out, more Americans knew a queer individual on a
personal level and public attitudes towards LGBTQ+ rights shifted positively.
The exact source of the opinion changes on LGBTQ+ issues is still unresolved, but what
is more important here is whether these changes have any effect on the representation of these
issues in American legislative politics. Previous research has found mixed effects. There is a
relationship between public opinion on LGBTQ+ rights and legislative behavior in Congress
(Haider-Markel 1999a; Hansen and Treul 2015; Krimmel, Lax, and Phillips 2016), but this
relationship is often limited. Krimmel, Lax, and Phillips (2016) found that constituency opinion
affected more moderate Democrats who were resistant to LGBTQ+ rights but did not greatly affect
other Democrats and Republicans. Moreover, LGBTQ+ representation has been found to be
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Figure 3.2. Percent who View Same-Sex Relations as Wrong by Educational Attainment, 19942018 (GSS)
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affected by the presence of and attitudes among specific groups within a legislator’s constituency
(Oldmixon and Calfano 2007; Bishin and Smith 2013). Bishin and Smith (2013) called this
subconstituency politics. They argued in the case of LGBTQ+ rights, when legislators are faced
with both active constituency groups for and against LGBTQ+ rights, they will side with the group
that is closest to their party’s established position. Thus, we would expect Democrats to be pulled
towards supporting LGBTQ+ rights and Republicans to be pulled to do the opposite.
Party politics appears to affect which groups are listened to within a legislator’s
constituency. I argue this will be true when it comes to the consequences of the education
realignment which has resulted in the influx of non-college educated voters into the Republican
Party and college educated voters into the Democratic Party. Prior public opinion research on
support for LGBTQ+ rights found a significant positive relationship between educational
attainment and support for a wide variety of pro-LGBTQ+ policies (Bobo and Licari 1989; Grapes
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Figure 3.3. Percent who Support Same-Sex Marriage by Educational Attainment, 2004-2018
(GSS)
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2006). Bobo and Licari (1989) argued this link stems from a sense of toleration for difference that
higher education instills in individuals. Loftus (2001) found that a significant explanation for the
overall increase in support for LGBTQ+ rights in the latter part of the twentieth century was the
increase in educational attainment among Americans.
While there has been an overall increase in support for LGBTQ+ rights, sharp differences
between college educated and non-college educated Americans remain. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show
the persistence of these differences over time. Figure 3.2 presents public opinion data from the
General Social Survey (GSS) on whether the respondent views homosexuality as wrong, while
Figure 3.3 presents GSS data on support for same-sex marriage legalization. Both figures show
increasingly favorable attitudes towards the LGBTQ+ community, but the education gap remains
relatively constant.
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Figure 3.4. Support for LGBTQ+ Policies by Educational Attainment, 2020 (ANES)
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Figure 3.4 presents data from the 2020 American National Election Survey (ANES) on
support for several different LGBTQ+ policies. While there is little different between college
educated and non-college educated voters on some policies like requiring businesses to provide
services to same-sex couples regardless of religious beliefs, there are still large differences on
issues like banning employment discrimination of gay men and lesbians. Of note, there is about a
twenty-point difference between respondents with bachelor’s degree or higher and respondents
with only a high school education on support for allowing transgender individuals to use the
bathroom of their choice. This follows prior findings that greater educational attainment generally
has a positive effect on support for transgender rights and policies, though Taylor, Lewis, and
Haider-Markel (2018) found this relationship to be somewhat weaker than that between education
and support for gay and lesbian rights. As transgender issues become an increasingly large focus
of politics surrounding the LGBTQ+ community, these findings suggest educational attainment is
still relevant in shaping public support for currently salient LGBTQ+ issues.
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These data on public support for LGBTQ+ rights and the literature on public opinion
towards LGBTQ+ rights reviewed here suggest that as educated voters who are more favorable to
LGBTQ+ rights realign to the Democratic Party, we should expect greater responsiveness to the
LGBTQ+ community among Democrats. We should also not expect Republican legislators to be
responsive to the LGBTQ+ community as their electoral coalition relies more on Americans who
are less supportive of LGBTQ+ rights. This combines with Bishin et al.’s (2020) argument that
the Republican Party is currently subject to a backlash to LGBTQ+ rights driven by organized
conservative groups, despite overall public opinion warming towards the LGBTQ+ community.
The analysis presented below support these expectations and show that the education realignment
contributed to the replacement of many Democratic members of Congress who were unresponsive
to and Republican members of Congress who were responsive to the LGBTQ+ community.

3.3. Data and Methods
The primary dependent variable used in this chapter to measure party position taking on
LGBTQ+ rights is the congressional scorecard published by the Human Rights Campaign (HRC).
The Human Rights Campaign is one of the leading pro-LGBTQ+ interest groups currently active
in national politics. In this chapter, I use data from the 101st to the 116th Congresses (1989-2020).14
The HRC produces a scorecard for each two-year congressional period by selecting congressional
roll call votes and co-sponsorships of bills the HRC views as consequential to the LGBTQ+
community. The HRC records whether members of the House of Representatives and Senate take
the pro- or anti-LGBTQ+ position on the bill. It then compiles these positions to create a scorecard
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Scorecards for the 108th through 116th Congresses were drawn from the HRC online archive (Human Rights
Campaign 2022). Earlier scorecard data was drawn from data made publicly available by Bishin, Freebourn and Teten
(2020).
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rating for each member of Congress using a simple average.15 The scores range from 0 to 100,
with higher scores indicating more pro-LGBTQ+ congressional behavior.16
There is some analysis of the average scores both parties received over time from the HRC,
but the bulk of the analysis in this chapter is a comparison of individual members of Congress to
their co-partisans at the same point in time. This is achieved by comparing an individual member’s
scorecard rating to the average rating of members in the same party and in the same chamber in
Congress. What I will do is to create a set of Democratic and Republican outliers in each chamber
and in each congress included in this study. I determine outliers using median absolute deviation
(MAD). The MAD for a set of data is calculated by determining the median of the absolute
deviations from the dataset’s median. I selected to use MAD to determine congressional outliers
over standard deviation from the mean following statistical research which argued the former is a
more robust technique for detecting outliers than the latter (Olewuezi 2011; Leys et al. 2013).
Unlike the mean that is very sensitive to outliers, the median is less affected by outliers. This makes
MAD a more logical choice for this study than standard deviation.
I calculated the MAD for Democrats and Republicans separately for the entire period
studied here (1989-2020).17 Then, for each congress and chamber, each member of Congress’
scorecard rating was compared to their party’s median scorecard rating: Democrats whose
scorecard ratings fell more than one MAD below their party’s median rating and Republicans
whose scorecard ratings was more than one MAD above their party’s median rating were
determined to be outliers in this analysis.18 I track the number of outliers in both parties over time
15

On select occasions, the HRC weights measures it views as very important more heavily and counts them more than
once in their scorecard calculations.
16
Some members of Congress do not receive scores if they miss several votes or if leave/enter Congress mid-session.
17
Democrats=20; Republicans=17. This can be compared to the standard deviation results which were 26 for
Democrats and 23 for Republicans.
18
It is obvious that there are also outlying Democrats who have higher scores than their party median and outlying
Republicans who have lower scores than their party median. These members are not consequential for this study as I

52

and track the future of outliers in the 2000s: whether they remain in Congress, retired, or lost
reelection; and whether control of their district or state switched parties. I examine the degree to
which these outliers were converted into their party’s mainstream or were replaced by new
members who were not outliers or were from the opposing party.
There should be some skepticism of the use of interest group scorecards as a data source.
As the HRC is a private interest group with political motivations, the choice of which votes to
include in the scorecard could be biased as has been argued to be the case with other interest group
scorecards (Charnock 2018). At the same time, Anderson (2012) argues using legislative
scorecards created by interest groups is appropriate when studying “domain-specific ideology,”
especially for policy domains in which significant intraparty division exists. I argue LGBTQ+
policy is such an issue during the early part of this study. There is a fair degree of consistency as
to the policies that are included in the scorecards, with the same kinds of policies and related bills
showing up year after year.
The scorecards do reflect changes in the aims of the LGBTQ+ community over time, such
as marriage equality and military discrimination diminishing in importance after those policies
were enacted. Following Bishin, Freebourn and Teten (2020), I test for the validity of the
scorecards as measuring the same concept over time using Cronbach’s alpha. The result is 0.91,
which suggests the scorecards are measuring the same concept for each congress. I also note that
to derive whether a member is an outlier with their party on LGBTQ+ rights, I only compare
members within the same period, so concerns about comparisons across time are not as relevant
for that measure. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the political agenda of the LGBTQ+

am trying to explain how Democrats became more pro-environment and Republicans became more anti-environment.
Existing Democrats who are very pro-environment and Republicans who are very anti-environment are not going to
affect this dynamic.
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community changed over the period studied here: debate shifted from issues like marriage equality
to legal protections for the transgender community. While the issues may change, I argue we can
expect member behavior on LGB issues to be correlated with behavior on transgender issues. This
follows public opinion research that finds support for transgender rights is affected by existing
support for and exposure to the LGB community (Flores 2015).
To test how congressional behavior on the environment and whether members are outliers
within their parties on this issue are connected to the education realignment, I use data from the
United States Census Bureau and the American Community Survey on the educational attainment
for states and congressional districts in recent decades.19 The specific measure I employ is the
percentage of constituents 25 years or older who have a bachelor’s degree or higher. I also restrict
this data point to only non-Hispanic white constituents for some of the analysis. Control variables
used in some of the statistical models of congressional behavior include political party; the
Democratic vote share for a state or district in the last presidential election;20 pro-LGBTQ+
campaign contributions;21 the chamber of Congress the member belongs to; and whether that
chamber was controlled by Democrats at the time.

3.5. Trends in Congressional Outliers on LGBTQ+ Rights
Using the outlier detection technique described above, Figure 3.5 presents the total number
of outliers in Congress on LGBTQ+ rights from 1989-2020. We can observe a dramatic decrease
in the number of outliers in each congress over this period: in the 1990s and early 2000s, there

19

Availability of this data at the congressional district level varies over time. From 2003 onwards, I have complete
data at the state and congressional district level for educational attainment. I was also able to access older census data
for 1993. Years in between 1993 and 2003, I do not reliable data for.
20
Data drawn from Daily Kos elections (Daily Kos 2020).
21
I used the logarithm of the dollar amount received by each member from pro-LGBTQ+ groups. Data drawn from
Center for Responsive Politics (2022).
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Figure 3.5. Number of HRC Rating Outliers in Congress, 1989-2020
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were on average more than a hundred outliers in each congress. In recent years, this number has
dwindled to a low of fewer than twenty outliers in the 116th Congress from 2019-20. This decrease
is also not isolated to any one party or chamber of Congress: Figure 3.6 shows the percentage of
members of each party in each chamber that is an outlier on the HRC scorecard. While there are
sudden short-term increases in the number of outliers among both parties, the overall trend is one
of greater intraparty agreement on LGBTQ+ issues over time.22
There may be fewer Democratic and Republican outliers on LGBTQ+ rights in Congress
today than in years past, but the next question to ask is whether this decrease is related to the

22

The very significant increases in the number of Republican outliers in the House and Senate in the 113th (2013-14)
and 114th (2015-16) Congresses stem from many Republicans supporting several (mostly failed) amendments to
broader legislation that would increase federal benefits for same-sex couples and protect against discrimination and
harassment of LGBTQ+ individuals.

55

Figure 3.6. Percent of MCs who are HRC Rating Outliers by Party and Chamber, 1989-2020
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broader education realignment that is the focus of this project. Before we can answer this question,
we must first ask whether being an outlier on LGBTQ+ rights within one’s party is related to
constituent educational attainment. Table 3.1 attempts to answer this latter question. This table
presents results of a time-series logistic regression in which the dependent variable is whether a
member of Congress was an outlier within their party on the HRC scorecard rating. Independent
variables included in the regression were the percent of a member’s constituents who have a
college education; the percent of a member’s non-Hispanic white constituents who have a college
education; the Democratic vote share in the member’s district or state in the most recent
presidential election; campaign contributions from pro-LGBTQ+ interest groups and donors; the
chamber of Congress a member belongs to; whether Democrats controlled that chamber in the
period in question; and whether the member was an outlier in the prior congress. Data included
here ranges from 2003 to 2020 and Democrats and Republicans are split into separate models as
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Table 3.1.Time-Series Logistic Regression for HRC Outliers Status, 2003-2020
Democrats
Republicans
b/(se)
b/(se)
b/(se)
b/(se)
% Constituents with Bachelor's Degree or Higher
-0.159***
0.023
(0.021)
(0.013)
% White Constituents with Bachelor's Degree or Higher
-0.142***
0.023
(0.023)
(0.012)
Democratic Presidential Vote Share in Last Election
-0.128*** -0.103***
0.016
0.016
(0.014)
(0.016)
(0.020)
(0.018)
Pro-LGBTQ+ Campaign Contributions
-0.363*** -0.340***
0.969***
0.961***
(0.070)
(0.070)
(0.147)
(0.145)
Senate
-1.397*** -1.655***
0.205
0.217
(0.345)
(0.352)
(0.222)
(0.223)
Democratic Control of Chamber
-0.453*
-0.521*
0.045
0.047
(0.225)
(0.222)
(0.156)
(0.156)
1.974***
2.029***
1.702***
1.698***
HRC Outliert-1
(0.310)
(0.334)
(0.274)
(0.274)
Constant
9.153***
8.006***
-3.914*** -3.968***
(1.065)
(1.176)
(0.663)
(0.629)
Log Likelihood
-311.926
-319.588
-692.201
-691.888
N
2133
2133
2181
2181
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; District and Year Random Effects included

we would expect educational attainment to have opposite effects on the member being an outlier:
greater constituent educational attainment should make it less likely for Democrats to be an outlier
and more likely for Republicans to be an outlier.
In Table 3.1, we can observe that for both Democrats and Republicans, the direction of the
effect of constituent educational attainment is as expected, but the effect is much larger and more
significant among Democrats than Republicans. These effects are seen more vividly in Figure 3.7
which presents the marginal effect of constituent educational attainment on outlier status for
Democrats and Republicans, holding the effect of all other variables constant. As educational
attainment increases, Democrats are much less likely to be an outlier within their party on
LGBTQ+ issues and Republicans are more likely to be so, though this relationship is much weaker.
Why might this be the case? I hypothesize that the temporary surge in the number of Republican
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Figure 3.7. Predicted Probability of HRC Rating Outlier Status by Constituent Educational
Attainment, 2003-2020
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outliers in the 2010s that is seen in Figure 3.6 at a time when they did not hold as many seats in
highly educated districts and states may be affecting the relationship here.
To account for this, I ran the same logistic regression model with Republican members of
Congress only, but I split the data in two: Republicans in Congress from 2003-2010 and
Republicans in Congress from 2011-2020. Table 3.2 and Figure 3.8 present the results of this
revised model and the marginal effect of district educational attainment respectively. We can
observe that educational attainment does have a larger effect on Republican members of Congress
in the earlier period than in the later period as expected; and that in the earlier period, the effect of
overall constituent educational attainment has a significant positive effect on a Republican
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Table 3.2. Time-Series Logistic Regression for Republican HRC Outlier Status, 2003-2020
2003-10
2011-20
b/(se)
b/(se)
b/(se)
b/(se)
% Constituents with Bachelor's Degree or Higher
0.034*
0.007
(0.017)
(0.013)
% White Constituents with Bachelor's Degree or Higher
0.03
0.011
(0.018)
(0.011)
Democratic Presidential Vote Share in Last Election
0.143***
0.165***
0.009
0.009
(0.033)
(0.030)
(0.006)
(0.006)
Pro-LGBTQ+ Campaign Contributions
0.808***
0.932***
1.012***
1.006***
(0.178)
(0.198)
(0.174)
(0.174)
Senate
-0.267
-0.131
0.151
0.155
(0.284)
(0.374)
(0.188)
(0.186)
Democratic Control of Chamber
-0.119
-0.088
-0.019
-0.015
(0.335)
(0.361)
(0.213)
(0.213)
HRC Outliert-1
3.430***
3.557***
1.264***
1.252***
(0.405)
(0.455)
(0.340)
(0.337)
Constant
-9.759*** -10.946*** -2.834*** -2.957***
(1.610)
(1.440)
(0.448)
(0.425)
Log Likelihood
-178.594
-162.377
-487.562
-487.189
N
849
800
1381
1381
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; District and Year Random Effects included

member’s outlier status. This effect is seen visually in Figure 3.8.23 Though, it must be repeated
that educational attainment continues to have a much weaker effect on Republicans than
Democrats. While I will present other data below that shows that there is still strong support for
the education realignment removing pro-LGBTQ+ Republicans from Congress, it may be other
purported factors on Republican LGBTQ+ position taking may have had a greater effect than the
education realignment itself.
In addition to the regression models, we can also simply look at the raw average constituent
educational attainment numbers for both outliers and non-outliers. In Figure 3.9, we can see that
over the period examined here, Republican outliers represent districts and states with greater

23

The greater confidence interval in Figure 3.8 for the 2003-10 data at higher levels of educational attainment may be
accounted for by the fact that there were very few Republican-held districts or states with such high levels of
educational attainment at this time.
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Figure 3.8. Predicted Probability of Republican HRC Rating Outlier Status by Constituent
Educational Attainment, 2003-2020
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educational attainment than Republican non-outliers; and the opposite is true for Democrats.24 This
is the case in both the House and Senate, though the differences are starker in the former chamber
than in the latter. This difference between the chamber is likely the result of there being a greater
variation in constituent educational attainment in the House than in the Senate. Again, we also see
a more significant relationship among Democrats than Republicans.
There does appear to be a more significant relationship between LGBTQ+ position taking
and constituent educational attainment among Republicans if we look at specific roll call votes in

24

Years included are 1993-94 and 2003-20 for House and Senate members. Additionally, the Senate figure includes
data from 2001-02.
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Figure 3.9. Constituent Educational Attainment of HRC Outliers vs. Non-Outliers, 1993-2020
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Congress. Two key LGBTQ+ policies that received a vote in Congress in the 2000s were the
Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA) and the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA)
introduced earlier in this chapter. The former was a proposed constitutional amendment that would
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Figure 3.10. Predicted Probability of Voting for LGBTQ+ Bills by Constituent Educational
Attainment and Party
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (2007; 2013)
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ban same-sex marriage. This amendment was voted on in both the House and Senate in 2006 and
failed to receive the required two-thirds majority in both chambers. The latter would have banned
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. Similar versions of the bill received floor
votes in the House in 2007 and in the Senate in 2013.
The level of educational attainment in members’ districts or states had a significant effect
on whether Democrats and Republicans voted for these measures. Figure 3.10 displays the
marginal effect of constituent educational attainment on the likelihood Democrats and Republicans
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voted for both bills.25 This is based on two logistic regression models for each bill.26 For the
Federal Marriage Amendment, greater constituent educational attainment makes a member less
likely to support the amendment among both parties; and the opposite is true for support for
ENDA. Unlike the outlier models, constituent educational attainment has a larger effect on
behavior among Republicans than among Democrats. But overall, we can see that Republicans
from highly educated districts were more likely to take the pro-LGBTQ+ position on these two
bills and Democrats from less educated districts were more likely to take the anti-LGBTQ+
position. In the following sections, I will show that the education realignment contributed to the
removal of these members who were outliers on LGBTQ+ rights within their parties.

3.5. The Effect of the Education Realignment on LGBTQ+ Rights Party Position Taking
We know that the overall number of congressional outliers on LGBTQ+ rights decreased
in recent years among both Democrats and Republicans, but where did those outliers go and did
the decrease have anything to do with the education realignment? This section attempts to address
both questions. To do this, I analyze the 187 members of Congress who were an outlier within
their party on the HRC scorecard rating for at least one congress from the 108th to 111th Congresses
(2003-10).
I chose the time range of 2003-10 for both data availability and real-world dynamics in
Congress. I have consistent data on district and state educational attainment beginning in 2003;

25

For the 2007 House vote on ENDA, seven Democratic members publicly stated they were voting against the bill,
because it did not ban discrimination based on gender identity in addition to sexual orientation. Because these members
were still taking a pro-LGBTQ+ position, they are shown as voting for the bill in the data. These members were Yvette
Clarke (NY-11), Rush Holt (NJ-12), Michael Michaud (ME-02), Jerry Nadler (NY-8), Edolphus Towns (NY-10),
Anthony Weiner (NY-9), and Nydia Velázquez (NY-12).
26
Other independent variables besides educational attainment and party included in these models were: (1) the
Democratic vote share in the prior presidential election; (2) pro-LGBTQ+ campaign contributions; (3) a dummy
variable for senators; and (4) whether the member was female. The latter follows public opinion research that finds
women are more likely to support pro-LGBTQ+ policies than men (Herek 2002).
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Figure 3.11. Futures of HRC Rating Outliers, 2003-2010
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and I choose 2010 as a cutoff because that coincides with the 2010 midterm elections in which
many moderate and conservative Democrats left Congress. The time range also includes the 2006
and 2008 congressional elections that ousted many moderate and liberal Republicans. The removal
of these moderates can be observed in Figure 3.5. All of this combines to the 2000s being the
period in which full data is available and in which it is most likely to detect pro-LGBTQ+
Republicans and anti-LGBTQ+ Democrats.
I trace the futures of these 188 outliers in Congress from 2003-10. There are three possible
future paths of interest in this study: (1) the outlier can remain in Congress; (2) they can have left
Congress and their district or state is held by the same party; and (3) they can have left Congress
and their district or state is now held by a different party.27 Figure 3.11 shows the percent of HRC
outliers who fall into each category. About 10% continue to serve in Congress; and about 30%
27

There are obviously more specific outcomes for these members, such as whether they sought higher office, retired,
or lost a primary or general election, but for my purposes here, such intricacies are not especially relevant.
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Table 3.3. Odds Ratios of Seat Switching Parties: HRC Outliers vs. Non-Outliers, 2003-2010
Republicans
Democrats

House of Representatives
5.08
23.22

Senate
7.41
4.21

have left Congress and their constituency is still represented by the same party. But the majority
(58%) of outliers during this period have left Congress and the opposite party now holds their
seat.28
The percentage of HRC outliers who remain in Congress is also much lower than Congress
in general during this period: thirty-two percent of those who were in Congress from the last
congress (2009-10) included in this outlier analysis continue to serve in Congress in 2021. This is
nearly triple the percent of the outliers who remain. Beyond this dynamic, districts and states held
by HRC outliers from 2003-10 are much more likely to have flipped from one party to another as
of 2021. Table 3.3 presents the odds ratios for comparing HRC outliers and non-outliers by party
and chamber on this metric. For Republicans and Democrats in both the House and Senate, outlier
districts and states are shown to be more likely to switch parties. This is particularly true for House
Democrats, for whom districts represented by HRC outliers are more than twenty times more likely
to switch parties than those that were not. That high number likely stems from the many
conservative House Democrats who were ousted during the 2010 and 2014 midterm elections.
Another key difference between HRC outliers and non-outliers is where the outliers are
from in relation to the rest of their party’s coalition at the time. Figure 3.12 contrasts the regional
distribution of both the overall Democratic and Republican caucuses in Congress and that of only

28

To account for redistricting in the House of Representatives that affects the geographical composition of
congressional districts over time, I use data from Daily Kos Elections which compares districts before and after
redistricting in recent years (Daily Kos 2012).
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Figure 3.12. Regional Distribution of Democrats and Republicans in Congress, 2003-2010
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Democratic and Republican outliers.29 One can observe that the number of Democratic outliers
from the South and the number of Republican outliers from the Northeast are much higher than

29

The regional classification for congressional districts and states is based on the classification used by the U.S.
Census Bureau.
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the numbers from those regions in the entire caucus of both parties. This echoes prior accounts of
recent trends in the geographical composition of both parties which find Democrats and
Republicans generally losing support in the South and Northeast, respectively (Mellow 2008;
Reiter and Stonecash 2011). It is not surprising that these outliers disproportionately represented
districts in regions their parties were actively losing support in. It is also not surprising since the
Northeast has the highest level of educational attainment, and the South has the lowest. Thus, we
should expect Republican outliers to be more concentrated in the Northeast and Democratic
outliers to be more concentrated in the South.
This section produced three central findings about congressional outliers on LGBTQ+
rights from the 2000s: (1) they are less likely to remain in Congress; (2) the districts and states
they held are more likely to have switched parties in recent years; and (3) they disproportionately
come from regions that were shifting away from the outliers’ parties. The following sections will
show that these trends can at least be partially explained by the education realignment.

3.6. Elite Conversion among Outliers on LGBTQ+ Rights
If the education realignment led to the decrease in congressional outliers on LGBTQ+
rights, it could have occurred through two different methods: elite conversion and/or elite
replacement. This would then also affect the broader positions both parties took on LGBTQ+ rights
in subsequent years. I will tackle elite replacement in the following section, but as for elite
conversion, the logic is that if districts or states held by HRC outliers have a change in educational
attainment, then those outliers may change their positions on LGBTQ+ rights to become more in
step with their constituency. For example, if a Democratic outlier sees a sharp increase in the
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Table 3.4. 2003-2010 HRC Rating Outliers who Remain in Congress
Member
Susan Collins
Bill Cassidy
Lisa Murkowski
Chris Smith
Mario Diaz-Balart

Republicans
District/State
2020 Outlier
ME
Yes
LA
No
AK
No
NJ-04
No
FL-25
Yes
Average ∆

Democrats
District/State
2020 Outlier
VA-03
No
IL-01
No
NC-01
No
WI-03
No
TX-28
Yes
OH-09
No
SC-06
No
OH-13
No
DE
No
MD-02
No
TN-05
No
IL-11
No
GA-02
No
MS-02
No
GA-13
No
Average ∆
Note 1: Bolded names represent senators.
Note 2: Cassidy moved from House to Senate over this time period.
Member
Bobby Scott
Bobby Rush
G.K. Butterfield
Ron Kind
Henry Cuellar
Marcy Kaptur
Jim Clyburn
Tim Ryan
Tom Carper
Dutch Ruppersberger
Jim Cooper
Bill Foster
Sanford Bishop
Bennie Thompson
David Scott

∆ HRC Rating (2010-20)
-35
-20
-17
7
8
-11.4

∆ HRC Rating (2010-20)
14
16
18
20
23
23
26
26
27
29
32
32
34
38
53
27.4

educational attainment of their constituents, they may take more liberal positions on LGBTQ+
issues.
I first look at conversion among the few HRC outliers who continue to serve in Congress.
Table 3.4 lists these members of Congress. It also lists whether that member was an outlier within
their party on the HRC scorecard rating in the most recent congress for which there is data: the
116th Congress (2019-20). Two Republicans (Susan Collins and Mario Diaz-Balart) and one
Democrat (Henry Cuellar) continue to be outliers. All others do not. Furthermore, on average the
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Figure 3.13. Remaining HRC Outliers: Change in HRC Rating vs. Change in Constituent
Educational Attainment
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HRC scorecard ratings of Republicans fell by about 11 points and the ratings of Democrats rose
by about 27 points.30 These findings suggest that nearly all the HRC outliers from 2003-10 who
remain in Congress are much more in step with their parties on LGBTQ+ issues. Thus, there is
evidence for conversion.

30

The difference for each member was calculated by subtracting the member’s average scorecard rating from the
2003-10 period from their scorecard rating in 2019-20.
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Figure 3.14. HRC Outliers who were replaced by Co-partisans: Change in HRC Rating vs. Change
in Constituent Educational Attainment
80

Change in Constituent Educational Attainment

60

-80

40

20

0
-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

-20

-40

-60

-80

Change In HRC Scorecard Rating
Republicans

Democrats

Republican Trend Line

Democratic Trend Line

But is this conversion related to the education realignment? One way to answer this
question is by comparing the changes in a member’s HRC scorecard rating over time to the changes
in educational attainment among that member’s constituents over the same period. Figure 3.13
does so by presenting a scatterplot of HRC outliers who remain in Congress. The two axes
represent the change in the member’s scorecard rating and the change in their seat’s educational
attainment. We can observe that there does not appear to much of a relationship between these two
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variables: the trend lines for both Democrats and Republicans are relatively flat; and even slightly
negative for the former, which is the opposite of what would be expected if the education
realignment is substantially impacting these members.
As was stated above, these outlier members who remain in Congress are not very
numerous, so it is difficult to draw conclusions from this particular group of outliers. A larger
group of outliers are those who no longer remain in Congress, but whose district or state continues
to be held by the same party in the 117th Congress. It could be that these new co-partisan members
are more in step with their party on LGBTQ+ issues and that this shift corresponds to changes in
constituent educational attainment. A scatterplot for this second group is seen in Figure 3.14, but
again, there is little to no relationship observed between the two variables. While many of these
districts and states are no longer represented by members who are HRC outliers, it does not appear
that the education realignment had much to do with that shift or with any elite conversion
altogether.

3.7. Elite Replacement among Outliers on LGBTQ+ Rights
While there is little evidence the education realignment leading to conversion among HRC
outliers who remain in Congress or who were replaced by co-partisans, there is significant
evidence for the education realignment leading to the replacement of HRC outliers with members
of the opposing party. If the education realignment were to affect outliers through this mechanism,
we would expect Republican outliers in highly educated districts and states and Democratic
outliers in less educated districts and states to be the most likely to be replaced by a member of a
different party in Congress. The logic here is that as the education realignment progresses and
more college-educated voters shift allegiances to the Democratic Party and the opposite occurs
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among non-college-educated voters, this will lead to the flipping of districts and states with
constituent educational attainment out of step with the party that had controlled them previously.
Figure 3.15 supports these expectations. This figure shows all the districts and states held
by HRC outliers from 2003-10 by their level of educational attainment and whether the seat is held
by the opposite party as of 2021.31 First, we can observe that HRC Democratic outliers are
concentrated in less educated districts and states and HRC Republican outliers are concentrated in
highly educated districts and states. This corresponds to what we would expect from the
relationship between constituent educational attainment and HRC outlier status described above.
Second, and more importantly, we can observe that less educated Democratic districts and highly
educated Republican districts are more likely to have changed parties since as of 2021. About 73%
of Republican highly educated outlier districts are now controlled by Democrats and about 74%
of Democratic less educated outlier districts are now controlled by Republicans. This is compared
to 29% of the rest of Republican sample and 48% of the rest of the Democratic sample. Much of
this party switching was also concentrated in the Northeast among Republicans and in the South
among Democrats. This supports the regional trends discussed earlier.
The results presented in this section suggest that the education realignment did impact the
fate of LGBTQ+ congressional outliers most through the replacement of pro-LGBTQ+
Republicans and anti-LGBTQ+ Democrats with members of the opposing party. These new
members were not outliers in their parties on LGBTQ+ issues either: of the 110 districts and states
represented by an HRC outlier from 2003-10 that are now held by different parties, only one of
them is represented by a member of Congress who is an outlier within their party on the HRC
scorecard rating. From this, we can extrapolate that the education realignment resulted in the

31

The level of educational attainment (low, medium, high) is in comparison to the overall distribution among HRC
outlier districts and states.
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Figure 3.15. Constituent Educational Attainment of HRC Rating Outliers by Party Switch as of
2021
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replacement of pro-LGBTQ+ Republicans with pro-LGBTQ+ Democrats and of anti-LGBTQ+
Democrats with anti-LGBTQ+ Republicans. This is the chief effect of the education realignment
on party position taking in Congress on LGBTQ+ rights.

3.8. Conclusion
One of the most remarked upon shifts in American politics in recent decades has been the
dramatic increases in representation of the LGBTQ+ community in public policy. Since the 1990s,
we have witnessed gay men and lesbians prevented from openly serving in the military to not only
those groups being allowed to serve, but also transgender individuals as well. The Biden
administration overturned a Trump administration ban on transgender military service and is even
now offering gender affirming surgeries and treatments to transgender veterans (Karni 2021). We
have also gone from the federal government defining marriage as exclusively between a man and
a woman to the Supreme Court making same-sex marriage legal nationwide in 2015. This decision
was championed by the Democratic Party at the time, and the changes in military policy were led
by Democratic officials too.
While the Democratic Party shifted its stance on LGBTQ+ rights significantly in recent
years, the Republican Party has largely been opposed to many advancements in LGBTQ+ rights,
or at least, they have watched on the sidelines while policy did change. This is in the face of
increasing public support for LGBTQ+ rights among the American people. This chapter attempted
to explain these dynamics by arguing that the education realignment led to increased party sorting
on LGBTQ+ rights. Whereas in the 1990s and 2000s, there were many pro-LGBTQ+ Republicans
and anti-LGBTQ+ Democrats in Congress and in the electorate, the education realignment
removed many of these outliers from their party. While there was conversion among existing pro-
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LGBTQ+ Republicans and anti-LGBTQ+ Democrats in Congress, this appears to be relatively
unrelated to the education realignment and may be explained by other accounts of party position
change on LGBTQ+ issues that focus on the work of activists within each party (Fetner 2008;
Karol 2012; Baylor 2018).
I found greater evidence for the education realignment affecting the parties through
replacement. This supports other similar findings from Bishin, Freebourn and Teten (2020). As
the education realignment progressed and college-educated voters became more Democratic and
non-college-educated voters became more Republican, this resulted in the flipping of dozens of
congressional seats. Many of these districts and states that flipped parties were previously
represented by pro-LGBTQ+ Republicans and anti-LGBTQ+ Democrats. They were largely
replaced by pro-LGBTQ+ Democrats and anti-LGBTQ+ Republicans, respectively. This had the
effect of creating more unanimity in both parties on LGBTQ+ rights, but also led to more
polarization between the parties in this issue area.
This chapter opened with an anecdote about two pro-LGBTQ+ Republicans: Chris Shays
and Susan Collins. The former was a victim of the education realignment, but the latter remains in
Congress as the sole Republican senator who was an outlier within her party on LGBTQ+ rights
as of 2020. The only remaining Democratic senator who is an outlier as of 2020 is Joe Manchin of
West Virginia. He is the only Senate Democrat to not cosponsor the Equality Act, the most
discussed piece of LGBTQ+ legislation in the 117th Congress (2021-22).32 This is in addition to
Manchin being the last Democratic holdout in the Senate on supporting same-sex marriage. He
stated he respects the Supreme Court’s decision in 2015 but has yet to say he favors same-sex
marriage himself (Johnson 2019). Manchin represents West Virginia, which is the state with lowest

32

Equality Act, S. 293, 117th Congress (2021).
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percent of residents who hold a bachelor’s degree or higher in the entire country. He has been able
to hold on to his seat as a Democrat, despite Donald Trump carrying his state by nearly forty points
in the 2020 presidential election.
One of Manchin’s fellow Senate Democrats who also resisted supporting same-sex
marriage was Mark Pryor of Arkansas (Roarty 2013). Pryor, another frequent Democratic outlier
on LGBTQ+ rights, came from another very conservative state and one that has the third lowest
educational attainment in the country. Pryor was not as lucky as Manchin though and lost
reelection in 2014 by more than fifteen points to Republican Tom Cotton. While there are still proLGBTQ+ Republicans like Susan Collins and anti-LGBTQ+ Democrats like Joe Manchin in
Congress, most of them have gone the way of Chris Shays and Mark Pryor – they have
disappeared.
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Chapter 4. An Environmental Education: The Effect of the Education
Realignment on the Environment

“[Drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge] is a fall-on-your-sword issue. We will simply
vote no and will do so happily.”
- Republican Representative Charles Bass of New Hampshire (Curwood 2005)
In November 2005, House Republicans were attempting to win a long sought-after policy
victory: to open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) in Alaska for oil and natural gas
drilling. Republicans had included a provision to allow drilling on the refuge in the Energy Policy
Act passed earlier that year, but the provision was removed during the conference reconciliation
process. Now, the House Republican leadership had attached the provision to a new budget bill,
that was cutting billions of dollars from social spending. These cuts meant that moderate House
Democrats, who could usually be relied on to support drilling in the ANWR, were unwilling to
support the bill. Thus, Republicans had to hope that their whole caucus would support the bill for
it to pass. Their hopes were dashed when twenty-five moderate Republicans sent a letter to Speaker
Dennis Hastert stating they would not support the budget bill unless the drilling provision was
removed. The Republican leadership was forced to relent and removed the provision, keeping the
ANWR safe a bit longer and delivering a big victory to environmentalists (Associated Press 2005).
The author of that letter was Representative Charles Bass of New Hampshire, who is also
the source of the above quote from a 2005 radio interview on this string of events. Bass entered
the House in 1995 as part of the conservative Republican Revolution, but established himself as a
moderate on several issues, including the environment. He believed climate change was real and
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often supported measures to strengthen environmental protections.33 These beliefs increasingly
separated him from his Republican colleagues as congressional Republicans moved to the right on
the environment throughout the 1990s and 2000s.
A year after Bass sent the letter to his leader, he lost his bid for reelection. He would win
his district back four years later but would lose it again in 2012. No Republican has won it since
at the congressional or presidential level. At the time Bass first lost, his New Hampshire Second
Congressional District was a district with a higher-than-average level of educational attainment:
the percentage of constituents with a bachelor’s degree or higher was nearly six points higher than
the national average. The district’s level of educational attainment has increased over time,
especially among white females, whose rate of college education alone has doubled since the time
Bass sent his letter.
Pro-environment Republicans like Charles Bass leaving Congress is a phenomenon that
has accelerated over recent decades. There are very few pro-environment Republicans left as
evidenced by a 2019 vote in the House of Representatives on an amendment to an appropriations
bill to make drilling in the ANWR easier.34 Only five House Republicans joined Democrats in
defeating the amendment. The same number of Democrats broke ranks and voted with
Republicans. These few members were outliers within their parties on environmental issues, but
they were also outliers in that they represented districts that differed from their co-partisans on
educational attainment. The five Republicans’ average district educational attainment was over
five points higher than the House Republican caucus overall. The five Democrats represented
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Representative Charles Bass, speaking on H.R. 910, 111th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record 1540 (April 6,
2011): H 2357.
34
Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2020, H.R. 3055, 116th Congress (2019),
Roll Call Vote No. 143.
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districts with educational attainment levels on average nearly ten points below the rest of the House
Democratic caucus.
These differences in district educational attainment and member behavior on
environmental issues, as well as the shift in party affiliations in districts like the one Bass
represented are part of the larger education realignment that has seen more educated voters shift
to the Democratic Party from the Republican Party and the reverse to occur among less educated
voters. This chapter explores the effects of that realignment on both parties’ position taking on
environmental issues. I find that this realignment has contributed to the growing polarization of
the two parties on environmental policy chiefly through the replacement of pro-environment
Republicans and anti-environment Democrats in Congress. Furthermore, the majority of these
members were replaced by their districts and states shifting to the opposing party. This replacement
can be partially explained by the education realignment. Conversion of pro-environment
Republicans and anti-environment Democrats and the replacement of such members with copartisans who were more in step with their party’s position on the environment played a less
prominent, but still significant role. The result of these trends over recent decades resulted in two
parties that were further apart from one another yet more internally cohesive on environmental
issues.
This chapter proceeds as follows: I first review the recent history of party position taking
on the environment. I then discuss the public’s attitudes towards the environment and how those
attitudes figure into the impact the education realignment has had on party position taking on the
environment. The data and methods used to trace the impact of this realignment on the realignment
are introduced followed by the analysis of this impact. I conclude by discussing what the future
may hold for party position taking on the environment.
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4.1. The Evolution of Environmental Party Politics
The 1970s was arguably the decade in which the environment was at its highest salience in
American politics. During this time, many pro-environment interest groups launched such as the
Environmental Defense Fund and Greenpeace (Duffy 2012). This was a decade when several key
laws were passed which were aimed at protecting the environment, including the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, the Safe Drinking Water
Act, and the Endangered Species Act; and in 1970, the Environmental Protection Agency was
created to be the bureaucratic hub for environmental regulation in the federal government
(Andrews 2012).
Many of these environmental protection laws enjoyed widespread bipartisan support in
Congress (Kraft 2018). The 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act passed by a vote of 375-1 in
the House of Representatives and the vote in the Senate was unanimous; and the Endangered
Species Act passed with 355 and 92 votes in the House and Senate, respectively.35 Both of these
bills, along with several others were signed by Republican president Richard Nixon, who also
proposed the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Nixon may not have been
an ardent environmentalist, but he and many other Republicans were willing to support these
environmental protections spearheaded by environmental activists and liberal members of
Congress.
Nearly five decades later, the 2016 Republican Party platform called for a significant
reduction in regulatory powers of the EPA and to “shift responsibility for environmental protection
from the federal government to the states” (Peters and Woolley 2016). So how did the Republican
Party shift from leading the effort to create the EPA to attempting to dismantle it? Similarly, how
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Clean Air Amendments of 1970, H.R. 17255, 91st Congress (1970); Endangered Species Act, S. 1983, 93rd Congress
(1973).
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did the Democratic Party go from routinely having dozens of Democrats in Congress voting for
drilling in the ANWR in the early 2000s to having fewer than ten such individuals?
As seen in Figure 4.1, the two parties are increasingly polarized on environmental issues.
Since the 1980s, Democrats became more pro-environment and Republicans became more antienvironment in both chambers of Congress according to the League of Conservation Voters’
congressional scorecard ratings.
Many previous accounts of party position taking on the environment trace the beginnings
of this polarization to the rise of conservatism in the Republican Party. In response to the activist
liberal policies of the New Deal and Great Society that grew the national government, a
conservative backlash arose. Part of this backlash was aimed at the environmental regulations
implemented during the 1970s. Both Duffy (2012) and Layzer (2014) argued conservative activists
who were fiercely opposed to many government regulations of the environment gained
prominence in the Republican Party and pushed the party to move away from any pro-regulation
stances. This rise of anti-government regulation conservatism within the Republican Party
culminated in the election of Ronald Reagan as president in 1980.
During the Reagan administration, many environmental protection regulations were rolled
back, though this mainly occurred through executive and bureaucratic action as Democrats
maintained control of Congress and blocked major legislative rollbacks (Andrews 2012; Kraft
2018). Still, the Reagan administration’s actions on the environment spurred another backlash
movement – this time from pro-environment activists. The 1980s saw a significant increase in the
number and activity of pro-environmental groups, which increasingly aligned themselves with the
Democratic Party. Duffy (2012) argued that this was part of the backlash cycle that characterized
environmental politics in recent American history: when liberals control government and
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Figure 4.1. Average LCV Scorecard Rating by Party and Chamber, 1983-2020
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implement new environmental regulations, anti-government conservatives mobilize against the
new regulations; and when conservatives control government and roll these regulations back, proenvironment activists and interest groups mobilize to protect these regulations.
The George H.W. Bush administration was a time in which some bipartisanship on
environmental policy returned in American politics. Bush attempted to set himself apart from his
predecessor as a more pro-environment Republican and pulled many of his fellow Republicans
along with him (Andrews 2012). Bush’s effort culminated in the bipartisan amendments to the
Clean Air Act in 1990 that attempted to tackle new environmental issues like acid rain and ozone
82

depletion. These amendments passed in the House of Representatives by a vote of 401-25 and in
the Senate by a vote of 89-10.36
This resurgence of bipartisanship on the environment ended with the election of Democrat
Bill Clinton as president in 1992. Republicans in Congress, led by their new leader Newt Gingrich,
opposed new environmental regulations. This left Democrats to attempt to pass new legislation on
their own, which they largely failed to accomplish due to internal party divisions and a focus on
other issues. Internal party divisions also kept Republicans from rolling back more environmental
regulations when they retook Congress in 1994 and the presidency in 2000 (Klyza and Sousa
2008). Such divisions are seen in the anecdote about ANWR drilling in the opening of this chapter.
Klyza and Sousa (2008) characterized the status of environmental politics in the 1990s and
2000s as one of legislative gridlock. Both parties when they were in power attempted to shift
environmental policy in their desired direction but were often unable to get legislation passed
because of a lack of bipartisan agreement and pushback from moderate members. These dynamics
are seen in the effort to pass the American Clean Energy and Security Act in 2009.37 This bill
sought to increase environmental regulation and most notably would implement a “cap and trade”
policy, in which a nationwide cap on carbon emissions would have been set and would have
allowed private businesses to buy and sell permits to emit greenhouse gases. Democrats, in charge
of both houses of Congress and the presidency for the first time in over a decade attempted to pass
this bill. Its environmental regulations had to watered down significantly to gain enough support
to pass in the House of Representatives and still 44 Democrats voted against it. It only passed
because eight Republicans crossed the aisle to support the legislation. The bill then died in the
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Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, S. 1630, 101st Congress (1990).
American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Congress (2009).
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Senate, where it faced opposition from moderate Democrats and a filibuster threat from
Republicans.
After the failure to pass any significant environmental protection legislation, President
Barack Obama turned to executive actions to shift environmental policy, just like his predecessor
George W. Bush did and his successor Donald Trump would. Absent one party having large
majorities in both chambers of Congress and little internal party division, it appears that the
legislative stalemate on environmental policy Klyza and Sousa describe will continue. While the
former condition seems unlikely given current levels of polarization in the electorate, I will show
that the latter is less of a pressing issue in Congress today as the numbers of pro-environment
Republicans and anti-environment Democrats have dwindled. This explains some of the
divergence between the parties on the environment observed in Figure 4.1.
Shipan and Lowry (2001) attempt to explain party divergence on the environment too.
They argued the more ideologically extreme factions within both the Republican and Democratic
parties gain influence under two conditions: (1) when environmental issues are salient; and (2)
when interest groups involved in the environment become more prominent. Historically, the first
condition is not often met as the environment is not a very salient issue for many Americans (Guber
2003; Klyza and Sousa 2008).
On the second condition, this echoes findings by Anderson (2011). Anderson found that
the presence of significant numbers of constituents who belong to environmental groups has a
positive effect on the representation of pro-environmental policies by both Democrats and
Republicans in Congress. Environmental interest groups have risen in size and influence over
recent decades (Kraft 2018). Of particular importance for party position taking in Congress,
campaign donations from environmental groups in congressional elections rose from less than a
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million dollars in 1990 to over thirteen million dollars in 2020 (Center for Responsive Politics
2022). But such donations are increasingly slanted towards Democratic candidates: in 1990, the
ratio of pro-environment donations between Democrats and Republicans in Congress was about
8:1; in 2020, it is about 38:1. If we combine this with the rising influence of anti-environmental
regulation activists in the Republican Party, it is likely that the pull of these competing activist
groups polarized the parties. While I focus on another source of polarization in this chapter, I do
not dispute that activist pressure is a relevant cause of party polarization on the environment.
Another source of the polarization observed on environmental policy is the regional
composition of both political parties. In a study of congressional behavior on environmental policy
in the 1980s, Kamieniecki (1995) found that both northeastern Republicans and southern
Democrats were outliers in their parties on the environment. Northeastern Republicans were more
supportive of, and southern Democrats were less supportive of environmental protections than the
rest of their parties respectively. These Republicans and Democrats were often the ones who
frustrated their party’s environmental agenda throughout the 1990s and 2000s (Klyza and Sousa
2008). Furthermore, Shipan and Lowry (2001) found that when there were more Democratic
members of Congress from the South, the parties were less polarized on the environment. In recent
years, there are fewer northeastern Republicans and southern Democrats in Congress (Mellow
2008; Reiter and Stonecash 2011). This has contributed to the growing polarization between the
two parties on this issue. As I will show below, these regional trends were connected to the
education realignment: many northeastern Republicans represented highly educated constituencies
and exhibited more pro-environment behavior in Congress; and the opposite was true for southern
Democrats. As voters began to realign on the basis on educational attainment, many of these
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members were swept out of office. This transformation of both the Democratic and Republican
coalitions contributed to the polarization of the parties on environmental policy.

4.2. Public Attitudes on the Environment: Party and Education
As party elites polarized on environmental issues, the party masses polarized as well. In
the electorate, Democrats became more concerned with the environment and more supportive of
policies aimed at protecting the environment; and Republicans became less concerned in
comparison (Guber 2013; Dunlap, McCright and Yarosh 2016; Egan and Mullin 2017). As
Dunlap, McCright and Yarosh (2016) found, there has long been a partisan gap in support for
environmental policies among the American public, but that gap began to grow dramatically in the
mid-2000s. Guber (2013) argued that much of this gap is the result of voters taking cues from party
elites on environmental issues. I do not dispute that this took place, but there was also party
switching taking place at the same time.
As discussed earlier, one such instance of party switching is the education realignment that
led to the trading of voters between the two parties on the basis of educational attainment.
Educational attainment fits in with environmental policy as this is a policy area in which
Americans differ depending on their level of educational attainment (Van Liere and Dunlap 1980;
Guber 2003; Driscoll 2019). More educated Americans tend to hold more pro-environment
attitudes and exhibit higher levels of support for environmental regulations than less educated
Americans. This relationship also extends to voting behavior: both Salka (2001) and Coan and
Holman (2008) found that higher education led voters to be more likely to support proenvironment ballot measures.
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There are a few theories for why this relationship between educational attainment and
environmental attitudes exists. One advocated by Van Liere and Dunlap (1980) is that education
affects attitudes towards the environment as higher education leads to higher social status:
educated (and oftentimes wealthier) individuals tend to have achieved their basic material needs
and can shift their attention to less pressing issues like the state of the environment. I would add
that those with a college education are less likely to be in occupations that would be directly
affected by increased environmental regulations such as manufacturing. This may lead them to
lend more support for such regulations. At the same time, this theory may be more relevant to the
question of whether income or class affects support for the environment. Because there is often a
correlation between income and education, income may be driving environmental attitudes more
than education is.
A theory more isolated to education is that education makes an individual more
knowledgeable about the environment. Guber (2003) argued that environmental policy involves
complex issues regarding the science of climate change and the regulations proposed to address it.
The more educated an individual is, the more cognitive skills they possess to comprehend the
intricacies of environmental policy. They are also more likely to take action on the environment
due to their greater organizational skills. Guber’s theory for environmental policy fits in with more
general theories about how education affects political behavior and participation (Verba,
Schlozman and Brady 1995). More recent studies of public opinion on the environment support
Guber’s theory: Cook (2016) argued increased education and scientific knowledge can help
individuals reject misinformation about climate change; and Motta (2019) found greater scientific
knowledge led to greater support for government funding of science, though Motta argued interest
in science may be more important than scientific knowledge alone.
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The gap in attitudes towards the environment by educational attainment has fluctuated over
time. Since the 1970s, the General Social Survey (GSS) has asked respondents whether they
believe the federal government is spending too much, too little, or just the right amount on
protecting the environment. Figure 4.2 reports the percentage of respondents who stated that the
government was spending too little on environmental protections by educational attainment. One
can observe that attitudes on this measure fluctuate back and forth over time and often corresponds
to the party of the president. Americans, regardless of educational attainment, voice more concern
over a lack of spending on the environment under Republican administrations than Democratic
ones. This makes intuitive sense given the parties’ opposing positions on environmental spending.
These findings also support the cyclical nature of environmental politics discussed earlier:
environmental issues become more salient and environmental activism becomes more robust
during Republican administrations than Democratic ones.
At the same time, the gap between those with a college education and those without one
widened under Republican administrations. This gap may be explained by the greater political
knowledge college educated Americans possess as discussed above. College educated Americans
may have been more aware of rollbacks of environmental regulations during the Reagan, George
H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush administrations than those without a college education.
Generally, Americans with a bachelor’s degree or higher are more likely to view the government
as spending too little on the environment that Americans with only a high school diploma, though
the difference between these two groups fluctuates over time. In recent years, a significant gap can
be observed between the two groups. Nevertheless, there is not great support for educational
attainment having much of an effect on environmental attitudes using this measure.
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Figure 4.2. Percent who Believe the Government is Spending Too Little on Protecting the
Environment, 1974-2018 (GSS)
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A lack of a consistently observable effect may be due to the nature of the question. The
question asks respondents to assess the current performance of the government on environmental
policy. This supposes that they are aware of how much the government is spending to protect the
environment, a supposition that is suspect given low levels of political knowledge. Americans’
evaluations of the government may also just reflect their partisan leanings, with higher evaluations
of the government’s performance resulting from a match between the party identification of the
respondent and the party that controls the White House. Thus, it may be more useful to look at
support for discrete attitudes on environmental issues rather than general evaluations of how the
government is handling environmental policy.
In 2010, the GSS included a battery of several questions on the environment. Responses to
five of those questions are reported in Figure 4.3. The questions included in Figure 4.3 are: (1)
whether society worries too much about the environment and too little about the economy; (2)
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Figure 4.3. Americans' Attitudes and Behavior on Environmental Issues by Educational
Attainment, 2010 (GSS)
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whether they are willing to pay higher taxes to protect the environment; (3) whether the U.S.
government is doing enough to protect the environment compared to other countries; (4) whether
they believe threats to the environment are exaggerated; and (5) whether they are a member of an
environmental group. Pro-environment responses to these five questions by educational attainment
are reported in Figure 4.3. For all five questions, a higher percentage of respondents with a
bachelor’s degree or higher gave a pro-environment response than respondents with only a high
school education.
Recently, the American National Election Survey (ANES) included survey questions on
support for specific environmental regulations in a 2019 pilot study: (1) greater government
regulation of businesses that produce greenhouse gases; and (2) higher fuel efficiency standards
for cars and trucks. Figure 4.4 reports responses to these questions by educational attainment.
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Figure 4.4. Americans' Support for Government Policies to Address Climate Change by
Educational Attainment, 2019 (ANES)
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Again, we can observe a college education is associated with much higher levels of support for
these two policies. The data shown in Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show that education attainment affects
support for environmental policies.
Some scholars have argued education may not be that significant. Hamilton (2011) found
that while higher levels of educational attainment generally are associated with higher levels of
concern about global warming, partisanship affects that relationship. The more educated
Democrats are, the more concerned they were about global warming, but concern fell as education
increased among Republicans in Hamilton’s study. It should be noted that Hamilton presented
these interaction effects only among strong Democrats and Republicans. As the education
realignment was transpiring when the survey Hamilton employed was fielded, I argue confining
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results to only strong party identifiers may exclude significant numbers of less educated Democrats
and more educated Republicans who may have been more likely to identify as weak party
identifiers as they were shifting parties.
Like Hamilton, Benegal, and Holman (2021) found a counterintuitive effect of education
on support for environment protection. Their study interacted educational attainment with racial
resentment and found that respondents who were racially prejudiced exhibited lower levels of
support for environmental protection, but education exacerbated that relationship: college educated
racist respondents were less likely to support policies to mitigate climate change than non-college
educated racist respondents. This relationship held among both Democrats and Republicans. While
this is a robust and interesting finding that goes against the theory about education and the
environment advocated in this chapter, I argue the broader contours of the education realignment
soften the effects of this study on my theory. Prior research on this realignment generally found
that social issues, including race, were driving the realignment. This is resulting in the sorting of
voters on racial issues, with more racially resentful voters leaning Republican and less racially
resentful voters leaning Democrat. It is likely that most racially resentful voters who are highly
educated will stay in the Republican Party; and most of the highly educated voters who do shift to
the Democratic Party are going to be more racially tolerant and have more pro-environment
attitudes.
Driscoll (2019) argued that while educational attainment and other demographic variables
used to be significant predictors of attitudes towards environmental policy, the effect of those
variables diminished in recent years and were replaced by partisanship as the most powerful
predictor of environmental policy support. While Driscoll’s findings supported this argument, they
do not account for the increasingly close relationship between demographics and partisanship. The
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education realignment is resulting in the increased correlation between educational attainment and
partisanship. Thus, as the realignment progresses, it may appear that educational attainment on its
own is becoming less consequential for attitudes on the environment, but what may be occurring
is that educational attainment is predicting partisanship which in turn is predicting concern for
climate change.
While there is some debate as to how educational attainment impacts attitudes on the
environment, I argue on the whole, there is some relationship based on the prior studies and data I
present above. This has potential consequences for party position taking on the environment. As
the education realignment progresses and Democrats come to represent more educated constituents
and Republicans come to represent less educated constituents, we can expect Democrats to become
more supportive of environmental protections and Republicans to become less supportive of such
protections. This stems from greater cohesion in each party’s coalition on environmental policy
because of this realignment.

4.3. Data and Methods
The primary dependent variable used in this chapter to measure party position taking on
the environment is the annual congressional scorecard published by the League of Conservation
Voters (LCV) since the 1970s (League of Conservation Voters 2021). The League of Conservation
Voters is a leading pro-environment interest group that advocates and lobbies for environmental
protection policies. In this chapter, I use data from the 98th to the 116th Congresses (1983-2020).
For each year, the LCV selects congressional roll call votes that a panel of conservation experts
deems consequential for the environment. The LCV records whether members of the House of
Representatives and Senate take the pro- or anti-environment position. It then compiles these votes
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to create a scorecard rating for each member of Congress using a simple average.38 For example,
if there are ten votes included in a given year’s scorecard and a member of Congress took the proenvironment position in four of those votes, they would receive a 40% scorecard rating for that
year.39 The scores range from 0 to 100, with higher scores signifying more pro-environment voting
behavior. Rather than scores for individual years, I use scores for an entire congress over a twoyear period.40
While I do compare the average scores for both parties over time as seen in Figure 1, most
of the analysis below focuses on comparing individual members of Congress to their co-partisans
at the same point in time. Again, I employ an outlier detection scheme that uses median absolute
deviation (MAD).41 Democrats that fall more than one deviation below and Republicans that fall
more than one deviation above their party’s median scorecard rating are classified as outliers.42
The MAD is calculated over the entire period examined here (1983-2020).43 I track the number of
outliers in both parties over time and track the future of outliers in the 2000s: whether they remain
in Congress, retired, or lost reelection; and whether control of their district or state switched parties.
I am focused on the degree to which these outliers were converted into their party’s mainstream or
were replaced by new members who were not outliers or were from the opposing party.

38

On rare occasions, the LCV weights consequential votes more heavily and counts them more than once.
If a member of Congress is absent for a vote, it counts as negative. This is done to signify that the member of
Congress did not place importance on the vote in question. Beginning in 2019, the LCV began to excuse absences due
to “family and medical leave or disasters.” Missed votes due to actions like campaigning still count against a member’s
score. This only amounts to a small fraction of observations each year.
40
For many years, the LCV includes a score for the overall congressional session. In years in which they do not, I
simply average the member’s scores over the two-year period.
41
For a more detailed discussion of the MAD outlier scheme, see Chapter 3.
42
It is obvious that there are also outlying Democrats who have higher scores than their party average and outlying
Republicans who have lower scores than their party average. These members are not consequential for this study as I
am trying to explain how Democrats became more pro-environment and Republicans became more anti-environment.
Existing Democrats who are very pro-environment and Republicans who are very anti-environment are not going to
influence this dynamic.
43
The MAD for Democrats and for Republicans was 16.
39
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As noted in Chapter 3, there should be some concern of the use of interest group scorecards
as a data source. The LCV is a private interest group that has political motivations which may bias
the choice of which votes to include in the scorecard. But as Shipan and Lowry (2001) argued, the
LCV ratings appear to have face validity: members of Congress known to be more proenvironment tend to receive very high scores and those who are known to be more antienvironment generally receive very low scores.
There is also skepticism over whether these scorecard ratings can be used to compare
congressional behavior over time. There is the potential that a rating of 100 in the 1980s may not
mean the same as a rating of 100 in the 2010s. I do not deny that this is an issue, but I would argue
the issue of the environment has changed over time – for example, an issue like global warming
was not paramount in the 1970s and 1980s as it is today. Thus, we should expect the issues included
on these scorecards to change over time as the debate surrounding the environment changes over
time. At the same time, I argue the same underlying factors would drive a member to be proenvironment today as it would thirty or forty years ago. Following Bishin, Freebourn and Teten
(2020) who also used interest group scorecards, I tested for the validity of the scorecards as
measuring the same concept over time using Cronbach’s alpha. The result was 0.91, which
suggests the scorecards are measuring the same concept for each period. I also note that to derive
whether a member is an outlier with their party on the environment, I only compare members
within the same period, so concerns about comparisons across time are not as relevant for that
measure.
To test how congressional behavior on the environment and whether members are outliers
within their parties on this issue are connected to the education realignment, I use data from the
United States Census Bureau and the American Community Survey on the educational attainment
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for states and congressional districts in recent decades.44 The specific measure I employ is the
percentage of constituents 25 years or older who have a bachelor’s degree or higher. I also restrict
this data point to only non-Hispanic white constituents for some of the analysis. Control variables
used in some of the statistical models of congressional behavior include political party; the
Democratic vote share for a state or district in the last presidential election (Daily Kos 2012); proenvironment campaign contributions;45 the chamber of Congress the member belongs to; and
whether that chamber was controlled by Democrats at the time.

4.4. Explaining Trends in Congressional Outliers on the Environment
As shown in Figure 4.1, the two parties have polarized on environmental policy in
Congress in recent decades, but how was this polarization achieved? One explanation is that the
number of pro-environment Republicans and anti-environment Democrats dramatically
diminished. Figure 4.5 shows the number of members of Congress who are outliers within their
parties on environmental policy from 1983-2020. For much of the 1980s, there were well over a
hundred members of Congress who were outliers in their parties. That number hovers around forty
in recent years. Furthermore, this decrease has not been limited to any one party or chamber. As
Figure 4.6 shows, the members of each party’s caucus who are outliers have decreased in both
chambers.46

44

Availability of this data at the congressional district level varies over time. From 2003 onwards, I have complete
data at the state and congressional district level for educational attainment. I was also able to access older census data
for 1983 and 1993. Years in between 1983 and 1993 as well as 1993 and 2003, I do not reliable data for.
45
I used the logarithm of the dollar amount received by each member from pro-environment groups. Data drawn from
Center for Responsive Politics (2022).
46
The dramatic jump in the percentage of Senate Democrats who are outliers on the environment in the 116th Congress
(2019-20) is partially explained by the several Democratic senators who missed several votes while running for
president during this period.
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Figure 4.5. Number of LCV Rating Outliers in Congress, 1983-2020
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The fact that there are fewer members who are outliers within their party is not a surprising
one, in and of itself. What is of more interest is that a member’s outlier status appears to have a
connection to the educational attainment in that member’s district or state. A time-series logistic
regression model was run for the congressional data from 2003 to 2020. The dependent variable
was whether the member of Congress was an outlier within their party on the LCV scorecard rating
for that congress. Independent variables included in the model were the overall educational
attainment of the member’s constituents; the educational attainment of the member’s non-Hispanic
white constituents; the Democratic vote share in the district or state in the last presidential election;
pro-environment campaign contributions given to the member in the last electoral cycle; the
chamber of Congress the member belongs to; and whether Democrats controlled that chamber.
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Figure 4.6. Percent of MCs who are LCV Rating Outliers by Party and Chamber, 1983-2020
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The data was split by political party as we would expect educational attainment to have different
effects on Democrats and Republicans: higher educational attainment would make Republicans
more likely to be an outlier and Democrats less likely to be an outlier.
Table 4.1 presents the results of these models. The effect of constituent educational
attainment on a member’s outlier status is as expected for both Democrats and Republicans and
the effects are significant for both overall educational attainment and white educational attainment.
It should be noted that the effect of educational attainment is small compared with other variables
included in the models. Additionally, the effect of constituent educational attainment is much more
pronounced among Democrats than Republicans. Overall, the results lend support for some
connection between a member’s voting behavior on environmental issues and the educational
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Table 4.1. Time-Series Logistic Regression for LCV Rating Outlier Status, 2003-2020
Democrats
b/(se)
b/(se)
-0.110***
% Constituents with Bachelor's Degree or Higher
(0.020)
% White Constituents with Bachelor's Degree or Higher
-0.074***
(0.018)
Democratic Presidential Vote Share in Last Election
-0.103*** -0.087***
(0.014)
(0.014)
Pro-Environment Campaign Contributions
-0.222*** -0.249***
(0.058)
(0.059)
Senate
0.025
-0.268
(0.296)
(0.281)
Democratic Control of Chamber
-1.198*** -1.204***
(0.233)
(0.233)
1.492***
1.641***
LCV Outliert-1
(0.298)
(0.314)
Constant
7.123***
5.813***
(1.104)
(1.022)
-492.704
-507.534
Log Likelihood
N
2150
2150
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; District and Year Random Effects included

Republicans
b/(se)
b/(se)
0.060***
(0.015)
0.048***
(0.014)
0.015*
0.015*
(0.006)
(0.006)
0.280***
0.271***
(0.067)
(0.068)
-0.542
-0.52
(0.346)
(0.352)
1.679***
1.681***
(0.293)
(0.294)
3.171***
3.173***
(0.391)
(0.409)
-6.535*** -6.346***
(0.705)
(0.700)
-470.188
-472.201
2204
2204

attainment of their constituents. This connection is more clearly shown in Figure 4.7 which
displays the marginal effect of constituent educational attainment on LCV outlier status for both
Democrats and Republicans with other variables held constant. As educational attainment
increases, Democrats become less likely to be outliers and Republicans become more likely to be
outliers.
We can also observe the marginal effect of constituent educational attainment on member
behavior on a discrete environmental bill. Figure 4.8 shows the likelihood of both Democrats and
Republicans voting for the previously discussed American Clean Energy and Security Act in 2009,
otherwise known as “Cap and Trade.” As constituent educational attainment increases, so does the
likelihood Democrats and Republicans support the bill. Again, the effect among Democrats is
stronger than among Republicans, though this may because there were only being eight
Republicans total who voted for the bill compared to 44 Democrats who voted against it.
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Figure 4.7. Predicted Probability of LCV Rating Outlier Status by Constituent Educational
Attainment, 2003-2020

Pr(Outlier)
0

0

.2

.2

Pr(Outlier)

.4

.4

.6

Republicans

.6

Democrats

5
15
25
35
45
55
65
% Constituents with Bachelor's Degree or Higher

5
15
25
35
45
55
65
% Constituents with Bachelor's Degree or Higher

Figure 4.9 also lends support for a connection between a member’s LCV outlier status and
the educational attainment of their constituents. In this figure, I compare outliers and non-outliers
in both parties and in both chambers on constituent educational attainment over time.47 In the
1980s, there was little difference between outliers and non-outliers on educational attainment in
both parties, but by the 1990s and 2000s, a persistent gap opened. On average, Republican outliers
represent districts and states with greater educational attainment than their co-partisans; and the
opposite is true among Democrats. The gap is also more pronounced in the House of
Representatives than in the Senate. This likely stems from there being much more variation in
47

Years included are 1983-84, 1993-94, and 2003-2020 for House and Senate members. Additionally, the Senate
figure includes data from 2001-02.
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Figure 4.8. Predicted Probability of Voting for 2009 "Cap and Trade" Bill by Constituent
Educational Attainment and Party
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district educational attainment in the House than there is in the Senate. These results also align
with the overall contours of the education realignment itself: the shift accelerated in the mid 1990s
and has continued since. In the following section, I show how the education realignment
contributed to the removal of many of the Republicans and Democrats who were outliers within
their parties on environmental issues in recent decades.
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Figure 4.9. Constituent Educational Attainment of LCV Rating Outliers vs. Non-Outliers by Party,
1983-2020
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4.5. The Effect of the Education Realignment on Environmental Party Position Taking
From the previous section, we can conclude that the number of congressional Democrats
and Republicans who are outside of their party’s mainstream on environmental policy decreased
in recent years; and that whether a member of Congress is outside of their party’s mainstream is
partially related to the level of educational attainment in their district or state. This section seeks
to explain the former using the latter. I use an analysis of 212 unique members of Congress who
were outliers on the LCV scorecard rating for at least one congress from the 108th to 111th
Congresses (2003-2010). These include both members of the House of Representatives and Senate.
This time range was chosen for both data availability and events in Congress during that
time. I only have consistent data on district and state educational attainment beginning in 2003.
This period ends with the 2010 midterm elections that resulted in a Republican landslide that
ousted many moderate and conservative Democrats. If one refers to Figure 5, one can observe a
sharp drop in the number of congressional LCV outliers after this electoral cycle. This cycle came
after good years for Democrats in 2006 and 2008 that ousted many moderate and liberal
Republicans. Thus, the 2000s become the period where we would be most likely to observe
significant numbers of members of Congress who buck their party on the environment and in
which data on educational attainment is available.
For these 212 outliers, we can trace their futures in Congress. There are three possible
outcomes of interest for these members: (1) they can remain in Congress; (2) they have left
Congress and their district or state is still held by the same party; and (3) they have left Congress
and their district or state is now held by a different party.48 Figure 4.10 shows the percentage of

48

To account for redistricting in the House of Representatives that affects the geographical composition of
congressional districts over time, I use data from Daily Kos Elections which compares districts before and after
redistricting in recent years (Daily Kos 2020).
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Figure 4.10. Futures of LCV Rating Outliers in Congress, 2003-2010
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the 210 members who fall into each category. Half of these outlying members have left Congress
and the district or state they represented has switched parties. Just over a third of the members left
Congress but were replaced by a member of their own party. The remaining eleven percent remain
in Congress as of 2021.49
This distribution differs greatly from Congress in general during this period. In comparison
with the twelve percent of outlying members who remain in Congress, thirty-two percent of those
who were in Congress from 2009-10 remain there in 2021. Additionally, districts and states
represented by members who were outliers from 2003-10 were much more likely to switch parties

49

Two of the outlying members who remain in Congress moved from the House of Representatives to the Senate.
They are Bill Cassidy (R-LA) and Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV).
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Table 4.2. Odds Ratios of Seat Switching Parties: LCV Outliers vs. Non-Outliers, 2003-2010
Republicans
Democrats

House of Representatives
3.55
10.18

Senate
8.76
9.52

than districts and states represented by members who were not outliers. Table 4.2 displays odds
ratios for comparing outliers and non-outliers from this period by party and chamber on whether
their district or state switched parties as of 2021. Across both parties and chambers, districts and
states represented by outlying members of Congress are much more likely to switch parties than
districts and states that were not. There are some differences by party and chamber though,
particularly among House Republican outliers who are only a bit more than three times more likely
to have left Congress. The odds are more than doubled for Senate Republicans and House and
Senate Democrats.
A final way in which the outlying members of Congress differ from their co-partisans is
where they are from. Figure 4.11 compares the regional distribution of both the overall Democratic
and Republican caucuses in Congress and Democratic and Republican LCV rating outliers from
2003-2010.50 The percentage of Democratic outliers who were from the South is much greater than
the overall percentage of southern Democrats; and the percentage of Republican outliers from the
Northeast is much greater than the overall percentage of northeastern Republicans. This supports
the earlier findings of Kamieniecki (1995) and Shipan and Lowry (2001) who found southern
Democrats to be more anti-environment and northeastern Republicans to be more pro-environment
than their co-partisans. These regional findings are also what the education realignment would
predict: the Northeast has the highest level of educational attainment, and the South has the lowest.

50

The regional classification for congressional districts and states is based on those provided by the U.S. Census
Bureau.
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Figure 4.11. Regional Distribution of Congressional Democrats and Republicans, 2003-2010
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If greater constituent educational attainment leads to more pro-environment congressional
behavior, we should expect to find more Republican outliers in the Northeast and more Democratic
outliers in the South.
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From the data presented above, we can conclude that: (1) outlying members of Congress
on environmental issues in the 2000s come from different regions than their co-partisans; (2) they
are less likely to remain in Congress; (3) and they are more likely to have represented districts and
states now held by the opposing party. As I will show in the following section, this latter trend is
related to the education realignment.

4.6. Elite Conversion among Outliers on the Environment
The education realignment could affect the fates of outlying members of Congress on
environmental policy and thus indirectly affect party position taking on the environment through
either conversion or replacement. For conversion, we may expect that if districts or states held by
outliers have a change in constituent educational attainment, then those outliers may convert
positions and become more in step with the rest of their party on the environment. These outliers
could also be replaced by a member of their own party who is not an outlier on the environment;
and we can see if this corresponds to the educational attainment of the district or state in question.
For the few outlying members who remain in Congress today, there is mixed evidence for
conversion. Table 4.3 reports whether these members continue to be outliers and what the change
was between their average LCV rating from 2003-10 and their LCV rating in the most recent
congress. For Republican outliers, it is difficult to say what the direction of travel was for these
few members. Six of the eleven members continued to be outliers in the 116th Congress; and the
average change in scorecard ratings for these members was -2.18. About half the group received
higher LCV ratings and the other half received lower ratings compared to a decade ago. Among
Democratic outliers who remain in Congress, it is easier to draw conclusions. All but two of the
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Table 4.3. 2003-2010 LCV Rating Outliers who Remain in Congress
Member
Bill Cassidy
Rob Wittman
Gus Bilirakis
Susan Collins
Chris Smith
Vern Buchanan
Shelley Moore Capito
Mario Diaz-Balart
Jeff Fortenberry
Michael Turner
Fred Upton

Republicans
District/State
2020 Outlier
LA
No
VA-01
No
FL-12
No
ME
Yes
NJ-04
Yes
FL-16
Yes
WV
No
FL-25
Yes
NE-01
Yes
OH-10
No
MI-06
Yes
Average ∆

∆ LCV Rating (2010-20)
-25
-16
-15
-14
-3
-2
1
6
8
11
25
-2.18

Democrats
Member
District/State
2020 Outlier
∆ LCV Rating (2010-20)
Linda Sanchez
CA-39
No
3
Michael Bennet
CO
Yes
5
Bennie Thompson
MS-02
No
10
John Larson
CT-01
No
11
Alcee Hastings
FL-23
No
13
Sheila Jackson Lee
TX-18
No
14
Mike Doyle
PA-14
No
16
Al Green
TX-09
No
16
Bobby Rush
IL-01
No
20
Ann Kirkpatrick
AZ-02
No
23
David Scott
GA-13
No
23
Henry Cuellar
TX-28
Yes
24
Sanford Bishop
GA-02
No
34
Average ∆
16.31
Note 1: Bolded names represent senators.
Note 2: Cassidy and Capito moved from House to Senate over this time period.

thirteen members were no longer outliers in the 116th Congress; and overall, there was a 16-point
increase in LCV ratings among these members from 2010 to 2020.
The more important question is whether any of these changes or lack thereof are related to
the education realignment. If they were, we could expect members who shifted significantly on in
their LCV ratings to also represent districts or states that saw significant fluctuations in constituent
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Figure 4.12. Change in LCV Scorecard Rating vs. Change in Constituent Educational Attainment:
LCV Outliers who Remain in Congress, 2010-2020
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educational attainment over the same period. Figure 4.12 does this by plotting a member’s change
in LCV rating and the change in their district’s educational attainment on a scatterplot. While the
trendlines for both Democrats and Republicans are positive, which is what would be expected if a
more educated constituency drives members to take more pro-environment positions, both lines
are relatively flat. This suggests that there is little effect, but this is a very small sample size of less
only two dozen members, so it is difficult to draw robust conclusions.
If we expand the sample size to outliers who were replaced by a member of the same party
though, we see similar results. Figure 4.13 plots these members and districts/states on the same
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Figure 4.13. Change in LCV Scorecard Rating vs. Change in Constituent Educational Attainment:
LCV Outlier Districts that Remain in Same Party's Control, 2010-2020
70
60
50

Change in Constituent Educational Attainment

40
30
20
10
0
-70

-60

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

-10
-20
-30
-40
-50
-60
-70

Change in LCV Scorecard Rating
Republicans

Democrats

Republican Trend Line

Democratic Trend Line

axes as in Figure 4.12. Again, we see flat trendlines for both Democrats and Republicans. While
over 80% of the members in this group are not outliers as of the most recent congress despite
replacing a co-partisan who was an outlier, this seems to have little to do with the education
realignment. But this is what we would expect from the broader implications of the education
realignment which involves voters switching party affiliations. While it could be the case that a
Republican member in a highly educated district and a Democratic member in a less educated
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district may shift their position on the environment to be more in step with their constituents, it is
more likely that such districts just flip parties altogether. The following section will show just that.

4.7. Elite Replacement among Outliers on the Environment
There is much greater support for the education realignment affecting party position taking
on the environment when we consider the replacement of outliers on the environment with a
member of Congress of the opposing party. If the education realignment is leading to more
educated populations becoming more Democratic and less educated populations becoming more
Republican, we should expect highly educated districts and states represented by Republicans and
less educated districts and states represented by Democrats to be more likely to flip parties. From
the analysis previously discussed, we know that outliers in each party on the environment are
concentrated in such districts and states and that outliers were more likely to have their districts or
states flip parties than members who were not outliers.
We can test these expectations by comparing the level of constituent educational attainment
in the 212 outlier districts and states and whether those districts and states are represented by a
member of the opposite party in the 117th Congress (2021-22). Figure 3.14 does just that.
Democratic and Republican outlier districts and states are separated into three categories based on
their constituent educational attainment (low, medium, and high).51 It is apparent that Democratic
outliers are concentrated in less educated districts and states and Republican outliers are
concentrated in highly educated districts and states. This supports earlier discussed findings that
Democrats are more likely to be outliers if they represent less educated constituents; and the
opposite is true for Republicans.
51

The level of educational attainment (low, medium, high) is in comparison to the overall distribution among LCV
outlier districts and states.
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Figure 4.14. Constituent Educational Attainment of LCV Rating Outliers by Party Switch as of
2021
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We can also observe that as constituent educational attainment increases for Republican
outlier districts and states, it is more likely that those districts and states are now represented by a
Democrat in Congress. Again, the inverse is true for Democratic outlier districts and states. 67%
of Democratic outlier districts with low educational attainment flipped parties over the last decade,
while only 45% of districts with medium to high educational attainment shifted to the Republican
Party. 65% of Republican outlier districts with high education attainment switched parties over the
same period, while just 23% of the remaining less educated Republican districts are now held by
Democrats.
The results of Figures 3.14 suggest the education realignment affected whether districts
and states held by moderate Democrats and Republicans on the environment switched parties.
Party switching was concentrated among highly educated Republican districts and states and less
educated Democratic districts and states. Furthermore, the regional dynamics discussed previously
were present: most party switching occurred in the Northeast for Republicans and the South for
Democrats. Combining these results with those above that found the majority of congressional
outliers on the environment had their district or state switch parties, I argue the education
realignment primarily affected party position taking on the environment through elite replacement
of existing moderate Democrats and Republicans with members of the opposing party.
Importantly, these new members were overwhelmingly not outliers within their party on the
environment.

4.8. Conclusion
Like most major issues in American politics, the two parties have polarized on the
environment in recent decades. In this chapter, I attempted to see whether this polarization is

113

related to the education realignment observed in American elections during the same time span.
As the environment is an issue on which there is a difference of opinion among Americans with a
college degree or those without, I expected that the realignment of voters based on their educational
attainment may affect party position taking on the environment. A more educated Democratic
coalition should take more pro-environment stances and a less educated Republican coalition
should do the opposite.
The major findings in this chapter on this question are twofold. First, I found that whether
a member of Congress broke with their party’s mainstream on the environment was related to the
educational attainment of their district or state. Throughout the 2000s, many pro-environment
Republicans represented more educated constituencies and many anti-environment Democrats
represented less educated constituencies. Second, I found that most of these outlying members
were swept out of Congress in recent years and that a majority of the districts and states they
represented no longer are held by the same party. Furthermore, the districts and states that switched
parties were associated with higher educational attainment for Republicans and lower educational
attainment for Democrats. The education realignment contributed to the polarization of the two
parties on the environment by aiding in the ouster of moderate Democrats and Republicans and
their replacement by members of the opposite party. It had little effect through conversion.
These findings bolster prior arguments that the composition of the parties’ coalitions is
related to polarization on the environment (Shipan and Lowry 2001; Klyza and Sousa 2008;
Anderson 2011; Layzer 2014). In earlier decades, the two parties had support from both more
educated Americans who supported environmental protections and less educated Americans who
were more skeptical of such regulations; and this allowed both parties to remain more moderate
on environmental policy. But as the electorate became more polarized on the basis of educational
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attainment, this removed pro-environment voters from the Republican coalition and antienvironment voters from the Democratic coalition. This allowed for greater internal cohesion on
the environment in both parties, but also pushed the parties farther apart on this issue.
Such trends are encapsulated well in the fate of Representative Collin Peterson (D-MN).
Peterson, a Democrat, was first elected in 1990 and established himself as one of the more
conservative members of the House Democratic caucus. He consistently received scorecard ratings
from the LCV much lower than his fellow Democrats. Peterson rose to be the ranking Democrat
on the House Agriculture committee, a committee that is responsible for setting many
environmental policies. As chairman of the committee from 2007-2011 and 2019-2021, he helped
craft agriculture bills that exempted farmers from environmental regulations and stated in 2019
that climate change should not be a top priority for Congress (Boudreau 2019; Philpott 2020).
By 2020, Peterson’s Minnesota district was one of the districts with the lowest educational
attainment that Democrats controlled. Peterson’s margin of victory had been decreasing in recent
elections and his luck ran out in 2020 when he lost reelection to a conservative Republican by
close to fourteen points. He was replaced as the chair of the Agriculture Committee by David Scott
of Georgia, a Democrat who has a lifetime LCV rating score fifty points higher than Peterson’s;
and the Democratic Party lost one of its few remaining conservative members.
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Chapter 5. Blue Dogs to New Dogs: The Effect of the Education Realignment
on Economic Policy

“I was surprised so many Democrats from blue states ended up voting for [a repeal of DoddFrank].”
- Jim Manley, Former Democratic congressional aide (Stein and Van Dam 2018)
In the spring of 2018, a rare event occurred on Capitol Hill: an important piece of
legislation passed with significant bipartisan support. That piece of legislation was a partial
rollback of banking reforms created in the landmark Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010. This new bill did not repeal Dodd-Frank in its entirety but
weakened some of the regulations placed on banks the banking community believed were too
onerous. It allowed banks with assets up to $250 billion to avoid heightened regulatory scrutiny.
This bill was spearheaded by Republicans who controlled both chambers of Congress and the
White House at the time, but it attracted significant number of Democratic votes in the House of
Representatives and Senate: 33 House Democrats and 17 Senate Democrats voted for the bill.52
These Democrats voted for the bill despite many of them representing safe seats53 and fellow
members of their party arguing they were voting to make another financial crisis more likely.
Liberal congresswoman Pramila Jayapal (WA-07) went so far as to call the bill a “sledgehammer”
to Dodd-Frank (Fang 2018).
This was not the first time that a significant number of Democrats voted against increased
regulations on the banking industry. When the final version of Dodd-Frank passed the House in
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Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, S. 2155, 115th Congress (2018).
Democrat Hillary Clinton won these districts and states by an average of more than nine points in 2016.
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2010, 19 Democrats voted against it.54 55 But there are key differences in the kinds of Democrats
who voted against Dodd-Frank in 2010 and the Democrats who voted for the Dodd-Frank repeal
in 2018. The earlier group was predominantly made up of conservative Democrats from the South
who represented rural and less affluent districts. Their districts were also less educated: the average
percentage of their constituents who had a bachelor’s degree or higher was 20.4 percent which was
close to eight points lower than the national average at the time and thirteen of those nineteen
districts are now held by Republicans in Congress today.
The Democrats who voted for the Dodd-Frank repeal were less uniform. Many were from
rural and less educated districts and states like the 2010 group, but many hailed from districts and
states that were had only recently begun electing Democrats. Among the 50 Democrats who voted
for the repeal, nearly half represented districts or states that Democrats did not control in 2003;
and the rate of college education in these mostly affluent urban and suburban districts and states
was six points higher than the national average.
These shifts from 2010 to 2018 reveal a broader shift that has occurred in the Democratic
Party in recent decades among the party’s economic moderate wing. Whereas in the past, many
moderate and conservative Democrats were concentrated in less educated districts and states, these
Democrats now more commonly represent highly educated districts and states. This is reflective
of the broader education realignment in American politics that has seen the Democratic coalition
become more educated and the Republican coalition become less educated; but unlike how this
realignment has affected the party’s position taking on social issues like LGBTQ+ rights and the
environment in which the realignment ousted socially moderate Democrats, on economic policy,

54

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Congress (2010).
One Democrat in the Senate, Russ Feingold (WI), voted against the bill, but he publicly stated he opposed it for not
being “tough enough” on Wall Street (Applebaum and Herszenhorn 2010).
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it has helped to maintain a significant number of economic moderates in Congress. I argue this is
partially explained by public opinion research that finds greater educational attainment leads to
more liberal social issue positions, but more conservative economic positions. The education
realignment led to fewer Democratic economic moderates from rural, less educated districts and
states, and more from the affluent, highly educated areas Democrats have increasingly won in
recent years. Additionally, while this new class of Democrats are moderates on economic issues,
they are not moderates on social issues, which contrasts with the earlier group, who were
moderates across both economic and social issues. This leads to the current state of the Democratic
Party in Congress, in which Democrats are overwhelmingly in agreement on liberal social issue
positions but have more internal disagreement on economic issues: there are more outliers on
economic issues than social issues within the party. This results in a Democratic Party that is more
conservative on economic policy now than it was in previous years.
On the Republican side, the picture is less clear. At the same time as Democrats are
increasingly winning highly educated constituencies, Republicans are winning less educated
constituencies, whom typically have more liberal positions on economic issues in comparison with
their more educated counterparts. But whereas the influx of new voters on the Democratic side is
associated with a significant number of economically moderate to conservative Democrats in
Congress, there is not the same level of economically moderate to liberal Republicans. The
Republican Party has maintained its pro-business, low tax, and anti-government regulation stances
on economic policy, despite the resurgent rhetorical populism in the party evidenced by the rise of
Donald Trump. At the same time, there is a growing number of outliers in the Republican Party
on economic issues in the last few years, though they have not had much of an effect on the party’s
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policy stances as a whole nor does it appear to be as related to the education realignment as changes
in the Democratic Party are.
This chapter seeks to explain the recent dynamics in both parties’ positions on economic
issues and determine whether the education realignment has been a factor in the parties’ position
taking. The chapter proceeds as follows: I first review the parties’ historical stances on economic
policy. Next, I review the public opinion research on the relationship between educational
attainment and economic policy preferences. Then, I use data on congressional behavior on
economic policy from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s annual legislative scorecard to test
whether this relationship influenced the parties’ stances on economic policy through the education
realignment. I find that the education realignment has led to the replacement of many economic
policy outliers in both parties in Congress with new economic outliers who differ from their
predecessors in the kinds of constituencies they represent, but that this had a much more
pronounced effect in the Democratic Party than in the Republican Party. I conclude by discussing
what these findings suggest for the future of economic policy in American congressional party
politics.

5.1. Party Position Taking on Economic Policy
For much of the histories of the Democratic and Republican parties in America, the former
has been more associated with greater government regulation of the economy and the latter has
been more associated with more support for the free market; and this was especially true after the
Democratic Party dramatically expanded the influence of the federal government in the economy
with the New Deal programs of the 1930s (Gerring 1998). Throughout the mid-twentieth century,
Democrats, when in power, expanded the size and scope of the federal government and its reach
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into economic affairs; and while Republicans were always resistant to Democratic economic
policy, their resistance took on a new form with the rise of supply side economics and deregulation
championed most prominently by the Reagan administration. This increased polarization on
economic issues between the two parties.

The Democrats
But in response to a series of electoral losses that were blamed on the excessive liberalism
of Democratic presidential candidates like George McGovern and Walter Mondale, the
Democratic Party began to shift some of their issue positions on economic policy. This shift is
associated with the rise of the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), which was founded in 1985
by moderate and conservative Democrats to promote a new brand of Democrats (Hale 1995).
These New Democrats, most notably President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore, argued
for a less liberal Democratic Party. Once in office, President Clinton began by embracing more
government involvement in the economy on issues like health care, but after Republicans took
back both houses of Congress in the 1994 midterm elections, he worked with them to roll back the
size and scope of the federal government. Some notable laws Clinton signed into law during this
time were the 1996 Telecommunications Act,56 which deregulated the media industry, and the
1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,57 which deregulated the financial industry. Both acts repealed
prior statutes put into place by Democrats during the New Deal and many Democrats in Congress
voted for both bills alongside Clinton’s support.
These shifts in economic policy by Democrats in the 1990s can be observed in Figure 5.1,
which shows the average scores received by each party in Congress on the U.S. Chamber of
56
57

Telecommunications Act of 1996, S. 652, 104th Congress (1996).
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, S. 900, 106th Congress (1999).
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Figure 5.1. Average Chamber of Commerce Congressional Scorecard Rating by Party and
Chamber, 1983-2020
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Commerce’s annual legislative scorecard. This scorecard documents congressional roll-call votes
on business and economic policy. Democrats move closer to Republicans on this scorecard as the
1990s progress and this trend continues for much of the 2000s and 2010s. In fact, Democrats in
the 116th Congress (2019-2020) scored higher on the Chamber of Commerce’s (COC) scorecard
than they have in decades. While Democrats have attempted to expand government regulation of
the economy in recent years when they controlled Congress and the presidency, often these
regulations are watered down, such as the removal of the public option from the 2010 Affordable
Care Act.58
This leads to the argument that Democrats are becoming less economically liberal than
they were in previous decades (Miller and Schofield 2008; Geismer 2015; Frank 2016; Fraser
2017). Fraser (2017) characterized the Democratic Party as reflective of “progressive
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Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress (2010).
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neoliberalism,” an ideology that values both equality and rights for historically marginalized
groups, as well as the ethos of free markets and the financial powerhouses in the U.S. economy. I
find support for this characterization as the Democratic Party became more liberal on social issues
than on economic issues in recent decades. Both Miller and Schofield (2008) and Geismer (2015)
attribute the party’s shift on economic issues to changes in the party’s coalition. The former argues
this is a result of the Democrats’ attempt to woo pro-business and socially liberal voters who were
disaffected in the Republican Party over the party’s embrace of social conservatism. Geismer
(2015) develops a similar argument and focuses on how the core of the Democratic Party shifted
from working-class voters who were connected to the party through labor unions to affluent, whitecollar suburbanites that emerged in the postindustrial economy. I place my argument in line with
these explanations about the Democratic Party: the education realignment resulted in collegeeducated voters who commonly held socially liberal yet economically conservative views
becoming a more important constituency within the Democratic coalition. This restrained the
Democratic Party from shifting further to the left on economic issues and in some instances can
explain economically conservative positions taken on by the party.
Not all agree with the assertion that Democrats are less economically liberal than they used
to be. Malpas and Hilton (2021) argue that while Democrats did retreat somewhat from their
history of economic liberalism in the 1990s with the rise of the New Democrats under Clinton,
economic liberalism rebounded in the 2000s and 2010s. But their findings rest on an analysis of
Democratic party platforms; and while I do not dispute their findings regarding the policies that
are included in the national platform, I argue that we must look at Democrats’ behavior when in
elected office to fully understand their positioning on economic issues. This chapter does so by
examining congressional behavior on roll-call votes. This is important, because while a party can
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propose a given policy in their platform, the realities of governing mean that the party may not be
able to deliver on that policy if elements of their party balk at the policy. I argue that this is what
often occurs in the Democratic Party today on economic policy: Democratic leadership proposes
a policy, but economic moderates and conservatives within the party’s congressional caucus push
back against the policy, either reforming it more to their liking or killing it altogether. This is
evident in the internal debates in the Democratic Party over the 2021 Build Back Better Act
(Ollstein, Caygle, and Ferris 2021; Prokop 2021). And I find that increasingly, Democratic
economic moderates and conservatives come from highly educated districts and states that have
been incorporated into the Democratic coalition because of the education realignment.

The Republicans
At the same time as Democrats waffled around the center of economic policy, Republicans
clearly shifted to the right in response to the Reagan revolution and remained there. In Figure 5.1,
we can observe Republicans largely maintaining the same average score in recent decades, but
why is there stasis in the Republican Party amidst such change in the Democratic Party? This goes
against what Miller and Schofield (2008) predicted the Republican Party would look like in the
modern era: they argued that as Democrats would come to embrace more conservative economic
policies that reflected their new coalition, Republicans would come to embrace more economically
populist policies that reflected their new coalition of more working-class, white voters. These
working-class whites are traditionally more supportive of economically liberal policies.
We see some evidence of economic populism with the ascendancy of Donald Trump in the
Republican Party who ran on expanding certain social safety net programs and raising tariffs to
promote domestic industry in 2016, but his economic populism was not shared by most
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Republicans in Congress. Thus, when Republicans controlled Congress and the presidency for the
first time in a decade in 2017, their major legislative priorities were to cut taxes on the wealthy59
and partially repeal the Affordable Care Act,60 neither of which reflects the economic populism
Trump ran on.
A possible explanation for why the Republican Party has remained staunchly economically
conservative is that Republicans have been able to shift American political culture to the right on
economic policy. Smith (2007) argues that in the late twentieth century, Republicans changed how
they framed their conservative economic policies: they went from highlighting the need for a small
government to balance the federal budget to arguing that a smaller government would promote
jobs and economic growth. Smith argues this message became popular amongst the American
public and thus, economic discourse is now held on Republican terms instead of Democratic terms.
This shifts national politics to the right on economic policy, and this aligns with what others argue
regarding economic policy and particularly economic inequality – that economic policy is heavily
skewed towards conservatism and policies that benefit the wealthy (Bartels 2008; Hacker and
Pierson 2010; Gilens 2012; Witko et al. 2021).61
Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez (2016) point to internal pressure from parts of the
Republican coalition to explain the party’s economic ultra-conservatism. They argue that the
influence of extremely wealthy donors, most notably the Koch brothers, keep Republicans from
embracing more economically populist positions that may be popular among their working-class
supporters. This “Koch Network” donates large sums of money to Republican candidates to ensure
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Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, H.R. 1, 115th Congress (2017).
American Health Care Act of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th Congress (2017).
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This is not to say that economic liberalism is dead, as Bartels (2008) argues Democrats do enact some liberal policies
when in power that serve to reduce inequality. Rather, I argue that the center of American politics on economic policy
has shifted to the right.
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they support business-friendly policies while in office, such as hostility to minimum wage
increases and support for “right to work” laws that make it more difficult for labor unions to
organize.
A recent explanation for Republican position taking on economic policy is offered by
Hacker and Pierson (2020). They explain why Republicans can push for economic policies that
disproportionately benefit the wealthy while increasingly relying on white working-class voters to
win elections. This is possible because of the Republicans’ embrace of what Hacker and Pierson
label “plutocratic populism.” This ideology combines support for plutocratic economic policies
with appeals to working-class whites on social issues, especially those surrounding race and
immigration. In a sense, Republicans can still push for economic policies that help their rich donors
and hurt their poor voters because they distract the latter with appeals to their racial and ethnic
identity and fears that this identity is being threatened by increased demographic diversity in the
United States.
Hacker and Pierson’s argument fits in with my argument about why the education
realignment developed in the first place, as social issues became a more dominant force in
American politics than economic issues. This shift makes social issues more salient for many
voters and thus can explain why working-class white Republicans, many of whom do not have a
college degree, are satisfied with Republicans who harp on identity politics but support the
plutocratic policies described above. This creates a disconnect between the desires of Republican
voters and the actions of Republican elites on economic issues, as I will show below that
Americans without a college degree are traditionally more supportive of economic liberalism than
their college-educated counterparts. But this disconnect does not significantly affect support for
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the Republican Party as these voters are satisfied with the representation they receive from the
party on social issues.

5.2. Public Opinion on Economic Policy by Education
Whereas greater educational attainment often corresponds to more liberal ideological
positions on social issues like LGBTQ+ rights and the environment, public opinion studies often
find that it is associated with more conservative economic positions (Jackman and Muha 1984;
Phelan et al. 1995; Mendelberg, McCabe, and Thal 2017; Nye et al. 2020). Evidence of this
relationship can be seen in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. These figures report data from the American
National Elections Survey (ANES) over time on support for the free-market economy and labor
unions, respectively. We can observe that over time, college-educated Americans are more
supportive of the idea that the free-market handles the economy better than the government does
compared to Americans without a college degree. At the same time, college-educated Americans
feel less favorably towards labor unions than Americans without a college degree. It should be
noted though that the gap between college-educated and non-college-educated Americans on these
measures has narrowed in recent years. This could be potentially explained by both groups
converting their positions in response to the education realignment, in which the former is
becoming more Democratic, and the latter is becoming more Republican. But I emphasize that a
gap remains.
Why does the greater educational attainment correspond with more conservative economic
positions? Public opinion research offers several answers to this question. Jackman and Muha
(1984) argue that a college education affects economic attitudes less by changing students’
ideologies and more by cementing existing ideologies. They argue that many students who enter
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Figure 5.2. Percent who Believe the Free Market is Better than Government at Handling the
Economy by Education, 2000-2016 (ANES)
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higher education already skew conservative on economic policy as they come from privileged
backgrounds that have been benefited by existing, conservative economic policies. But where
education has an impact is that it gives students more robust cognitive skills that allow them to
have more developed ideologies which they can articulate. Thus, for Jackman and Muha, a college
education is a system of ideological refinement – it allows individuals to refine their beliefs they
had when they entered college. A potential issue with this theory is that increasingly, college
students come from both affluent and non-affluent backgrounds, so how would this theory explain
conservative economic attitudes among non-affluent students?
An alternative mechanism is one proposed by both Phelan et al. (1995) and Mendelberg,
McCabe, and Thal (2017). They both argue college-educated individuals’ economic conservatism
is produced through socialization while on college campuses, though they both offer different
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Figure 5.3. Labor Union Feeling Thermometer Rating by Education, 1964-2016 (ANES)
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theories of how this socialization occurs. Phelan et al. (1995) argue that higher education socializes
students to the “official culture” in American society, which they argue includes values of
tolerance and equal opportunity that can explain college graduates’ predisposition towards
liberalism on many social issues. But this official culture does not include a value of equal
outcomes, which restrains support for more liberal economic policies that aim to promote
economic equality. Thus, a college education can produce somewhat conflicting attitudes
surrounding underprivileged groups. For example, Phelan et al. find in their study that college
graduates have more tolerance of the homeless but are less willing to support policies to
economically aid the homeless.
Mendelberg, McCabe, and Thal (2017) argue instead that college campuses socialize
students into a culture of affluence. They argue that many individuals who attend college come
from affluent families, and they arrive to college with a latent predisposition to economic
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conservatism that reproduces the affluence they are accustomed to. Once on a college campus,
these students are surrounded by fellow students from affluent backgrounds which reinforces their
predisposition towards economic conservatism. Additionally, norms that both legitimize the
preservation of affluence and the seeking of financial gain are instilled into students. This results
in college graduates who are more economically conservative in their ideology, and these effects
are stronger the more affluent the student body of a college or university is. I argue that both
socialization mechanisms are valid explanations for why we continually find college education to
be associated with greater economic conservatism.
A final explanation for why college graduates are more economically conservative is that
their higher educational attainment insulates them from the pitfalls of the free market. Nye et al.
2020 argue that a college education produces human capital among students and graduates who
believe that they have skills that will allow them to succeed in many different economic situations.
Thus, they have less of a desire than their less educated counterparts to have the government step
in to regulate the market economy as it would not benefit them significantly. But this argument
that relies on economic interest is challenged by recent work which found that ideas that promote
economic conservatism gained in college are just as important in explaining individual attitudes
as this economic interest mechanism (Gelepithis and Gianni 2020).62 Additionally, Hainmueller
and Hiscox (2006) find that specifically on the issue of trade policy, the elevated support for free
trade agreements among college graduates is explained more by a shared value for market
liberalization than economic interest.
Ultimately, I associate myself with the socialization explanation for college graduates’
greater economic conservatism, though for the purposes of this chapter, it is more consequential
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This study only looked at college graduates in European countries, so there is a question of whether these findings
can be generalized to the American context.
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that the relationship between higher education and economic conservatism exists. This is because
the education realignment is introducing more college graduates into the Democratic Party and
more non-college graduates into the Republican Party. If the former group of voters is significantly
more economically conservative than the latter, this is likely to affect the economic policy
positions of both parties in the long term. This may help explain why Democrats became more
economically conservative as a party in recent years as they absorb more economically
conservative college-educated voters. At the same time, it would also suggest that Republicans
should have moved to the left on economic policy as they absorb more economically liberal noncollege-educated voters, which we do not observe. This contradiction will be explored in
subsequent sections of this chapter.

5.3. Data and Methods
The primary source of data for this chapter is the annual U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s
congressional scorecard (U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2021). The Chamber of Commerce (COC)
is a prominent pro-business interest group that advocates for government policies that promote the
interests of businesses and business owners. Traditionally, this has meant lobbying for
economically conservative policies that reduce government regulation of businesses and the
economy. For example, the COC opposed House Democrats passing the Protecting the Right to
Organize (PRO) Act in 2019, which would have protected and expanded the ability for labor
unions to form in workplaces.63 But this does not mean the COC reflexively takes the Republican
position on all congressional bills: in 2021, it supported the passage of the bipartisan infrastructure
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bill, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, which most congressional Republicans voted
against.64
In this chapter, I use scorecard data from the 98th to the 116th Congresses (1983-2020).
Each year, the COC decides which roll call votes in the House of Representatives and Senate are
important enough to business interests to be termed “key votes.” The COC then sends a letter to
members of Congress notifying them that this vote will be scored and included in the annual COC
scorecard.65 At the end of each congressional session, the COC compiles these key votes into a
comprehensive scorecard that assigns a score of 0 to 100 for each member of Congress.66 The
higher the score a member of Congress receives, the more pro-business that member’s voting
behavior is according to the COC. Rather than scores for individual years, I compute a score for
an entire congress over a two-year period.67
While some of the analysis in this chapter is a longitudinal one that looks at changes in
both parties and in both chambers over time, the primary analysis is comparing members to their
co-partisans at a single point in time. I use the outlier detection scheme that determines a member
as an outlier in their party or not based on median absolute deviation (MAD).68 Democrats who
fall more the one deviation above and Republicans who fall more than one deviation below their
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Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, H.R. 3864, 117th Congress (2021).
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party’s median scorecard rating are classified as outliers.69 The MAD is determined for the entire
period studied here (1983-2020).70 In this chapter, I track the number of COC outliers in each party
over time, but instead of tracing the future of outliers in earlier years, I focus on the COC outliers
who currently serve in Congress. This is in line with my theoretical expectations that unlike with
social issues like LGBTQ+ rights and the environment where I would expect outliers to disappear
in both parties as the education realignment flips educated districts to the Democratic Party and
less educated districts to the Republican Party, I expect the education realignment to increase the
number of outliers on economic issues in both parties. Thus, I am concerned with where current
economic outliers come from: in particular, I am interested in the level of educational attainment
of their constituents and whether they represent seats that are recent pickups for their party. I
compare these economic issue outliers with social issue outliers to determine whether they are
different on these two metrics.
As reviewed previously, interest group scorecards are subject to criticism as a data source.
Interest groups, like the COC, are political organizations and politics will play into which bills and
votes are included in their scorecards. At the same time, as referenced previously, Anderson (2012)
argues that interest group scorecards can be an important tool in measuring congressional behavior
on a specific policy domain – in this case, economic regulation. Additionally, the COC scorecard
is a useful metric of determining which members of Congress the nation’s largest pro-business
interest group deems as friendly to business interests; and the members who turn up as outliers on
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Obviously, we could also label Democrats who fall below their party’s median and Republicans who fall above
their party’s median as outliers, but as this chapter is concerned with explaining Democrats becoming more
economically conservative and why Republicans have not become more economically liberal, it is more consequential
to look at Democrats who are more conservative and Republicans who are more liberal on economic policy.
70
The MAD for Democrats was 14 and the MAD for Republicans was 8.
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the COC scorecard are members who one would expect to turn up from their coverage in the
media.71 This suggests face validity.
There is also a question of whether the COC scorecard can be used to compare members
of Congress at different points in time. In other words, there is potential that a rating of 0 in 1990
may not mean the same thing as a rating of 0 in 2020. Obviously, the kinds of economic issues
that are subject to debate and votes on the House and Senate floor change over time and thus, the
COC scorecard reflects those changes. For example, there is a difference between the regulations
on the health care industry created in the 2010 Affordable Care Act and the proposed regulations
in the recently debated Medicare for All Act that would create a national health care system.72 But
both bills still target the same concept of whether the government should be more involved in
health care, and both are included in the COC scorecard. Thus, I argue that while the kinds of bills
and policies included in the COC scorecard change over time, it is continually measuring whether
a member takes more pro-business or anti-business positions in Congress. But as a robustness
check, I test for the validity of the scorecards as a measurement of the same concept over time
using Cronbach’s alpha. The result was 0.9. This suggests that it is likely the COC scorecard is
measuring the same concept for each congressional session included here. Additionally, as a
significant portion of my analysis here compares members to one another at the same point in time,
concerns about longitudinal validity should become less important.
To test how congressional behavior on economic policy and whether members are outliers
within their parties on this issue are connected to the education realignment, I use data from the
United States Census Bureau and the American Community Survey on the educational attainment

71
72

A list of outliers who serve in the current 117th Congress (2021-2022) can be found in the appendix.
Medicare for All Act of 2019, H.R. 1384, 116th Congress (2019).
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for states and congressional districts in recent decades.73 The specific measure I employ is the
percentage of constituents 25 years or older who have a bachelor’s degree or higher. I also restrict
this data point to only non-Hispanic white constituents for some of the analysis. Control variables
used in some of the statistical models of congressional behavior include political party; the
Democratic vote share for a state or district in the last presidential election (Daily Kos 2020); probusiness campaign contributions;74 the chamber of Congress the member belongs to; and whether
that chamber was controlled by Democrats at the time.

5.4. Trends in Congressional Economic Outliers
From Figure 5.1, we observed that Republicans largely remained high and constant in their
average scorecard ratings from the Chamber of Commerce, while Democrats gradually received
higher ratings as the years transpired. If we are interested in explaining these dynamics, looking at
the outliers in both parties on the COC scorecard can be useful. The most pro-business Democrats
and most anti-business Republicans would affect the parties’ overall behavior on economic policy:
if there are more or less of these kinds of members, this could explain the changes in position
taking among Democrats and the lack thereof among Republicans. Figure 5.4 shows the number
of total party outliers on the COC scorecard from 1983-2020. We can observe that while there is
a decrease in the number of total outliers from the beginning of this period to the end, this drop off
is not as significant as what was observed in earlier chapters on LGBTQ+ rights and environmental
protection. In the last decade, there are still, on average, several dozen economic outliers in

73

Availability of this data at the congressional district level varies over time. From 2003 onwards, I have complete
data at the state and congressional district level for educational attainment. I was also able to access older census data
for 1983 and 1993. Years in between 1983 and 1993 as well as 1993 and 2003, I do not reliable data for.
74
I used the logarithm of the dollar amount received by each member from the financial industry (Center for
Responsive Politics 2022).
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Figure 5.4. Number of Chamber of Commerce Rating Outliers in Congress, 1983-2020
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Congress. This is what the education realignment would predict: the addition of more Democrats
from highly educated districts and states and Republicans from less educated districts and states
should keep both parties internally heterogenous on the issue of economic regulation; and that
these kinds of Democrats and Republicans should be the most likely to be outliers in their parties
on this issue area.
Table 5.1 attempts to assess this relationship between constituent educational attainment
and whether a member of Congress is an outlier in their party on economic policy from 2003-2020.
The logistic regression models report unexpected results for both Democratic and Republican
members. For the latter, the educational attainment of the members’ constituents is not a significant
factor in whether they are an outlier or not. This is also true when only the educational attainment
of white constituents is included, whom have been the most likely to switch parties in recent years.
This null finding makes a certain amount of sense considering the stasis in Republicans’ position
taking on economic issues, as seen in Figure 5.1. It may be that other factors discussed above keep
135

Table 5.1. Time-Series Logistic Regression for COC Rating Outlier Status, 2003-2020
Democrats
Republicans
b/(se)
b/(se)
b/(se)
b/(se)
% Constituents with Bachelor's Degree or Higher
-0.067***
0.014
(0.017)
(0.01)
% White Constituents with Bachelor's Degree or Higher
-0.059***
0.012
(0.018)
(0.009)
Democratic Presidential Vote Share in Last Election
-0.154*** -0.144***
0.003
0.003
(0.016)
(0.017)
(0.004)
(0.004)
Business Campaign Contributions
0.03
0.01
-0.151*
-0.150*
(0.135)
(0.131)
(0.063)
(0.063)
Senate
-1.855*** -1.970***
0.307
0.308
(0.391)
(0.398)
(0.207)
(0.207)
Democratic Control of Chamber
-1.868*** -1.890***
0.385**
0.385**
(0.257)
(0.264)
(0.133)
(0.133)
COC Outliert-1
0.367
0.363
1.353***
1.352***
(0.317)
(0.335)
(0.208)
(0.209)
Constant
8.714***
8.330***
-2.214*** -2.174***
(1.247)
(1.252)
(0.484)
(0.483)
Log Likelihood
-541.211
-544.206
-864.8
-865.015
N
2157
2157
2215
2215
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; District and Year Random Effects included

Republicans from taking more liberal positions on economic issues, despite the pressure from the
growing number of less educated and more economically liberal constituents in their coalition.
The findings among Democrats are harder to explain. Considering the contours of the
education realignment, we would expect greater constituent educational attainment to make a
Democrat more likely to be an outlier on economic issues. Instead, we find that lower constituent
educational attainment significantly increases the likelihood of being an outlier. But this is harder
to explain: if the most pro-business Democrats are likelier to represent less educated
constituencies, why have Democrats become more pro-business at a time when they continue to
represent fewer of these kinds of constituencies? A larger factor in explaining why a Democrat is
an outlier in the results in the vote share the Democratic candidate received in the most recent
presidential election. This suggests that electoral competitiveness may be more consequential to
Democratic behavior on economic issues, but both less educated and highly educated
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constituencies are competitive for Democrats in recent years so this again presents a puzzling
result.
If we take a closer look at the constituent educational attainment of COC outliers and how
that has changed over time in both parties, the results are closer to what the education realignment
would predict. Figure 5.5 reports the number of outliers in each party in Congress since 2003 by
the level of educational attainment of the outliers’ constituents.75 For Republicans, we can observe
that the share of COC outliers that represent highly educated constituencies has decreased and the
share that represent less educated constituencies has increased over the past two decades. For
Democrats, the opposite occurred.76 From 2003-2010, the percent of Republican COC outliers
from low educated districts and states was 24%. From 2011-2020, that number jumped to 37%.
For Democrats, the share of outliers from highly educated districts and states went from 15% in
the earlier period to 28% in the later period. This reflects the transformation of both parties’
coalitions in recent years: the Democratic coalition became more educated, and the opposite
occurred in the Republican coalition.
Figure 5.5 also suggests that COC outliers are not particularly concentrated among any
level of constituent educational attainment, which conflicts with what we may expect considering
public opinion research on the relationship between educational attainment and attitudes on
economic policy and with what previous chapters on other issue areas found on the relationship
between constituent attitudes and legislative behavior. It may be that the relationship between
constituent attitudes and legislative behavior is weaker when it comes to economic issues than on

75

The level of educational attainment (low, medium, or high) is based on a comparison to all districts and states for a
given period.
76
There are some periods where the total number of outliers in a party drops dramatically. These drops tend to appear
when that party controls one or both chambers of Congress, which suggests that defections from the party line are
more likely when your party is in the minority rather than when it is in the majority. This may result from a majority
party’s hesitancy to put bills on the floor that divide the party.
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Figure 5.5. Number of COC Outliers by Party and Constituent Education Level, 2003-2020
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social issues, which could reflect the greater saliency of social issues in American politics in recent
decades. This would align with why the education realignment is purported to have occurred in
the first place: that the saliency of social issues created dissonance between voters and their parties
based on educational attainment. This also supports Hacker and Pierson’s (2020) argument that
the Republican Party can ignore constituent opinion on economic policy as it distracts its voters
with social issues. Perhaps the same is true of the Democratic Party as well.
Nevertheless, I argue the finding that a growing share of Republican economic outliers
come from less educated constituencies and Democratic economic outliers come from highly
educated constituencies is important. It suggests a transformation of both parties that the education
realignment brought about. It may be that the education realignment did not increase the
disagreement on economic policy within both parties in Congress, but it may have changed the
kinds of members who were disagreeing with their party’s orthodoxy on economic policy. The
following section examines the latter.

5.5. The Transformation of Congressional Economic Outliers
Unlike with social issues discussed in earlier chapters, there remain a significant number
of outliers on economic issues in both parties in Congress. Who these outliers are and what kinds
of districts and states they represent have changed; and I argue this is an effect of the education
realignment. The following sections looks at how these outliers changed in recent years in both
parties. I relate economic policy outliers to social policy (LGBTQ+ rights and environmental
protection) outliers and show how being an economic outlier is increasingly less linked to being
an outlier on social issues; and how this relates to the education realignment. I will show that there
have been more dramatic changes in the Democratic Party than in the Republican Party.

139

The Republicans
We observed earlier that Republicans largely maintained their extremely pro-business,
economically conservative positions in Congress in recent decades according to the Chamber of
Commerce’s scorecard. The absence of any changes in the party’s average scorecard rating does
not mean that there are no changes occurring in the party’s coalition in Congress. Figure 5.6
demonstrates that whereas in previous decades, Republicans who were economic outliers on the
COC scorecard were also often outliers on social issues, in recent years, economic outliers do not
stray from the party line on social issues. In this figure, I aggregated outliers on three different
scorecards on three different issue areas: (1) economic policy using the COC scorecard; (2)
environmental policy using the League of Conservation Voters’ (LCV) scorecard; and (3)
LGBTQ+ rights policy using the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) scorecard. I then broke down
those outliers into three categories: (1) “social outlier only,” meaning the member is an outlier on
either the LCV or HRC scorecard, but not the COC scorecard; (2) “economic outlier only,”
meaning the member is an outlier only on the COC scorecard; and (3) “social and economic
outlier,” meaning the member is an outlier on the COC scorecard and at least one of the social
policy scorecards.
I then broke this data down into four roughly equal timeframes, using four years as
snapshots: 1993, 2003, 2011, and 2021. If a member was serving in 1993, and they were an outlier
on any of the three scorecards after 1983, they are included in the data for 1993. This is repeated
for the following three timeframes. Aggregating the data in this way accounts for periodic dropoffs and surges in the number of outliers in a congressional session, as observed in earlier figures.
In Figure 5.6, the number of total Republican outliers remains relatively steady from the 1990s to
the present, but the share of Republican outliers who are only outliers on economic policy increases
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Figure 5.6. Types of Republican Outliers in Congress, 1993-2021
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from 18% in 1993 to 49% in 2021. This suggests that there is a growing number of Republicans
in Congress who will stray from the party’s mainstream on economic policy but will refrain from
doing so on social policy. This implies a hollowing out of general moderates in the Republican
Party who are in the center or skew left on most policy issues. While some remain, such as Senator
Susan Collins of Maine, there are not many of these kinds of Republicans left.
But are these changes related to the education realignment? Figures 5.7 and 5.8 attempt to
answer that question. The former compares the average constituent educational attainment of the
three categories of outliers and the average for all Republican members of Congress over time. We
can observe that Republican members who are only outliers on economic policy generally
represent districts and states with fewer constituents who are college graduates than Republicans
who are outliers on social issues only and who are outliers on all issues. The economic-only
outliers also tend to be a bit below the average Republican on constituent educational attainment
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Figure 5.7. Average Constituent Educational Attainment of Republican Outliers, 1993-2021
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too. This is what the education realignment would predict: constituents without a college degree
are less likely to support mainstream economic conservatism so it makes sense that economic
outliers in the Republican Party hail from districts and states with lower educational attainment.
Conversely, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, Republicans who are outliers on social issues should
be more likely to represent highly educated constituents, as higher education is correlated with
more liberal positions on social issues. But again, these findings reinforce the earlier point that it
appears economic outliers can come from highly educated constituencies and less educated
constituencies.
Additionally, Figure 5.8 does not lend much support the education realignment
significantly impacting Republicans on economic policy. This figure looks at party switching for
seats Republicans hold in the House and Senate in the current 117th Congress (2021-2022). It
reports how many of these seats Republicans also held in the 108th Congress (2003-2004). We can
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Figure 5.8. Party Switching among Republican Outliers Districts and States, 2003-2021
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observe that the overwhelmingly majority of seats Republicans hold in 2021 were also held by
Republicans in 2003. Furthermore, when looking at party switching among the three different
groups of outliers serving in the 117th Congress, there is not much variation. While the seats
occupied by economic outliers are a bit more likely to be new to the Republican Party than the
party average or the other outlier groups, it is a small difference. This is not what the education
realignment would implicate: we would expect districts and states with less educated constituents
and more liberal positions on economic issues to switch from the Democratic Party to the
Republican Party and send Republicans to Congress who hold similarly more liberal economic
positions.
The lack of robust findings for Republicans in both their overall behavior towards
economic issues and changes in economic outliers in the party suggest that the education
realignment has not had as strong of an effect as we would expect on the Republican Party in terms
of economic policy. It is possible that the expected transformation of the party on economic policy
is still in its early stages: we do observe a growing number of Republicans in Congress who are
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very conservative on social issues, but less conservative on economic issues. Their influence over
the party may grow if they continue to increase their numbers and work their way into senior
positions in congressional leadership. At the same time, it could be that prior scholarship that
argues business interests have a stranglehold on the Republican Party irrespective of public opinion
(Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez 2016) is correct.

The Democrats
In contrast to the weak findings for congressional Republicans, congressional Democrats
have undergone a much starker transformation and one that is more closely tied to the education
realignment. Figure 5.9 shows the size of the previously described three groups of outliers over
time in the Democratic Party’s congressional caucus. We can observe a steep decline in the total
number of Democratic outliers from 1993-2021. Most of that decline is in the categories of socialonly outliers and social and economic outliers; but the number of Democrats who are only outliers
on economic policy increased over this period. In 1993, 16% of Democratic outliers were only
outliers on the COC scorecard. In 2021, that percentage jumped to 65%. Thus, most Democrats
who stray from the party’s mainstream only do so on economic policy. This is marked change
from decades past. This is what the education realignment would predict: as Democrats come to
represent highly educated districts and states with socially liberal but economically conservative
voters, the party should largely agree on social policy, but have more divisions on economic policy.
Figure 5.10 shows that these Democrats who are only outliers on economic policy do tend
to come from more educated constituencies than the other groups of outliers. We can observe that
the average percentage of constituents who have a college education is about the same for
Democratic social-only outliers and social and economic outliers over time, but the educational
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Figure 5.9. Types of Democratic Outliers in Congress, 1993-2021
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attainment for economic-only outliers is much higher. In 2021, this gap was close to fifteen
percent. The educational attainment of these outliers is also very similar to the entire Democratic
caucus in Congress, which suggests these members are more numerous than the other kinds of
outliers. Again, this is what is to be expected given the contours of the education realignment: the
most economically conservative Democrats should increasingly come from highly educated
districts and states.
These highly educated districts and states that elect economically conservative Democrats
are also relatively new to the Democratic caucus according to Figure 5.11. Here, the rate of party
switching for the entire Democratic caucus and the three kinds of outliers is represented. The
percent of seats represented by economic outliers in 2021 that Democrats did not hold in 2003 is
almost twice as high as the percent of party switching for the Democratic Party as a whole.
Additionally, the rate of party switching from 2003-2021 is very low for social-only and social
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Figure 5.10. Average Constituent Educational Attainment of Democratic Outliers, 1993-2021
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and economic outliers, which suggests that the few remaining Democrats in these categories are
mostly holdovers from years past. I argue that the very high rate of party switching for economiconly outliers is reflective of Democrats increasingly winning districts and states with higher
constituent educational attainment.
Overall, these results suggest both that economic policy is becoming the major point of
division in the Democratic Party in contrast to social policy; and that whereas economic outliers
used to often also be outliers on social policy, they increasingly are only outliers on the former.
Essentially, the Democratic Party went from having many members in Congress who were
conservative on social and economic policy to now having very few members who are social
conservatives but quite a few who are economic conservatives. The former kind of member often
hailed from less educated constituencies, while the latter now often comes from affluent, highly
educated districts and states. I attribute this to the education realignment.
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Figure 5.11. Party Switching among Democratic Outlier Districts and States, 2003-2021
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This transformation can also be observed by looking at changes in caucus membership among
congressional Democrats. Two of the most prominent caucuses within the Democratic Party in
Congress in recent decades are the Blue Dogs and the New Democrats. The Blue Dog coalition
was founded in the wake of the 1994 midterm elections that gave Republicans control of both
houses of Congress for the first time in forty years. The Blue Dogs believed the Democratic Party
lost because it had moved too far to the left; and they wanted to steer the party back to the center
(Blue Dog Coalition 2022). Many of the caucus’ members were conservative southern Democrats
who were conservative on both social and economic policy. The New Democrat Coalition was
founded in 1997 to provide a congressional base of support for Democratic President Bill Clinton’s
“third way” politics that included more pro-business, economically conservative policies. In that
sense they shared common ground with the Blue Dogs, but unlike the Blue Dogs, the New
Democrats were mostly social liberals and represented suburban seats with highly educated
constituents (Jones and Stern 2010).
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Figure 5.12. Number of Blue Dogs and New Democrats in House Democratic Caucus, 2003-2021
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Figure 5.12 shows the number of members in each caucus from 2003-2021.77 We can observe that
for most of the 2000s, the size of both the Blue Dog and New Democrat coalitions were relatively
similar, though the latter was always larger. In the 2010s, the size of these coalitions became
increasingly different: there were fewer and fewer Blue Dogs and more and more New Democrats.
This is particularly seen after the 2010 midterm elections in which many conservative southern
Democrats lost their seats. As discussed in earlier chapters, many of these seats were rural and had
few college-educated constituents. The decline of the Blue Dogs only continued throughout
subsequent electoral cycles (Blake 2012). Meanwhile, the New Democrats surged, particularly
after the 2018 midterm elections that returned control of the House of Representatives to
Democrats for the first time in almost a decade. Many of the seats Democrats flipped in 2018 were
highly educated, suburban districts. This was part of the broader education realignment, just as the
loss of the seats Blue Dogs represented was.

77

There is crossover between these caucus’ memberships: Democrats can both belong to the Blue Dog and the New
Democrat coalitions.
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Figure 5.13. Average Constituent Educational Attainment of Blue Dogs and New Democrats,
2003-2021
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We can see evidence of New Democrats typically coming from more educated
constituencies than the Blue Dogs in Figure 5.13: the percent of constituents who held at least a
bachelor’s degree is higher for New Democrats in every congress since 2003. It can also be
observed that the constituent educational attainment of New Democrats more closely matches that
of all Democrats in Congress. This suggests New Democrats are more reflective of the entire
Democratic congressional caucus than the Blue Dogs are. The decline of the Blue Dogs and rise
of the New Democrats reflects the transformation of economic outliers in the Democratic Party.
There are fewer Democrats who are both economic and social conservatives and more Democrats
who are only outliers on economic policy. The former kind of Democrat often came from less
educated areas and the latter now commonly hails from highly educated areas. As the education
realignment progresses, we should expect these trends in the Democratic Party to continue.
Democrats will increasingly lose districts and states which are less educated, and which commonly
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elected socially and economically conservative Democrats; and Democrats will increasingly win
districts and states which are more educated, and which now often elect socially liberal and
economically conservative Democrats. The continued presence of economically conservative
Democrats pulls the Democratic Party more towards business interests as evidenced in Figure 5.1;
and is likely to constrain the ability of the party to enact significant liberal economic policies in
the years to come.

5.6. Conclusion
This chapter attempted to examine the effect the education realignment has had on both the
Democratic and Republican parties’ positions on economic policy in recent years. Because prior
research on the relationship between educational attainment and economic attitudes found that
individuals with higher levels of education tend to skew more economically conservative, we could
expect that a large influx of such voters into the Democratic coalition may influence the party’s
stances on economic policy. Similarly, the influx of less educated and more economically liberal
voters into the Republican coalition could affect its’ economic positions. We would expect
Democrats to become more conservative and Republicans to become more liberal; and that these
changes would be led by newly elected Democrats in highly educated constituencies and
Republicans in less educated constituencies.
What this chapter found was mixed evidence for the education realignment affecting the
parties on economic policy as expected. Relying on data from the Chamber of Commerce, in the
aggregate, Democrats have moved to become more conservative, yet Republicans have not done
so. Additionally, the relationship between the educational attainment of a member’s constituents
and that member’s behavior on economic policy was surprising: there were no significant effects
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for Republicans and while there was a significant effect for Democrats, it was the opposite of what
the education realignment would predict. A closer look at the most economically conservative
Democrats and the most economically liberal Republicans found that they hail from both highly
and lowly educated districts and states.
But where the education realignment does appear to have had an effect is in the kinds of
economic outliers in both parties that are more numerous in Congress today. Because the education
realignment led to the loss of many less educated districts and states for Democrats and highly
educated districts and states for Republicans, this means that many of the economic outliers who
remain in both parties are Democrats from highly educated constituencies and Republicans from
less educated constituencies. Additionally, this new breed of economic outliers tends to only be
outliers in this policy area and are not outliers in their parties on social policy. This differs from
the kinds of economic outliers who were removed as the education realignment transpired.
These changes were starker in the Democratic Party than in the Republican Party in
Congress. This follows the stability we observe in Republicans’ position taking on economic
policy in recent years, which comes at the same time as leading Republicans like Donald Trump
attempted to pull the party in a more populist direction. While there are more Republicans who at
least provide tacit support for some economic populism, staunch economic conservatives appear
to continue to control the party’s agenda. This supports Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez’s (2016)
argument that business interests dominate the Republican Party through campaign donations, even
when those interests appear at odds with the increasingly populist Republican base of support.
They may be able to ignore their voters on economic policy because they distract their voters with
conservative stances on social policy, as Hacker and Pierson (2020) argue. Whether these trends
will last should be the subject of later research, as economically populist Republicans in Congress
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may increase their numbers and eventually have a larger impact on the party. As establishment
Republicans in Congress retire or lose primary elections and are replaced by Republicans in the
vein of Trump, this may affect the party’s aggregate behavior on economic policy (Kilgore 2021).
While Malpas and Hilton (2021) argued Democrats have not abandoned their legacy of
economic liberalism, I observed that in the Democratic caucus in Congress, there are growing
division on economic policy. This is because the moderate and conservative Democrats of the past,
who typically hailed from less educated, rural districts and states and who strayed from the party
mainstream on both economic and social policy, are largely gone due to the machinations of the
education realignment. Those same machinations have made the typical Democratic moderate a
member who represents a highly educated, affluent constituency, and who is quite liberal on social
policy but less so on economic policy. I showed this transformation by describing the fall of the
Blue Dog Democrats and ongoing rise of the New Democrats in the Democratic congressional
caucus.
This is not to say that there are no Blue Dogs or typical conservative Democrats left: much
of the obstruction of the Democratic agenda in the 117th Congress is attributed to Senator Joe
Manchin of West Virginia, a state with the lowest educational attainment in the country. But he is
joined in that obstruction by Democrats who have won districts and states as part of the education
realignment. For example, when Senate Democrats held a vote on increasing the national minimum
wage to $15 in 2021 as part of the third COVID-relief bill, eight Democrats voted against the wage
increase (Everett 2021). While Manchin was one of the eight, six of the remaining seven represent
states with educational attainments at or above the national average. Additionally, four of those
senators flipped Republican held seats in the last twelve years: Jeanne Shaheen and Maggie Hassan
of New Hampshire, Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona, and Angus King of Maine, an Independent who
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caucuses with the Democrats. Unlike Manchin, these senators do not often stray from their party
on social policy. These Democrats, from more highly educated constituencies newly added to the
Democratic caucus, are likely to be the future of economic conservatism in the Democratic Party
as the education realignment progresses, whereas Democrats like Joe Manchin are being left in the
past.
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Chapter 6. Conclusion

“[Kyrsten Sinema is] smart as the devil. She’s very supportive of the environmental agenda in my
administration. Where’s she’s not supportive [is] she says she won’t raise a single penny in taxes
on the corporate side and on wealthy people.”
- President Joe Biden (Wagner and Hayes 2021)
In late 2021, President Joe Biden and Democratic leadership were trying to corral
Democrats in Congress to get behind a large reconciliation spending bill: the so-called “Build Back
Better” bill. Initial proposals for this bill included large increases in spending on social programs
and initiatives to combat climate change; and would pay for these new policies by raising taxes on
corporations and the wealthy. The bill was changed dramatically over the fall of 2021 to appeal to
certain Democrats who were reluctant to support the measure; and the bill was killed after Senator
Joe Manchin of West Virginia publicly announced he could not support the bill, despite the bill
being changed to appeal specifically to his preferences (Friedman and Davenport 2021).
The other Democratic senator who demanded major changes to the bill to get her support
was Senator Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona. As President Biden explained in the above quote from a
CNN town hall, Sinema largely supported the spending portions of the bill, especially the spending
on the environment. Where she disagreed with her party was on how to pay for these programs:
she refused to support raising corporate or individual tax rates and preferred to pay for the bill by
closing existing tax loopholes (Everett and Caygle 2021). This demand was eventually agreed to.
This episode is emblematic of Sinema’s position in the broader Democratic coalition: she largely
goes along with the party on social issues but bucks the party on economic issues. Sinema flipped
a Republican senate seat in 2018 after serving three terms in the House in a state whose partisan
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leanings has been affected by the education realignment. The combination of an increasing Latino
population and white college graduates leaving the Republican Party resulted in several
Democratic victories in Arizona in recent years. After Sinema’s victory in 2018, Joe Biden and
Mark Kelly won presidential and senate elections in 2020, respectively.
While Arizona is now more fertile ground for Democrats, the successes the party has in
states like this come with the addition of certain kinds of elected Democrats in the party’s coalition.
Someone like Sinema reflects the college educated whites who helped elect her to the Senate:
liberal on many social issues but more conservative on economic issues. She is also reflective of
some the findings presented in this dissertation regarding the effect of the education realignment
on party position taking; and may be a portend of what will come to pass in American party politics
in the years that follow.

6.1. Reviewing the Effects of the Education Realignment on Party Position Taking
The education realignment had its strongest effects on party position taking on social
issues. On both the issues of LGBTQ+ rights and environmental protection, I found the education
realignment contributed to the removal of pro-LGBTQ+ and pro-environment Republicans and
anti-LGBTQ+ and anti-environment Democrats in Congress. These Republicans and Democrats
disproportionately came from highly educated and less educated districts and states, respectively.
As voters in these constituencies began to switch parties, this resulted in many of these
constituencies switching parties at the congressional level. Importantly, for party position taking,
Democrats who replaced pro-LGBTQ+ and pro-environment Republicans shared their
predecessor’s stances on these issues; and the same was true for the Republicans who replaced
anti-LGBTQ+ and anti-environment Democrats.
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This resulted in the Democratic caucus in Congress becoming more united on taking liberal
positions on LGBTQ+ rights and environmental protection; and the Republican caucus coalescing
around very conservative positions on these two issue areas. A consequence of this greater
intraparty agreement on these social issues was an increase in polarization between the Democratic
and Republican parties on these issues. This decreases the opportunity for bipartisan action on
either of these issues; and suggests that any significant action in either direction on these issues
will occur when one party controls Congress and the presidency. Advocates for LGBTQ+ rights
and reducing the effects of climate change should focus their energy on electing Democrats and
pressuring the party to spend political capital on legislation that advances these issues. Conversely,
opponents of LGBTQ+ rights and increasing protections for the environment should appeal to
Republicans.
In contrast to the robust findings on how the education realignment affected party position
taking on social issues, its effect on position taking on economic issues is less clear. On the
Republican side, despite the party’s voter base shifting from economically conservative, affluent,
college educated whites to populist, working class, non-college educated whites, the party has not
embraced economic populism or liberalism. It still largely supports less government regulation of
the economy, lower taxes, and free trade. At the same time, there are some signs of change in the
Republican Party, especially among newer members of Congress, many of whom represent less
educated constituencies. They are somewhat more hostile to the interests of corporate America
than Republicans who served in Congress in decades prior. But I emphasize that such findings are
weak at present.
Among Democrats, the findings are more significant. While I found that over time,
economic moderates and conservatives in the Democratic Party came from both less educated and
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highly educated districts and states, the education realignment resulted in the number of Democrats
from the former type of constituency decreasing and the number from the latter increasing.
Whereas in the 1990s and 2000s, most economically conservative Democrats represented working
class, less educated districts and states, today, they represent highly educated areas. Another
important finding is that the previous type of economically conservative Democrat was also often
socially conservative. But the new type of economic conservative is often quite socially liberal.
The member of Congress described in the opening of this chapter, Kyrsten Sinema, is a good
example of this new kind of Democrat. Such Democrats will likely cause friction in the party in
the future on economic policy but will be more likely to support the party’s efforts on social issues.
While the education realignment may not have increased conflict within the parties on
economic policy as predicted, it has at least maintained divisions on economic policy, especially
in the Democratic coalition. This is in sharp contrast to its effect on social issues, where it
contributed to the removal of the members in each party who were the sources of division. Such
findings lend mixed support to the theory I presented that the education realignment would
increase intraparty agreement on social issues and increase disagreement on economic issues.

6.2. What the Education Realignment Tells us about Political Parties
The findings presented in this dissertation on the effects of the education realignment on
party position taking lend support to the argument that social issues drive American party politics
today (Hunter 1991; Brewer and Stonecash 2007; Sides, Tesler and Vavreck 2018; Highton 2020).
As past work on the education realignment argued, it was the parties’ initial polarization on social
issues in the 1960s and 1970s that triggered the realignment in the first place because college
educated voters and non-college educated voters found themselves at odds on social issues with
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the Republican and Democratic parties, respectively (Manza and Brooks 1999; Kitschelt and Rehm
2019; Zingher 2022). The fact that the education realignment had a strong effect on the removal
of socially conservative Democrats and socially liberal Republicans from both parties’ coalitions
in Congress makes sense if the primacy of social issues is to be believed. We would expect college
educated whites to support elect socially liberal Democrats as they shifted partisan affiliations; and
non-college educated whites to elect socially conservative Republicans. This is because social
issues are driving their partisan behavior.
What may be driving their behavior less is economic issues. Despite public opinion
research which found greater educational attainment is associated with greater economic
conservatism, the influx of college educated whites into the Democratic Party and of non-college
educated whites into the Republican Party did not dramatically affect the parties’ stances on
economic issues. While the Republican stasis on economic policy may be explained by arguments
that the party appeals to voters on social issues and lets special interests dictate its positions on
economic issues (Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez 2016; Hacker and Pierson 2020), the lack of
robust results for economic policy may reflect Carmines and Stimson’s (1980) argument about
easy vs. hard issues. They argued easy issues are more likely to drive voting behavior and partisan
realignments than hard issues. Easy issues typically involve symbolic policies that are based on a
“gut feeling” rather than issues which require high levels of political knowledge and/or technical
expertise to develop strong attitudes on. In this framework, social issues are more likely to easy
issues and economic issues are more likely to hard issues. Thus, it may be expected that voters
drive party position taking on easy, social issues rather than hard, economic issues.
Setting aside the findings regarding economic issues, the findings regarding social issues
bolster prior work on party position taking that highlights the power changes in a party’s coalition
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have in changing the kinds of position the party adopts (Wolbrecht 2000; Karol 2009; Schickler
2016; Baylor 2017). In this case, the addition of more college educated whites into the Democratic
Party and more non-college educated whites into the Republican Party helped engineer position
change in both parties on social issues. What happened here also demonstrates the interplay
between parties and voters during periods of partisan realignment. The parties initially polarized
on social issues and voters responded based on educational attainment: they changed their partisan
affiliations and helped to elect politicians in their new parties who reflected their positions on
social issues (and to a lesser extent, economic issues). This likely then led to further waves of
realignment and party position change. The iterative nature of this process may serve as a model
for other instances of partisan realignment: it is important to account for the interplay between
voters and elites in any instance of realignment and party position change. Doing so allows us to
better understand how these events typically unfold.
Part of how the events surrounding the education realignment unfolded is that much of the
position change at the elite level was produced through elite replacement rather than elite
conversion. While there were undoubtedly many Democrats and Republicans in Congress who
shifted their positions on the three issue areas studied in this dissertation, I did not find significant
evidence for such conversion being related to the education realignment. Where the education
realignment had an effect was through elite replacement, and primarily through the replacement
of Democrats and Republicans with members of the opposing party. The education realignment
resulted in many congressional districts and states flipping to the other party in recent decades.
This change at the electoral level led to changes in Congress in terms of the composition of both
parties’ coalitions described above. I argue that when it comes to realignments, and particularly
ones which have a geographic nature as the education realignment does since educational
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attainment is not evenly distributed across the country, replacement should be more consequential
than conversion when it comes to party position change. This builds on Karol’s (2009) theory that
party position change stemming from the incorporation of new groups in a party’s coalition should
involve replacement more than conversion. A new group entering a party’s coalition at the
electoral level should come with new politicians entering that coalition at the elite level.

6.3. Avenues for Future Research on the Education Realignment
While the education realignment began decades ago, it is still ongoing and the divide
between whites with and without a college education only appears to be growing in recent electoral
cycles. Because of this, there should be many more opportunities to study the contours of this
realignment and its consequences for party position taking in the future. There are likely many
more issue areas that are affected by the education realignment than the three studied here,
especially when it comes to social issues. This dissertation found very similar patterns between
the two social issues, LGBTQ+ rights and the environment. It would be worthwhile to look at other
social issues, such as abortion rights, racial equality, and gun control, to see if these patterns hold
up or if there are significant differences.
More work should be done on the relationship between the education realignment and
economic issues. This dissertation found an unexpectedly weak relationship between the education
realignment and party position taking on economic regulation. This could reflect a weaker tie
between constituent opinion and legislative behavior on economic issues as discussed earlier, but
it could also be that the effects of this realignment have yet to come to fruition. I did find a growing
number of Republicans in Congress from less educated districts and states who took somewhat
less orthodox positions on economic regulation compared to their co-partisans. As these members
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become more numerous and influential in the party, their different economic positions may
become more prominent. Thus, it would be useful to look back at Republican position taking on
the economy in the years to come.
Similarly, further work needs to be done on how the education realignment is affecting
Democratic position taking on the economy. This dissertation found that the education realignment
has helped to maintain a significant number of economic moderates and conservatives in the
Democratic caucus in Congress. At the same time, there is a growing number of progressives and
self-identified democratic socialists in the party; and they have more influence than in years past.
How does the Democratic Party reconcile these ideological differences within its caucus? Which
group will be more successful at shaping party policy? These are questions that should guide
further research on the Democratic Party; and answers to such questions can contribute to our
understanding of coalition dynamics within political parties.
Beyond the questions that remain after this project, there are many more opportunities to
explore the education realignment. While the education divide is primarily among white
Americans, recent elections showed signs of a smaller but growing divide among non-white
Americans. While non-whites still overwhelmingly vote Democratic in elections, recent gains
were made by Republicans among non-white voters. These gains were concentrated among nonwhites without a college education.78 If such trends continue and educational attainment divides
the non-white vote, what does that mean for both parties? Of particular interest for party position
taking would be how this may affect the Republican Party: does absorbing non-whites without a
college degree affect the party’s stances on policies which concern race?

78

The trend appears to be stronger among Latinos than blacks (Igielnik, Keeter, and Hartig 2021). Gains among blacks
are concentrated among men (Ostfeld and Garcia 2020).
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Finally, this dissertation explored party position taking at the national level in Congress,
but how has the education realignment affected party position taking and policymaking at the state
level? With state legislative districts being more numerous and smaller geographically than
congressional districts, there is much more variation in the level of educational attainment at the
state level than at the national level. This may allow the effects of the education realignment to be
even more stark in terms of how many legislative seats flip parties and how those changes at the
electoral level filter up to the policy level. Further research should explore the educational
realignment at the state and local levels to get a more accurate understanding of how this education
realignment is changing American politics.
But even if the study is confined to the national level, as was the case in this dissertation,
it is evident that the education realignment is real, it is growing, it affects what the Democratic and
Republican parties currently look like, and the kinds of positions both parties choose to take.
Education must be placed alongside race, class, and gender as a key identity that divides and shapes
American politics today.
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Appendix I. Public Opinion Data
The data used for the various public opinion figures in this dissertation are as follows:
1. Figures 2.1 and 2.2
a. Source: American National Elections Study, Cumulative Data File 1948-2020
b. Variable: Party Identification of Respondent – 7-point Scale (VCF0301)
2. Figure 3.2
a. Source: General Social Survey
b. Variable: Homosexual sex relations (homosex)
3. Figure 3.3
a. Source: General Social Survey
b. Variable: Homosexuals should have right to marry (marhomo)
4. Figure 3.4
a. Source: American National Elections Study, Cumulative Data File 1948-2020
b. Variables:
i. Services to same-sex couples (V201406)
ii. Does R favor/oppose laws protect gays/lesbians against job discrimination
(V201412)
iii. Transgender policy (V201409)
5. Figure 4.2
a. Source: General Social Survey
b. Variable: Improving & protecting environment (natenvir)
6. Figure 4.3
a. Source: General Social Survey
b. Variables:
i. Worry too much about envir, too little econ (grnecon)
ii. Pay higher taxes to help envir? (grntaxes)
iii. U.S. protect environment (usdoenuf)
iv. Environmental threats exaggerated (grnexagg)
v. Member of envir group (grngroup)
7. Figure 4.4
a. Source: American National Elections Survey, 2019 Pilot Study
b. Variables:
i. Increased government regulations on businesses that produce greenhouse
emissions (gw1)
ii. Higher fuel efficiency standards for cars and trucks (gw2)
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8. Figure 5.2
a. Source: American National Elections Survey, Cumulative Data File 1948-2020
b. Variable: Govt handle economy or free market can (VCF9132)
9. Figure 5.3
a. Source: American National Elections Survey, Cumulative Data File 1948-2020
b. Variable: Thermometer – labor unions (VCF0210)
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